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PREFACE
On November 11, 1965, Ian Smith, Prime Minister of Rhodesia, proclaimed his country's unilateral declaration of independence (UDI)
from Great Britain,

His proclamation set off a storm of protest

around the world from the United States to the Soviet Union,
criticisms were generally the same:

The

the white minority government of

Rhodesia was accused of ille gally seizing power,

Although most

countries felt that the Rhodesian UDI was a British colonial problem,
leaders from Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and Zambia convened in Nairobi ,
Kenya, to discuss the potential need of taJcing matters out of British
hands.

The issue to them was more than Rhodesia's illegal declara-

tion of independence from Britain,

It had racial overtones as well

for the Smith government was one of the last remnants of white western colonialism in Africa,
The UDI was a turning point in Rhodesian and world affairs,

It

legitimized white minority rule, and it de-emphasized the issue of
black majority rights.
same.

Today in 1978, the situation is much the

Britain has not recognized Rhodesia as an independent state,

and the white minority government of Ian Smith still maintains tight
control over the vast African majority.
I have selected the Rhodesian crisis for my Master's Thesis in
Political Science because it focuses on a number of important issues
in international affairs:

human rights and majority rule; colonial-

ism and Third World African independence; the effectiveness of the
vi

United Nations as an international peacekeeper; and major power politics,

It is these issues with which I will be concerned in the

following pages,
The major purpose in this paper is twofold:

(1) to analyze the

role of the United Nations in trying to resolve the Rhodesian crisis

1965-1978 , concluding with an assessment of its successes, failures,
and effectiveness or ineffectiveness as an international mediator;
and (2) to assess the impact of other external and internal pressures
on the Smith regime, including the protracted guerrilla war in Rhodesia and the possibility of major power confrontation in southern
Africa,
In analyzing the Rhodesian crisis from 1965 to the present, I
will divide the thesis into two parts,

Part I will deal with the

role of the United Nations in the Rhodesian issue,

Within this

section, Chapter I will give a brief background to the crisis and
will explain the constitutional problem of illegal independence
faced by Britain,

Chapter II will explain how the Rhodesian crisis

attained international dimensions,

The human rights issue of

majority rule, the United Nations concern with international peace
and security, and the organization's eventual decision to implement
economic sanctions against Rhodesia will be examined,

Chapter III

will deal with the actual implementation of United Nations sanctions,
Chapter IV will focus on the effectiveness and ineffectiveness of
economic sanctions.

Chapter V will conclude with an evaluation of

the role of the United Nations as an effective and/or ineffective
mediator in Rhodesia,
vii

Whereas Part I will focus on the role of the United Nations and
the use of economic sanctions in trying to resolve the Rhodesian
crisis, Part II will concentrate on related dimensions of the problem:

the impact of an escalating guerrilla war on the viability of

the Smith regime; the role of primary and secondary actors in the
outcome of the crisis; and the place of southern Africa (Rhodesia) in
contemporary world affairs.

Chapter VI will emphasize the failure

of negotiations to bring majority rule to Rhodesia,

Chapters VII

and VIII will focus on the major groups involved in resolving the
crisis -- the Smith regime, the African moderates, and the nationalist guerrillas as well as South Africa and the front-line states -and their influence on the outcome,

Chapter IX will show how the

Rhodesian problem has been internationalized to include participation
by the United States and the Soviet Union as well as Red China,
Chapter X will contain some concluding reflections on the Rhodesian
question and the future of the African state of Zimbabwe,

viii

PART I
ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

1

7
I.

NATURE OF THE CRISIS

Pre-UDI History of British Involvement
The Rhodesian

1

crisis 1965-1978 can only be understood if one

looks at past internal developments in the country.

Rhodesia is a

multiracial society in which blacks outnumber whites approximately
25 to 1,

2

but in which economic and political power is vested in the

hands of the white minority.

It has been this way since t he turn of

the twentieth century when white Europeans began to settle in Rhodesia and call the country their home.

The small white minority is

economically and politically dominant and is primarily responsible
for the growth of Rhodesia because it provides most of the professional, administrative, and managerial skills as well as technological
know-how.
Rhodesia was first settled in 1890 by a group of 200 white settlers and several hundred mercenaries selected by Cecil Rhodes, one
year after he had received a British royal charter to form the British South Africa Company.

'Ihe charter granted Rhodes authority to

settle in Salisbury and administer the land to the north of the
South African Republic and west of Portuguese territories for twentyfive years. 3
By 192.3, after many years of fighting between the white settlers
and local African tribes, company rule was abolished, and Rhodesia
was granted constitutional status as a self-governing colony of the
Brit ish Crown.

Under the 192.3 Constitution, political and economic
2

3
power was concentrated in the hands of the white minority.

There were

also powers reserved for the British which allowed them to protect
the African population against discriminatory legislation.

However,

these reserve powers were never used because the British Parliament
refused to legislate for internal Rhodesian affairs.
The character of the white society, therefore, developed as a
result of many factors:

the settlers' desire to claim Rhodesia as

their homeland; the struggle against the local Ndebele and Shona
peoples who had taken up arms against the settlers; the settlers'
aspiration for political autonomy; and the superiority of white values and interests in the development of the area,

The early conflict

situation with the natives was replaced by a kind of paternalism in
which the African was subservient to his white master. 4
In the years following the British granting of self-governing
colonial status to Rhodesia, there were three major objectives that
dominated Rhodesian development: 5

the preservation of the privileged

status of whites and the exploitation of blacks; the creation of a
"greater Rhodesia" by extension of European control into territories
to the north of Salisbury; and achievement of i ndependence from
Britain,
The white minority passed a great deal of legislation designed
to enhance its economic and political control over the country.

The

Land Apportionment Act qf 1930, later replaced by the Land Tenure
Act of 1969, became the basis of Rhodesia's social, economic, and
racial structure.

This act allocated over

30%

of the land, includ-

ing most of Rhodesia's arable land, for European use, while the

balance was reserved for the Africans,

This act has been modified a

number of times so that today although whites comprise only
the population, they have been allotted

5%

of

5C1/o of the best land, while

Africans and others who comprise 95% of the population, receive the
same amount of land.

6 The Land Apportionment Act did not allow

Africans to own property or occupy premises in towns.

Because the

act has been regarded by whites as evidence of their privileged position and as a source of racial discrimination by blacks, it is a
major source of bitterness between the two races.
Voting restrictions since 1923 have denied Africans effective
participation in the political process.

Various legislation has

denied all but a few blacks the right to vote.

Under Rhodesian law,

Africans must meet financial, property ownership, or educational
standards to qualify to vote. 7 In addition, the Unlawful Organizat ion Act, the Preventive Detention Act of 1959, and the Law and
Order Maintenance Act of 1960 have prevented African groups and
individuals from organizing effective resistance to discriminatory
white policies.
As early as 1924, the possible polit ical amalgamation of Northern (Zambia) and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Malawi) was discussed,

The primary reason for this potential union was economic,

It was felt that Southern Rhodesia, using manpower from Nyasaland,
could provide the expertise and power (coal) to develop the mineral
wealth of Northern Rhodesia.

In addition , it was also felt that an

amalgamation would consolidate the white minorities in each country.
Although a conference between Northern and Southern Rhodesia was held

5
in 1935 and serious consideration was given to possible unification,
no action was taken because the conference felt that the discriminatory policies of Southern Rhodesia would conflict with British commitments to Africans in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland,
With urging by whites in Northern and Southern Rhodesia and
agreement by the British government, however , the union of the three
areas into the Central African Federation became a reality in 1952 ,
Although one reason for the federation was economic in nature, another
was that Britain was also interested in developing a multiracial
society.

It failed, however , because African desires for independence

conflicted with European desires to maintain their privileged positions.

When Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland achieved independence

during 1962-63, Southern Rhodesia was left on its own, and the
European desire for independence intensified,
Race became an even bigger issue in the drive for independence,
The new Constitution of 1961 gave Africans only token participation
in the political system,

This was an important document for the

white minority because Britain surrendered its right to veto discriminatory legislation,

Even though Britain's reserve powers were re-

placed by a Declaration of Rights designed to provide equal enjoyment of fundamental rights and freedom for all individuals, regardless of race, discrimination remained because the Land Apportionment
Act and the stringent security laws stayed intact,
Africans were only allowed 15 out of
Assembly.

In addition,

65 members in the Legislative

Because of the continuing political, economic, and social

inequities, African nationalist groups boycotted the 1962 elections,

6
at which time European support passed from the moderate United Federal
Party of Sir Edgar Whitehead to the white supremacist, right-wing Rhodesian Front Party of Ian Smith.

The Rhodesian Front highlighted its

election campaign by :promising "separate development" of the races.

8

African :political support was split between the Zimbabwe African
People's Union (Z.APU), founded in 1961, and the Zimbabwe African
National Union (ZAND), founded in 1963. 9 Both parties were banned
and their leaders arrested and placed in detention for ten years

(1964-1974) in light of increased terrorist activities and militant
African demands for majority rule.

Europeans were fearful that Afri-

can majority rule, with the blessing of the British Crown, would
destroy their privileged role in Rhodesia,

As a result, European

demands for a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) began to
surface,

On the eve of the Rhodesian UDI the situation, therefore,

looked something like this:

both the British Labor and Conservative

parties were committed to a policy of withholding independence from
Rhodesia until its government agreed to broaden the base of its
franchise.

They had established the claim that independence on the

basis of the 1961 Constitution was a cceptable only if it applied to
the people of Rhodesia as a whole.

10

Britain was not willing to

grant Rhodesia independence based on its established racial :policies.
The Rhodesian Front Party, on the other hand, supported overwhelmingly in the 1965 general election, was advocating independence as the
only alternative to British-imposed majority rule.
As early as February 1964, Britain warned Rhodesia of the dire

11

consequences of a unilateral declaration of independence o

Later,

7
Prime Minister Harold Wilson on two separate occasions indicated the
seriousness with which Britain viewed a UDI.

In October 1964, he said ,

The British government cannot believe that once
the consequences (of an UDI) have been made clear,
the government and people of Southern Rhodesia will
take an irrevocable step of this kind.12
Then in April 1965, he warned the Smith regime of possible economic
sanctions and United Nations or Commonwealth interference in Rhodesia's
affairs if Rhodesia initiated an illegal independence move:
Rhodesia cannot hope to defy Britain, the whole of
the Commonwealth, nearly the whole of Africa, and
the United Nations.13
Unilateral Declaration of Independence
Despite negotiations between Rhodesia and Britain and the numerous British warnings concerning the consequences of UDI, the selfgoverning colony and its mother country were not able to resolve their
differences over the issue of black majority participation in government, and Rhodesia declared its independence on November 11, 1965,

14

knowing full well that its act would be criticized by the Commonwealth
and the United Nations.
The British responded to UDI by implementing the following policies:

recalling the British High Commissioner and expelling his Rho-

desian counterpart; excluding Rhodesia from the sterling area ; refusing to recognize Rhodesian passports; requesting Rhodesian civil
servants not to help the rebels' cause and asking Rhodesian armed
forces not to take up arms in favor of the r ebel government ; barring
Rhodesia from the Commonwealth Preference area; preventing the

8

exportation of capital and arms to Rhodesia; imposing economic sanctions on sugar and tobacco.
Harold Wilson viewed UDI as "an act of rebellion against the
Crown and against the Constitution, 1115 and he was confident that
Britain would have on its side "not only the support of the House (of
Commons), not only the support of the nations of the world, but ••• the
clear and decisive verdict of history. 1116

The initial sanctions and

other British policies were described as non-punitive and were designed to restore Rhodesia to a state of constitutional legality in
which there would be loyalty to the British Crown and a government
acting in the interests of all Rhodesians. 17

It is also worth not-

ing that the British leaders, from Arthur Bottomley, Secretary of
State for Commonwealth Relations, to Prime Minister Wilson, affirmed
Britain's position not to use force to resolve the Rhodesian problem,

18
The roots of the Rhodesian crisis and the ultimate confronta-

tion between Britain and Rhodesia can be summarized in terms of the
economic and political distribution of power in Rhodesia as well as
in the general feeling among white Rhodesians that their culture is
superior to that of the blacks.

To the Europeans, land has meant

the acquisition of wealth and ultimately the consolidation of white
political power resulting in their privileged social status,

The

whites believe that they are deserving of a special political power
role and also land ownership rights by virtue of the fact that they
have developed Rhodesia into a modern civilization,

To the Africans,

on the other hand, the Europeans represent the dispossession of their

9
land and the violation of their dignity.

This condition has not

only caused bitterness between the races, but it also helped initiate
the constitutional crisis with Britain in 1965.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER I
1. I will refer to the problem at hand as the Rhodesian crisis, despite the fact that Rhodesia has not been officially recognized as a
sovereign nation by any country or international organization. In the
eyes of the international community, the territory's official name,
developed during British colonial times , is still Southern Rhodesia.
The term Rhodesia, however, is shorter and is a more commonly-used
description.
2. Depending on which census figures one uses, the ratio of blacks
to whites varies from 20 to 1 to 25 t o 1. In _____ Africa South
of the Sahara 1977-78. London: Europa Publications Limited, 1 9 ~
p. 692 , the 1976 population is estimated to be 6,530 ,000 including
6 ,220,000 Africans, 277 ,000 Europeans of Rhodesian, South African, or
British origin, and 21 ,400 Asians and Coloureds.
3. Carter, Gwendolen and O'Meara, Patrick (ed.), Southern Africa in
Crisis. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1977 , p. 17.
4.

loc. cit., Po 19.

5. Windrich , Elaine, The Rhodesian Problem.
Kegan Paul, 1965, p. xv~

London:

Routledge and

6. Houser, George M., Rhodesia to Zimbabwe--~ Chronology 18JO to
1976. New York: The Africa Fund, 1977, p. 2. At present 45 million acres, 71% of Rhodesia's total grade 1 (most arable) land is
owned by whites, and 45 million acres, almost 50% of which is poor
farming land, is owned by blacks. Blacks, therefore, average 7.3
acres per individual, while whites average 162 acres per individual.
7. Under the 1923 Constitution high franchise qualification excluded virtually the entire African population from voting. Under the
1969 Constitution, for example , only 6645 Africans out of 5 million
qualified to vote.
8. See Windrich, op. cit., p. 48 for an explanation of the
principles of the Rhodesian Front's platform.
9 . The name Zimbabwe comes from the Shona word "Dzimbabwe" meaning "house of stones
Although the term was not brought into contemporary political usage until the 1960's by the two black nationallist political parties, it has nevertheless represented opposition to
white colonial rule since the time of white settlement in the area.
ZAPU and ZANU are named after the great Zimbabwe ruins, located near
Fort Victoria about 220 miles southeast of Salisbury. These ruins
have been identified as the center of a pre-colonial African state
system, See Houser, op. cito, p. 2.
10
0 "

11

10. See Windrich, op o cit., p. 205 referring to the message dated
September 21, 1965, from Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Arthur Bottomley, to the Prime Minister of Rhodesia, Ian
Smith, in which the followine; Five Principles for Rhodesian Independence were explained: (1) the principle and intention of unimpeded progress toward majority rule would have to be maintained and
guaranteed; (2) there would have to be guarantees against retrogressive amendment of the Constitution; (3) there would have to be immediate improvement in the political status of the African population;
(4) there would have to be progress towards ending racial discrimination; (5) the British government would need to be satisfied that any
basis for independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as
a whole.
11. Windrich, op. cit., p. 208, citing Letter of Commonwealth
Secretary Duncan Sandys to Rhodesian Front Prime Minister Winston
Field in February, 1964.
12. Kapungu, Leonard, The United Nations and Economic Sanctions
Against Rhodesia. Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C, Heath, 1973, p. 4,
citing British Information Services document T38 October 27, 1964,
13, See British Parliamentary Debates,
April 29, 1965.

Vol. 711, #655, Col, 639,

14. It is interesting to note that this was the first UDI in British history since 1776. Between 1776 and 1965 Britain and her
colonies had always been able to reach agreement on independence and
the constitutional system.
15. British Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 718, #671, Col. 353,
November 11, 1965,
16.

ioc. cit., Col, 356.

17.

loc, cit o, Colo 359,

18. British Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 720-21, #672, Col. 538,
November 12, 1965.

II.

UNITED NATIONS INVOLVEMENT

Rhodesia's UDI created two major conflicts,

The first presented

Britain with a constitutional crisis since UDI was perceived as an
act of rebellion,

The second presented the United Nations and the

international community with a problem because the Rhodesian situation attained international proportions,
In examining UDI and the conflicts it created, it is important to
look at the crucial issues:

human rights and majority rule; colonial-

ism; the initial United Nations involvement in the crisis; the combined role of the United Nations and Britain in trying to handle the
problemo

Since all of these issues are intertwined, they will be

examined as a group,
Pre-UDI Considerations 1961-1965
In 1960 a new source of anti-colonial influence developed in the
United Nations with the passage of Resolution 1514 (XV) on the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples, more popularly known as the "Anti-colonial Manifestoo"
resolution provided t hat:
Immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and NonSelf-Governing Territories or all other Territories which have not yet attained independence, to
transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or reservations, in
accordance with their freely expressed will and
desire, without any distinctions as to race, creed,
or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete
independence and freedom,1

12

This

1.3
In 1961 a Special Committee on the Situation With Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples was established to review areas covered by
Resolution 1514 (YY).

2

With the establishment of this Special Com-

mittee, anti-colonial forces showed that they had enough votes to
make the abolition of colonialism a major issue in the General Assembly, and , according to David Kay, that they were sophisticated enough
to develop a political vehicle by which they could attain their objectives .3

From the time of its inception, the Special Committee

included a substantial anti-colonial majority with representation from
eight Afro-Asian nations, two Soviet bloc nat ions, two Latin American
states , two Western European states, Yugoslavia, United States, and
Australia .

When the Special Committee's membership was increased in

1962 from seventeen to twenty-four , four of the new members were
Afro-Asian states.
Much of the impetus behind the anti-colonial forces' push for
power came when African and Asian nations expressed concern at
Britain's support for the new constitution in Rhodesia in 1961.

De-

spite the fact that Africans were given their first representation
in the Rhodesian Parliament, the new constitution restricted their
franchise through a two-role voting system, and political power was
still heavily concentrated in the hands of whites.

This situation

greatly alarmed the African nations, but perhaps more importantly,
they did not agree with Britain's absolution of its veto in Rhodesian
legislation in exchange for references in the constitution to
majority rule and a promise not to implement future discriminatory

14
legislation.

As a result, a Subcommittee on Southern Rhodesia was

established by the Special Committee of Twenty-four to study the
future of the territory.

11,

The crucial issue was whether Rhodesia was self-governing or
non-self-governing.

Its interpretation by Britain was the determin-

ing factor in how the Rhodesian situation was subsequently handled,
After receiving a recommendation from the Subcommittee on Southern
Rhodesia that "the situation in Southern Rhodesia should be considered by the General Assembly,,,as a matter of urgency, 115 the Special
Committee endorsed the recommendation and, in addition, decided that
Southern Rhodesia was non-self-governing within the meaning of
Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter and requested Britain to do
the following :

6

overturn the 1961 Rhodesian Constitution to restore

civil liberties in Rhodesia; apply the 1960 Anti-colonial Manifesto;
and repeal those Rhodesian laws which supported discrimination,

The

committee requested that the matter be considered by the General
Assembly at its resumed sixteenth session.

Its decision that Rho-

desia was non-self-governing was affirmed by the General Assembly in
June 1962, with the passage of Resolution 1747 (XVI), initiated by a

38 member Afro-Asian group as a moderate alternative to the more
sweeping draft proposed by the Special Committee, 7 While it declared
that Rhodesia was a non-self-governing territory, it avoided requiring Britain to annul the 1961 Constitution as the Special Committee
had wanted,

It did request Britain:

to undertake urgently the convening of a constitutional conference •• , which would insure the
rights of the majority of the people in conformity

15
with the principles of the Charter of the United
Nations and the Declaration on the granting of
8
independence to colonial countries and peoples,,,
The General Assembly, acting under the pressures of anti-colonial
Afro-Asian political forces, tried to promote majority rule in Rhodesia,

According to Leo Cefkin, 9 it was their purpose to establish

that Rhodesia was non-self-governing under Chapter XI of the Charter
so that Britain could be held responsible for bringing about independence under majority rule as stated in Resolution 1514 (Y:v), thereby eliminating the situation where the vast majority of the African
population had no voting rights or political impact on the establishment of a new constitution.
Resolution 1747, however, conflicted with the British position
that Rhodesia was self-governing.

After failing initially to resist

the Special Committee's demand that the Rhodesian situation was a
matter of urgency, thereby thwarting the Committee's goal of forcing

10 Br1·tain
.
. count ere d th e supa Genera1 A.ssembl y vo-ue on th e issue,
porters of the draft resolution by arguing that Rhodesia had been
autonomous since 1923 and that London's authority had been limited to
external relations, and that, therefore, Britain was powerless to
overturn the 1961 Constitution.

The British delegation argued that

the draft resolution did not address the constitutional limitations
on London's power to change the Rhodesian constitution:

"It asks

us to do things, such as the convening of another constitutional conference, that we cannot do alone."

11

At the same time that Britain called Rhodesia self-governing,
it also stated that Rhodesia was not fully independent either and

16
was, therefore, beyond the jurisdiction of the United Nations and
still within London's authority.

12

As pointed out by the British

delegation, United Nations intervention in the administration of dependent territories in circumstances precluded by the Charter was
"objectionable" and "dangerous, 1113

In addition, Britain continued to

maintain that it could not provide information required under Article
73e of the United Nations Charter because being self-governing, Rhodesia did not supply it.
During the 1962-1965 period, the issue of non-self-governing
versus self-governing continued to be argued between the British and
their supporters and the anti-colonial forces of the Third World.
What is important is that, at that point in time, there was a consensus in the United Nations on one major point:
was primarily a British problem.

the Rhodesian crisis

The United Nations only had an

indirect role to play in resolving that crisis.

It was a lobby of

Afro-Asian nations which tried to pressure Britain into using effective measures to deal with the Rhodesian white minority regime,

The

ultimate objective of the anti-colonial bloc of nations was to have
Rhodesia adopt majority rule rather than to allow it to maintain white
autonomy.

The Third World wanted a new constitution for Rhodesia

based on one man-one-vote, thereby assuring black majority rule.
That is why those nations argued that the Rhodesian problem was an
urgent matter.

They felt it deserved that kind of attention, espec-

ially because the 1961 Constitution had been opposed by the vast
majority of Africans,

And that is why they forced the issue of

Rhodesia's non-self-governing status to a vote in the General Assembly.

17
The Afro-Asian bloc felt that while white Rhodesians maintained an
autonomous position, that circumstance did not override the absence
of self-government for the African majority, as restrictions on African participation were characteristic of colonial rather than self-

.
governing
si·tua t·ions. 14
Despite the Special Committee's studies and demands and the subsequent supportiye United Nations resolutions, no progress was made
toward forcing Britain or the Rhodesian white regime to change their
positions.

While the Special Committee of Twenty-four and the entire

General Assembly were able to achieve their i nitial objective of
focusing world attention on the discriminatory government of Rhodesia, they were unable by 1965 to pressure Britain into providing results to meet their demands for black majority rule in Rhodesia.

As

a result, the Afro-Asian nations became more forceful in their use
of United Nations operationa).. procedures and more outspoken in their
demands, attempting to have what they called the "urgent" and "explosive situation" in Southern Rhodesia considered by the UN Security
Councii. 15

They also openly criticized Britain for its "persistant

refusal" to cooperate in the implementation of United Nations poli.
. 16
cies
on R'h od esia.
Security Council Involvement
The African states had great success in bringing resolutions to
the General Assembly and getting them passed.

They were unsuccess-

ful, however, in gaining the support of the Security Council, at
least prior to lIDI.

'Ihe first major confrontation in the Security

i8
Council occurred after the dissolution of the Central African Federation in 1963,

The Africans of Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and

Nyasaland (Malawi) had achieved :political control over their internal
affairs and desired independence and the severing of ties with
Southern Rhodesia,

They achieved this objectibe by 1963, after gain-

ing their independence from Britain,

However, division of the :prop-

erty of the Federation, namely the transfer of the armed forces and
aircraft, created a conflict between Britain and the African nations,
The Afro-Asian bloc of the Security Council asked Britain not to
"transfer 'powers and attributes of sovereignty' until the Southern
Rhodesian regime became representative of all of its :peo:ple, 1117

The

British refused to side with the Afro-Asian bloc and vetoed the resolution, arguing that since the forces and equipment belonged to
Southern Rhodesia prior to the Federation, they should revert back
to that territory's contro1,

18

The Security Council again considered the Rhodesian case in
April 1965, in light of the United Nations concern that Ian Smith,
Prime Minister of Rhodesia, would declare a unilateral declaration
of independence,

A moderate resolution, calling on Britain and all

other states to refrain from recognizing an independent Rhodesia and
asking Britain to :promote independence according to the desires of
the majority of the Rhodesian people, passed over the initial criticisms of the Soviet Union, 19
Ironically, it was not the :pressure from the African states, but
rather Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence on November
11, 1965, which accomplished the objective sought by the African
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nations in the preceding years--the direct involvement of the United
Nations Security Council.

And even more ironically, it was Britain

which initiated action in the Security Council.
Al though the General Assembly was first to react to UDI when it
passed a resolution condemning the act and asking Britain to end the
rebellion and the Security Council to consider the situation as a
matter of urgency,

20

there is no evidence, according to Cefkin, to

indicate that the Assembly's position influenced to a significant
extent the position of Britain or Rhodesia.

21

In fact, British warn-

ings during the negotiations just prior to UDI, that it would not be
able to control the actions of the United Nations, did not prevent
Smith from declaring UDI.

22

Because of the description in the United Nations Charter, the
role of the General Assembly is limited to discussion and adoption
of recommendations to members of the organization or specifically
the Security Council. 23

Its decisions are not binding on all members.

The Security Council, on the other hand, has broader powers than those
designated for the General Assembly.

It is given power to not only

investigate disputes or situations which are likely to endanger the
maintenance of international peace and security,

24

but also to de-

cide what measures should be taken to maintain or restore international peace and security. 25

In addition, according to the Charter,

its decisions are binding on all United Nations members.

26

At the request of Britain the Security Council met on November
12, 1965, to discuss the Rhodesian crisis,

The focus of United

Nations involvement shifted from the General Assembly to the Security
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Council.

Michael Stewart, British Foreign Minister, asked for sup-

port of British measures, which included, as already noted, the recall of the British High Commissioner, the cessation of arms
exports, the exclusion of Rhodesia from the sterling area, and
the ban on imports of tobacco and sugar. 27

He admitted that the

establishment of an illegal minority regime was a matter of world
concern:
The question of Rhodesia and the extent to which
this can create a difficult situation in Africa
and the Commonwealth makes it a matter of world
concern and those who deny this are burying their
heads in the sand.28
He also reaffirmed Britain's position not to use force to solve the
Rhodesian problem.

29

That same day the UN Security Council passed

Resolution 216 condemning UDI and calling upon member states "not to
recognize the illegal racist minority regime in Southern Rhodesia and
to refrain from rendering any assistance to the illegal regime. 1130
It is necessary to stress the significance of the status of the
Rhodesian crisis on November 12, 1965.

Even though Britain asked the

United Nations for support for its policies, the Wilson administration still wanted it to be "clearly and unmistakenly" understood that
it was a "British responsibility to reestablish the rule of law in
Southern Rhodesia and not the United Nations!

31 Britain, in fact,

was abandoning its position that it did not have the right to interfere in Rhodesia's internal affairs, but it did ·waht the ' United Nations to stay out.
The major argument in favor of the British position was that
somebody else would have raised the issue at the United Nations if

21
the British had not.

Since Britain feared potential communist involve-

ment in Rhodesia under United Nations legitimacy, it wanted to make
sure that it controlled the initiative on all further action on Rhodesia.32

As a result, British involvement with the Security Council

precluded the possibility of independent United Nations action.
Transfer of British Colonial Problem to United Nations
After UDI the British continued to regard the Rhodesian problem
as their constitutional crisis.

In speaking to the United Nations

General Assembly in December 1965, Prime Minister Wilson again rejected the use of force, denied the practicality of immediate majority
rule, and appealed for international support for economic sanctions:
In theory and under constitutional law, this is
a bilateral matter between the British Parliament,
who alone has the responsibility of decision in
Rhodesia, and the people of Rhodesia ••• We accept
the responsibility for dealing with this matter
because it is our responsibility ••• But having
embarked on a series of measures of unprecedented
severity.,.we have the right to ask every Member
of the Assembly to give us their fullest support. 33
There was evidence, however, that the sanctions which began as
a unilateral action by Britain against Rhodesia were proceeding to a
more universal action by the United Nations,

The British continued

to feel the pressure of greater Security Council demands,

The pas-

sage of Resolution 217 (November 22, 1965) called on Britain to put
an end to the "grave situation" in Rhodesia and said that its "continuance in time constitutes a threat to international peace and
security. 34
11

It called on Britain to take all appropriate measures

to eliminate the power of the Smith regime and called on states to
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desist from providing Rhodesia with arms, equipment, military materials, and to do their utmost to break economic relations, including
an embargo on oil and petroleum products. 35

The United Nations role

began as an extension of the British policy of instituting sanctions ,
which were intended to restore Rhodesia to a state of legality.

The

significance of Resolution 217 is the reference to the "threat to
international peace and security" because the interpretation of this
:phrase provided the United Nations with grounds for future involvement in the Rhodesian crisis.
In defiance of the Security Council's request for sanctions on
oil, tankers continued to transport oil and petroleum products to
Rhodesia through the port of Beira in Portuguese Mozambique.

As a

result, at the request of Britain the Security Council met, declared
the "situation a threat to peace," and authorized the British to
"prevent by force if necessary" oil arriving at Beira for Rhodesia. 36
The resolution also called on Portugal not to allow oil to be pumped
through Mozambique to Rhodesia. 37

This marked the first time that an

individual state was authorized to carry out a decision of the Security Council.

38

After the failure of the "Tiger" talks, 39 sanctions were
tightened in December 1966, with the passage of Resolution 232.
This time the Security Council called for selective mandatory sanctions on asbestos, iron ore, chrome, pig iron, sugar, copper, meat
and meat products, hides and skins, and leather in addition to arms
and oil. 40

The sanctions, again initiated by the British, were

termed mandatory because failure to comply with them would constitute

2.3
a violation of Article

25 of the Charter,

This was the first time

that the Security Council had ever called for mandatory sanctions,
By the end of 1966, the white Rhodesians, through their ini tiation of UDI, had provoked British as well as international reaction
to their discriminatory policies.

What had begun as a British con-

s t itutional problem had been transformed into an international problem,

This transition was accomplished with the concurrence of the

United Kingdom,
Legality of United Nations Involvement
According to the United Nations Charter,

41

the maintenance of

international peace and security through adjustment or settlement of
disputes or situations must be attained in conformity with the principles of justice and international law,

Although it is not possible

here to provide a comprehensive study of all of the legal problems in
the Rhodesian case, it is necessary to at least highlight the major
issues involved in the United Nations handling of the dispute,
According to Myres McDougal and W. Michael Reisman, 42 arguments
raised for and against United Nations involvement in the Rhodesian
situation focus on two important issues:
1,

the merits of the Security Council's finding of a "threat
to peace,"

2,

the conformity of the Security Council's action to certain
designated policies of the United Nations,

In order for the United Nations to get involved in the first
place and especially to apply mandatory economic sanctions, the
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Security Council had to decide that the case was an international
problem, not just a British one, and that it created "a threat to
international peace and security" under Article 39 of the Charter.
In addition, once that decision was made, the Council, in accordance
with Articles 41 and 42 had to decide how to restore the peace and
make that q_ecision binding.

The question that must be considered

then is whether or not the violation of African rights by a white
minority constitutes a threat to or a violation of peace and justifies United Nations intervention?

Like any legal issue the answer

depends on the interpretation of the facts and arguments , in this
case as they relate to appropriate provisions of the United Nations
Charter.
The basic argument a gainst the legality of United Nations action
in Rhodesia is that the activities of the white minority regime did
not represent a "threat to peace" within the meaning of the Charter. 43
Therefore, no matter how reprehensible the actions of the white
minority may be, they are beyond the jurisdiction of United Nations
action.

Charles Fenwick characterizes the Rhodesian situation as

"primarily a domestic issue between a mother country and its colony
and concludes that it would be better to have 'slower progressv toward
the objective of majority rule rather than magnify the denial of it
into a threat to peace under the Charter. 1144

John Howe11 45 feels

that the assumption of jurisdiction came before a threat to peace
was ever declared.

There are numerous other articles criticizing

United Nations action on the following bases:

that the activities of

the Rhodesian authorities contain no elements of aggression against
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her neighbors and are therefore within the rules of accepted international law;

46

that all activities of the Rhodesian regime have

occurred within the bounds of that territory. 47
Marsha11

48

Charles Burton

perhaps sums up the argument against United Nations action

most effectively when he says,
the globe abounds with situations which do not
accord with the preferences of one government or
another and which, under hypothetical conditions,
might be productive of violence. To construe the
pertinent phrase in Chapter VII as a warrant for
the Security Council to invoke compulsory action
on behalf of those who, because of frustrated
preferences, might conceivably reso:tt to force
is to infer for the U.N. a mission to engender
unending hostilities.
Many international scholars, on the other hand, have supported
the legal action of the United Nations in Rhodesia.

The feeling is

that framers of the United Nations Charter deliberately conferred
upon the Security Council in Chapter VII the responsibility to "determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of peace, or
act of aggression," and a lso to decide what action should be taken
to "maintain or restore international peace and security. ,.49

The

framers rejected specific definitions of "threat to peace," "breach
of peace," "act of aggression," because of potential peculiarities in
each case of threat or coercion, and they gave the Security Council
broad responsibility to define those situations of "threat to peace. 1150
In addition, it can be argued that the action of the Security Council
was also intended to be anticipatory and was not required to await
the commencement of disaster, 51

In this sense the Security Council's

responsibility in Art icle 39 would also be considered preventitive in
nature.5

2
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The broad responsibility of the Security Council to make determinations of "threats to peace" is not absolute.

Each situation must

be examined on its own merits to see if the threat exists.

In addi-

tion, procedural safeguards are established in the Charter with regard to voting procedures by the Security Council members.

They re-

quire a unanimous vote among permanent members and a majority of all
members. 53

It would, therefore, be difficult for the Council to pass

arbitrary legislation not in conformity with the accepted concepts of
international law.
Ralph Zacklin54 indicates that the denial of fundamental rights
anywhere is a threat to international peace and security and violates
the community principles of international public policy of the United
Nations Charter.

Myres McDougal and Michael Reisman55 agree in the

sense that
In terms of substantive merits ••• in the
contemporary world, international peace and
security and the protection of human rights are
inescapably interdependent and that the impact
of the flagrant deprivation of the most basic
human rights of the great man of the people of
a community cannot possibly stop short within the
territorial boundaries in which the physical
manifestations of such deprivation occur first.
The major argument supporting United Nations involvement was
that the "threat" to peace overrode domestic jurisdiction.

While

the Rhodesian rebellion was at first recognized as a domestic problem, the British government obviously felt that the international
ramifications of the act made review by the United Nations politically wise and legally correct. 56

It subsequently internationalized

the problem by initiating resolutions in the Security Council.

The
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fact that France, for one, abstained from those resolutions seems to
Ro~alynn Higgins to be a political argument rather than a legal one:
if the constitutional authority wishes to involve the United Nations
in matters which are otherwise within its own jurisdiction, it certainly has that prerogative. 57

The British, in other words, were

willing to accept the proposition that the Rhodesian crisis was a
"threat to peace."
What is important about the legal aspects of the Rhodesian
crisis is that the Security Council, in conjunction with the British,
determined that the Rhodesian problem was a crisis that endangered
international peace and security, and it did so in an overwhelming
manner.

Although the decision by the Security Council may be con-

sidered a political one, 58 as a matter of law within the articles of
the United Nations Charter, the Council is allowed to make that
choice. 59

Once that decision is made -- once the international body

agrees there is a threat to peace -- the activities that constitute
that threat cease to be "matters essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of a state. 1160
The Security Council felt that the UDI, violation of African
majority rights, and the perpetuation of white supremacy were, at
the very least, a potential threat to peace.

It was this situation

more than Rhodesia's threat of aggression that clouded the future in
southern Africa.
The argument that the activities of white Rhodesians were
within their domestic jurisdiction was not found to be correct by
the Security Council.

Even in the absence of finding of threat to
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peace, the United Nations could have considered the issue on the
grounds that human rights in Rhodesia had been violated.

They could

have accomplished this by using Chapter I, Article 2(7), to allow
them to incorporate a domest ic jurisdiction issue under international

. .

SUperVlSlOno

62

I n retrospect, the evidence tends to support the position that
United Nations majority's point of view on Rhodesia was correct.

The

subsequent fighting between Rhodesian forces and nationalist guerillas, South African troop support for Rhodesia, the involvement of
neighboring Zambia, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Angola, and
the potential conflict between East and West made,and continue to
make,the Rhodesian situation a crisis with international dimensions,
rather than just a constitutional problem for Britain.
In summary, prior to and just after the time of UDI, the Rhodesian situation was considered by the United Nations to be a British problem.

Many other United Nations members had achieved inde-

pendence through rebellion, and Rhodesia was no different.

The UDI

was an illegal act in constitutional law, but i t had no validity in
international law.

The UN General Assembly and Security Council

recognized the Rhodesian crisis within these constitutional constraints by calling on Britain to end the rebellion.

When it became

clear, however, t hat Britain could not or would not quell the rebellion (this issue will be examined later in this thesis), the United
Nations found i tself in a position to try and solve the crisis,
basis for the international community's encroachment into what
seemed to be a domestic matter was British divest iture of the

The
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problem as well as the realization that the denial of human rights
in a volatile area of the world was a "threat to international peace
and security."
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III,

IMPLEMENTATION OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
Definition and Purpose of Sanctions

Prior to showing how sanctions have been applied to Rhodesia, it
is essential first to define them in terms of their aims and objectives,

Although the use of many different kinds of sanctions in

policy decision-making will be mentioned, the primary concern of the
paper will be with economic sanctions and their impact on Rhodesia,
Johan Galtung

1

of the International Peace Research Institute,

Oslo, Norway, defines sanctions as
actions initiated by one or more international
actors (senders) against one or more others
(receivers) with either or both of two purposes:
to punish the receivers by depriving them of
some value and/or to make the receivers comply
with certain norms the senders deem important,
According to Michael Reisman, 2
Sanctions are techniques and strategies for
supporting public order, •• Sanctions are not
legitimized patterns of vengeance, but of
maintenance and improvement of public order,,,
coercive sanctions should be used only when no
lesser sanction will avail or a genuine overriding crisis requires exigent and intensely
coercive action in the defense of public order,
If one begins with these definitions, he must examine both British
and United Nations objectives in using sanctions,

The British objec-

tive in using sanctions as part of their foreign policy was political
in nature,

It was designed to force the Rhodesians to stop their re-

bellion and return to a state of constitutional legality worked out
by the Smith regime and the British government,

34

It was also

35
originally designed, as noted earlier, to be non-punitive.

In fact,

the British tried negotiations before opting for sanctions.

In

addition, force was ruled out from the beginning as a viable British foreign policy toward Rhodesia.

United Nations ob je ctives , on the

other hand, influenced heavily by the Afro-Asian bloc, were in the
beginning and continue to be political -- the defeat of the Smith
regime and its replacement by African majority rule.

The difference

between the two lies in the degree and type of sanctions.

The British

opted for economic sanctions as a last resort while the Afro-Asian
nations called on the British to use military sanctions (force) before
they accepted economic sanctions as a compromise.

The Afro-Asian

nations were not concerned with the methods used in bringing majority
rule to Rhodesia .

They were only interested in the results.

According to J. Kombo Moyana, 3 economist with the United Nations
Council on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), a more specific kind of
sanctions, namely economic ones ,
••• refer to a group of measures applied by one or
more parties to a dispute with a view to partially
or totally cripple the economy of the adversary
party or parties . These measures are designed to
affect the economy of the adversary via the
adversary's exports, imports, and/or external
financial dealings. Partial or total economic
ruin implies personal incomes declines." in the
sanctionee's economy. These income declines would
then be expected to cause enough hardship to the
population to induce desired changes in the policy
of the target government. Economic sanctions are
generally used as a substitute for force.
While it may be true that economic sanctions were used as a substitute
for force, it was no t Britain's intent, at least originally, to totally
or even partially cripple Rhodesia's economy.

The British hoped that
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the threat of economic sanctions would serve first as a deterrent to
Rhodesia's contemplat ion of UDI, and subsequently, as a way of negotiating a new constitution.

The Third World nations of the United

Nations were not as concerned with protecting the economy of Rhodesia
as Britain was.

Again, they desired results

the removal of the

Smith regime from office and its replacement by a government responsible to the African majority.

If that meant using force or crippling

the economy, they were in favor of it.
The crucial question for any nation or group of nations in applying economic sanctions is whether or not they will be effective.

The

degree of effectiveness will be measured primarily in terms of the
economic, the psychological, and the political impact they have in
the country against which the sanctions have been levied.

4

In sum,

economic sanctions would be considered efficient if they make the receiving nation change its policies to comply with those considered
important by the sending nation.

One must remember that economic

sanctions are still regarded as a viable alternative to military
sanctions.

In fact, they are specifically mentioned in the United

Nations Charter as a means of giving effect to the organization:' s
decisions. 5
The key concept in the implementation of sanctions is vulnerability and the mos t important element is concentration.

6

The more a

country's economy depends on one product, the more its exports consist of one product, and the more its imports and exports are concentrated on one trading partner, the more vulnerable the country is
t o economic sanctions.
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British Decision to Invoke Sanctions
The British leadership believed so strongly in the use of sanctions that Prime Minister Harold Wilson said in a communique at a
Commonwealth Prime Ministers 0 meeting in Lagos, Nigeria, in January
1966, that on the basis of "expert advice available to him the cumulative effects of the economic and financial sanctions might well
bring the rebellion to an end within a matter of weeks rather than
months. 117

Rhodesia's vulnerability made the success of sanctions

seem probable, especially since the country was so dependent on
Britain for trade.
At the time of the implementation of economic sanctions, one
study ranked Rhodesia fourth most vulnerable out of a group of fort.y
countries.

8

This report was primarily concerned with external vul-

nerability and incorporated such factors as the importance of imports
and exports and the accessibility of substitute markets.

According

to 1964 statistics, 9 Britain was the largest buyer of Rhodesian
tobacco, importing

50%

of Rhodesia's $117 million earnings.

Tobacco

accounted for one-third of the total export earnings of Rhodesia.
Britain was also the chief source of capital for Rhodesia with British investments amounting to $600 million in 1965.

Commonwealth

trade preferences helped the Rhodesian sugar and tobacco industries.
Sugar, for example, sold at $126/ton as compared to a world price of
$56/ton, thus earning Rhodesia an extra $11.2 million.

Most impor-

tantly,21,9% of Rhodesia's exports were sent to Britain and J0,.3%
of her imports were received from Britain.

In addition, the British
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contribution to Rhodesia's national income through the export sector
was approximately

7%.

Therefore, if Britain cut off her imports, the

national income of Rhodesia would fall by
not find substitute business,

7%,

assuming Rhodesia could

The national income in 1965 was

$1.025 billion of which 39% came from the export sector, 10 Also, the
fact that Rhodesia is a landlocked country made her even more vulnerable to economic sanctions.
The Wilson government felt that economic and financial sanctions
would create enough pressure on the Smith regime from the business
community to cause the government to agree to terms with Britain,
There was at that time evidence of business unrest:

11

the Rhodesian

Tobacco Association was worried that if Commonwealth preferences were
withdrawn, farmers would have to compete with the United States'
tobacco industry on less favorable terms; financial groups feared
the loss of capital from Britain to the point where only 19 out of
294 people who answered the Rhodesian Branch of Institute of Direction were in favor of UDI; the Association of Rhodesian industries
believed economic sanctions would severely cripple the Rhodesian
economy; the Associated Chamber of Commerce said "if Mr. Wilson was
as good as his word, Rhodesia would run short of currency,"

It is

even true that many Rhodesian businessmen were so fearful of sanctions that they exaggerated their economic impact on Rhodesian
. dus t ry.
in
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contribution to Rhodesia's national income through the export sector
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7%,

Therefore, if Britain cut off her imports, the

national income of Rhodesia would fall by
not find substitute business,
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alternative of military intervention.
Three Stage Approach to Sanctions
Britain's attitude and policies toward the Rhodesian crisis
created by UDI were significant in influencing the way economic sanctions were formulated, implemented and enforced .

The British posi-

tion from the beginning is best summed up by the ir United Nations representative George Brown: 13
Our objective throughout has been to compel the
rebel regime to return to legality on terms which
would be manifestly fair and acceptable to the
population of Rhodesia as a whole. Only when
legal government can be established on such terms
can Rhodesia move ahead to genuine independence and
to a stable and prosperous future •.•
As a result, the British instituted two programs to achieve the ret urn of Rhodesia to a state of legality:

the outlawing of the Rho-

desian Front regime; economic pressures designed to show the Rhodesians that there was no future in defying the civilized world.

The

best way to achieve that, according to the British, "was.,.to strike
directly at Rhodesia's earning power by action against the exports
which are most important to it in international trade,.0 1114
At the same time that Rhodesia was a British responsibility, the
crisis also had the reality of being a world concern. 15 While the
British wanted international help for their sanctions policies, their
ultimate goal was to achieve an end to the rebellion by peaceful
means.

They subsequently resisted demands in the General Assembly to

use force to bring about a settlement with the Smith government.

Brit-

ain made it clear that she would veto any mandatory resolution in the

4o
Security Council calling for the use of force in Rhodesia. 16 Prime
Minister Wilson argued that force could plunge Africa into armed conflict beyond the borders of Rhodesia and insisted, therefore, that
Britain would try to resolve the crisis through discussions and
negotiations. 17
Because Rhodesia was also an international concern, Britain
asked the United Nations for assistance.

As the United Nations

acq_uired more responsibility in the handling of the Rhodesian problem, its strategies became more defined.

It was the Security Council,

where resolutions can be adopted that are "binding" on all members
according to the Charter, which finalized United Nations strategy.
The United Nations policies toward Rhodesia after UDI can be
divided into three stages:

voluntary sanctions; selective mandatory

sanctions; comprehensive mandatory sanctions.

The initial response

of the United Nations in the form of Resolutions 216 and 217 was to
condemn UDI and call for voluntary economic and political sanctions
against Rhodesia.

At that time the United Nations role was an exten-

sion of British policy aimed at bringing the Smith regime to the
realization that UDI would not be successful.

Voluntary sanctions

failed, however, because foreign ships were still able to deliver
goods, especially oil, to Rhodesia.

As a result, Britain was asked

in Resolution 221 to prevent oil from reaching Rhodesia through the
Mozambiq_ue port of Beira.
Phase two of United Nations sanctions policy -- selective mandatory sanctions

occurred with the passage of Resolution 232.

Reso-

lution 232 acknowledged that the Rhodesian crisis constituted a "threat
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to international peace and security" and called on member nations to
prevent trade with Rhodesia on those selected items mentioned earlier
in the paper.
Phase three added a new dimension to United Nations sanctions
policy when the Security Council voted unanimously on May 29, 1968

253) , to impose under Chapter VII of the Charter compre-

(Resolution

hensive mandatory sanctions.

These involved a total embargo on trade

with Rhodesia, because the members were "gravely concerned that measures taken by the Security Council have not been complied with by all
Sta t es .••

,,18

In addition, the resolution proposed an embargo on util-

ity undertakings, tourist enterprises, and investments.
The passage from voluntary to mandatory sanctions made a system
of control absolutely necessary,

Nations were first asked to report

to the Secretary General those measures undertaken to implement Reso-

232,

lution

Subse~uently, a seven member sanctions committee was

organized after Resolution

253 to accumulate trade facts from United

Nations member states and to provide information on sanctions eva.

SJ.OTIS,

19

Actions taken by the UN Security Council since the passage of
Resolution

253 have focused, as a part of phase three , on making

comprehensive mandatory economic sanctions successful as a policy
tool.

Each of the resolutions has done one or more of the following:
1.

continued to call on states to end assistance to Rhodesia.

2.

condemned the refusal of nations to cooperate with the
United Nations in observance and implementation of sanc-

.
21
t ions.

20
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dealt with tactics used by nations to avoid implementation

,3.

22
.
of sane t ions.

widened sanctions to include other areas. 2.3

4.

Most recently , the Third World nations of the United Nations have
tried to gain Security Council acceptance of resolutions which propose penalties against those nations which still support the Rhodesian
.

regime.

24

Resolution .3.3.3 passed after Britain and the United States vetoed
an alternative resolution which had called for the following:

limit-

ing imports from South African and Portuguese territories to pre-UDI
levels; denying landing rights to those airlines of nations granting
such rights to Rhodesia; and extending the British blockade of Beria
to the Mozambique port of Lourenco Marques.

This was the ninth

British veto of a Security Council Resolution, the others having been
cast in opposition to the use of force and the expansion of sanctions
to South Africa and Portugal.
National Viewpoints of the Crisis
Up to this point, the thesis has described and analyzed the conflicting policies of the British and Afro-Asian nations toward the
Rhodesian problem.

The British government, for a variety of reasons

to be discussed in the next chapter, opted for a policy of economic
sanctions combined with United Nations international backing.

The

Afro-Asian nations, on the other hand , pressed for a policy of force
to end the Rhodesian rebellion.

It is, however, the purpose of this

section to examine briefly how other nations viewed the crisis.
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Although this study has also been made elsewhere, 25 it is worth discussing here so that the groundwork can be prepared for analysis and
conclusions in the next chapter,

Examination will be limited to those

nations -- France, United States, West Germany, Switzerland, the
Soviet Union, South Africa, Portugual, and the black African neighbors
of Rhodesia -- which not only represent the greatest divergence of
opinion on Rhodesia but also have had the greatest amount of impact
on the outcome of the Rhodesian crisis and United Nations sanctions'
policieso
From the beginning, France viewed Rhodesia as a British responsibility, similar to i ts problem in Algeria, and not one within the
jurisdiction of the United Nations,

As a result, France abstained on

Security Council votes until May 1968,

France was able until that

time to maintain good relations with African nations because they
agreed on the point that Rhodesia was a British problem.

But in 1968

when the Smith regime executed five African political prisoners and
the African nations pressed for stronger United Nations actions
against Rhodesia, France was faced with a dilemma.

If France did not

show concern for the humanitarian tragedy in Rhodesia, DeGaulle was
faced with the possibility of losing his popularity among African
nations.

As a result, France supported United Nations jurisdiction

for the first time and voted for comprehensive mandatory economic
sanctions against Rhodesia, indicating that she was "compelled 'by
the vast depth of feelings created throughout the world, and particularly in Africa' by the Rhodesian situation ,

11 26

The United States viewpoint was, and is, largely a carbon copy
of the British perspective.

The United States was initially supportive

of British policies to maintain the status of the Rhodesian crisis as
a British colonial concern.

It wasn't until the British ceded a great

portion of the responsibility for ending the problem to the United
Nations that the United States backed international involvement.
The perspectives of both the Federal Republic of Germany and
Switzerland are interesting since neither nation was a member of the
United Nations at the time of the implementation of sanctions.

The

position of West Germany has been to recognize neither the status of
Rhodesia as a state nor its minority government~ 27

In addition, it

has argued that in spite of the fact that it is not a member of the
United Nations , it has taken actions to restrict trade to Rhodesia.

28

However, trade contracts signed by West Germany and Rhodesia prior to
mandatory sanctions in 1968 were allowed to stand . 29
The Federal Council of Switzerland, on the other hand, has taken
the position that:
for reasons of principle, Switzerland, as a neutral
State, cannot submit to the mandatory sanctions of
the United Nations. The Federal Council will , however, see to it that Rhodesian trade is given no
opportunity to avoid the United Nations sanctions
policy through Swiss territory . It is for that
reason that it decided as early as 17 Dec. 1965,
independently and without recognizing any legal
obligation to do so, to make imports from Rhodesia
subject to mandatory authorization and to take the
necessary measures to prevent any increase in Swiss
imports from that territory.JO
Permanent neutrality status indicates that Switzerland should
not assist either side in a dispute.

Yet her official policy has
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been to maintain a ban on exports of war materials and to limit the
imports from Rhodesia to a level not exceeding the average of three
years prior to UDI. 31

So indirectly she claims to have provided some

degree of effectiveness to United Nations sanctions by not allowing
Rhodesia the opportunity of exporting goods through Switzerland to
other countries.
The Soviet Union and other socialist countries supported the
Afro-Asian point of view in the Rhodesian crisis because it gave them
a chance to criticize British and American policies and to champion
their cause as friend of the exploited peoples of Africa.

Interest-

ingly enough , however, the Soviets and Bulgaria abstained when Resolution 232 was adopted, saying they disagreed with the British rejection of stronger Afro-Asian amendments to the resolution. 32

In 1968

the Soviets did vote for Resolution 253 , thereby supporting the view
that Rhodesia was a "threat to international peace and security" and
the plan for economic sanctions ,

Throughout the period 1965-1968,

they also supported the African pressure on Britain to use force in
Rhodesia to put down the rebellion.
The South African and Portuguese positions can be examined
simultaneously since each nation supported the viewpoint that Rhodesia was a self-governing territory responsible for its own internal
affairs.33

They never accepted the Security Council judgment that

the Rhodesian crisis presented a " threat to international peace and
security, 34
11

In addition, South Africa and Portugal have claimed

that the Security Council Resolution 232 , :providing for mandatory
sanctions, was illegally passed because of the abstentions of France

4,6
and the Soviet Union.

They interpreted Article 27(3) of the Charter

to mean that the abstention of any :permanent member prevents the
Security Council from taking a :positive position.35

Since France and

the Soviet Union had abstained, Portugal and South Africa felt that
Resolution 232 should not have been adopted .

While this argument has

not won wide sup:port in le gal circles , it was nevertheless one of the
major positions argued by Portugal and South Africa at the time of
the implementation of sanctions.

On the contrary, the legal counsel

of the United Nations holds that the practice of abstention does not
invalidate resolutions and is not contrary to the objectives emanating from the United Nations Conference on International Organization.36

While Portugal and South Africa often voiced their le gal

object ions to sanctions, their primary refusal to comply with sanctions had to do with economic and political interests.

Portugal was

concerned with maintaining control over i ts colonial interests in
Angola and Mozambique .

South Africa , on the other hand , was con-

cerned because its racial policies were similar to those of Rhodesia
and i t feared the repercussions if United Nations objectives were
attained.
The last position to be analyzed is the one held by Rhodesia's
neighbors to the north and west .

While this view:point was advocated

by Botswana , the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Malawi, and
Zambia, at this :point the study is only concerned wi t h Malawi and Zambia
since they are adjacent neighbors .

Both nations pointed out the

adverse effects of sanctions on their economics. 37

While both

nations supported United Nations sanction :policies in the ory, in

reality they could not afford economically to implement comprehensive
sanctions because they were too dependent on Rhodesia for trade,3 8

A

Malawi spokesman said ",,,the country cannot be expected to :participate
in such sanctions to an extent where its own economy will be destroyed,"39

The Zambian government acknowledged that it would give

"maximum support" despite the fact that Zambia and Rhodesia's economies "have been intertwined for 70 years like Siamese Twins," 40
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IV.

INEFFECTIVENESS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

As one of the most important chapters in Part I, Chapter IV will
assess the impact of British and United Nations economic sanctions on
Rhodesia.

Using Rhodesia as a case study, conclusions will be drawn

as to the effectiveness and/or ineffectiveness of United Nations
sanctions in resolving any crisis, in turn looking at implications
for future sanctions policy,
Objectives and Limitations of Sanctions
The basic objective of sanctions against Rhodesia, as already
noted, has been to try and restore the country to a state of constitutional le gality so that majority rule can be achieved,
that must be asked is:

The question

Have the sanctions caused the receiving na-

tion (Rhodesia) to alter its policies in line with those of the sending nations (Britain and United Nations sanctions supporters)?
ly, the answer is "no,"

Clear-

Thirteen years after the initiation of sanc-

tions, the Smith regime remains in polit ical and economic command of
Rhodesia, at least until 1979,

Economic sanctions have not resulted

in political disintegration, their primary object ive in the first
place,

The British hope was that sanctions would cause economic

deprivation and unemployment in Rhodesia, thereby leading the populace to pressure the Rhodesian leaders into negotiating a settlement
that was an ac ceptable form of independence,
Galtung in his studies of sanctions policy has developed a number
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of interesting questions which are applicable to the Rhodesian situa1
.
t ion:
1.

Are sanctions negative ( punishment for deviance) or positive
(reward for compliance)?

2.

Are sanctions aimed at responsible individuals in the receiving nation or are they collective (hitting nations as a whole
including those not responsible)?

3,

Are sanctions internal (due to changes arising inside the
receiving nation) or external (interaction pattern with other
nations)?

4.

Are sanctions unilateral (one sending nation) or multilateral
or universal?

5,

Are sanctions general or selective (all or some measures)?

6.

Are sanctions total or partial?

He then lists three broad kinds of sanctions:

2

diplomatic sanctions,

which include non-recognition, rupture of diplomatic relations, no cooperation by international organizations, no direct contact with political leaders; communications sanctions, which include the rupture of
telecommunications, mail contact, transportation, news communications,
and personal cont act; and economic sanctions, including internal destruction and rupture of trade relations in terms of economic boycott.
The policy of sanctions directed at Rhodesia were immediately
negative, collective, and external.

In addition, there was a pro-

gressive increase from unilateral sanctions to almost universal, from
selective to general, and from partial to almost total,

By examining

these categories in combination with British foreign policy moves and
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Rhodesian counterstrategies, the effectiveness/ineffectiveness of
United Nations sanctions policies can be determined.
British Foreign Policy
Despite Rhodesia's vulnerability, Prime Minister Harold Wilson's
decision to implement economic sanctions did not prove to be a good one.
The reality of the situation was that Britain did not have a sound economic base from which to prosecute sanctions effectively a gainst Rhodesia.

In addition, Wilson was faced with serious political obstacles

in his attempts to handle the situation.
During the 1964- 1970 period, Britain suffered a balance of pa yments deficit.

It was estimated that by enforcing economic sanctions

against Rhodesia, the nation would lose an estimated $90 million, although according to Robert Sutcliffe, the damage caused by the loss of
British-Rhodesian trade was not so spectacular as to undermine the British government's desire to enforce sanctions. 3 Britain was not prepared, however, to cause further damage to its balance of trade deficit
by a ltering its economic relationships with South Africa.

4

And after

all , it was South Africa which was providing the major loophole in
United Nations sanctions policy by trading heavily with Rhodesia.

Al-

though Britain was willing to block the port of Beira (Resolution 221) ,
the nation wa s not willing to do the same with Lourenco Marques, another
Mozambican port, because South Africa used that port , and Britain
did not want to risk an economic confrontation,

As a result, Rho-

desia continued to receive oil by rail through Mozambique,and
the port of entry continued to be Lourenco Marques,

A November

54

1967 London Times editorial summed up the situation.5
the Rhodesian affair is another lesson, if Mr.
Wilson needed it, that a weak economy is no basis
for a strong foreign policy. Two years ago he not
only fatally underestimated the durability of the
Rhodesian economy but had not realised the debility
of his own ••• Having cast aside the deterrent of force,
he started an economic war which in advance he could
see South Africa in its own interests had to defeat.
In addition to economic complications, Wilson was faced with some
troublesome political problems.

The Labor Party at the time of UDI

had a majority of only one in the House of Commons, and because of
the "kith and kin" factor -- blood relationships between Rhodesians
and Britons -- the government could not afford to alienate itself
from the British electorate, especially in an election year.

After

the election in March 1966, when Labor was returned with a comfortable
ninety-seven vote majority, Wilson was again forced to reassess his
foreign policy, especially in light of the fact that Rhodesia had not
been brought to its knees.
situation.

Wilson found himself in an uncomfortable

He still was opposed to the use of force, having been

influenced by logistical problems, the kith and kin factor, and negative advice by the military.

6 Yet his economic sanctions had not

brought the quick desired results, and he had incorrectly estimated
that South Africa would not frustrate British sanctions policy.
Wilson best summed up his predicament in a speech to the House
of Commons in April 1966: 7
This is one of the most difficult problems which any
government have had to face in this country in this
century ••• because the complications are due to the
fact that Rhodesia is at the point of interception
of a number of distinct circles which cover vital
Commonwealth interests and vital economic interests
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for Britain -- and the economic interests cut more
than two ways -- covering Britain's standing in the
new world. This issue is at the very centre of that
area of the new world which is dominated by race
conflict, racial intolerance, and the ever present
danger of race explosion ••• Wrong decisions here or
the failure to take the necessary action,.,still
could touch off a new division in world affairs
based not on ideology but on colour,
Wilson first tried to negotiate a settlement with the Smith regime ,
but his efforts were in vain.

8

Instead of reacting meaningfully to

the Rhodesian crisis, he actually ended up reacting more to the reactions to Rhodesia in order to minimize British interests in collateral areas -- those regarding Tory opposition in Britain, Commonwealth
nations, United Nations, and South Africa. 9

Britain had an important

stake in all four, but Wilson's policy in trying to deal with all four
constantly worked at cross-purposes because all were incompatible with
one another.
Wilson did not want the Conservatives undermining his position
in Britain so he approached the question of sanctions with caution.
He was confronted with opposition in that the Conservative Party as
a whole found sanctions anathema,

R, H. Turton expressed this posi-

tion when he said "Nobody will benefit from economic sanctions and
the use of force except the Russian and the Chinese communists in
Africa. 1110

In addition, sanctions also contravened commercial inter-

ests in southern Africa and created an aversion among Conservative
Party members toward outside (United Nations) interference in Brit. .h a ff'
1.s
a1.rs.

11

In fact, Edward Heath called the problem on Rhodesia

"the great divice,"
opposition.

Wilson never did receive strong support from the

The Conservatives were much more interested in settling

the dispute, or if that were not achievable, perhaps disengaging from
sanctions actions altogether.

12

In his memoirs, Wilson says the Con-

servative Opposition was more interested in getting rid of him and his
Labor government than they were in getting rid of the illegal Smith
.
13
regime.

By imposing sanctions in stages, Wilson maintained as much

Conservative Party support as possible.

At the same time, however, he

allowed the Smith regime to prepare its defenses, and he alienated the
Commonwealth members who wanted majority rule for Rhodesia.
Wilson admits in his memoirs that if Britain had failed to react
strongly against UDI, the Commonwealth would have broken up entirely
or would have been reduced dramatically in size.

14

As it was, Tan-

zania and Ghana broke off diplomatic relations when Britain refused to
intervene in Rhodesia with force.
The Commonwealth was divided on how to bring the Rhodesian rebellion to an end.

The division was generally along racial lines with

Britain supported mainly by Australia, New Zealand, Malta, and Malawi,
while opponents, who supported the use of force in Rhodesia, were
comprised of the Afro-Asian-Caribbean group.

What kept the Common-

wealth from completely breaking up was the British concession to restrict negotiations with Smith to three months (October-December 1966),
after which time the British would seek United Nations mandatory
sanctions if a settlement had not resulted. 15

As mentioned earlier ,

talks with Smith broke down, and Britain made good on its promise to
ask the United Nations to initiate mandatory sanctions (Resolution
232).

At the same time, Britain made another major concession to the

Commonwealth when Wilson accepted NIBMAR (acronym for no independence
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before majority rule).

The acceptance of NIBMAR, however, resulted

in the termination of negotiations with Smith.
Within the pressure group of the Commonwealth was Zambia, which
posed a major problem for Britain in terms of economic and strategic
factors.

Zambia was the most sensitive to sanctions against Rhodesia

as the nation was almost totally dependent on Rhodesia for coal,
electricity , oil, consumer goods , and transportation.

While Zambia

felt from the beginning that economic sanctions would not undermine
the Smith regime and instead advocated force, the nation was still
willing to support the British sanctions to the best of her ability.
More than any country associated with the Rhodesian problem, Zambia
was the one which suffered the most.
At the same time that he tried to deal with the Conservative
opposition and attempted to appease the Commonwealth majority, Wilson
also attempted to balance competing objectives at the United Nations
by insisting on the maintenance of British responsibility for the
outcome of the Rhodesian affair while also trying to strengthen
Security Council pressures on Rhodesia.
Pursuing United Nations objectives to maintain credibility among
Afro-Asians had the effect of making it difficult to work with South
Africa, which from the start opposed any type of sanctions against
Rhodesia.

After all, South Africa, which provided the greatest por-

tion of economic assistance to Rhodesia, was in the best position to
help Britain bring pressure on Smith to reach a negotiated settlement,

Unfortunately, discussion with South Africa did not produce

results.

Wilson's efforts in this area were compromised from the
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start because Britain was not in a position to start an economic war
with South Africa over Rhodesia.
By trying to simultaneously deal with all of the above interest
groups, Wilson produced a foreign policy that constantly worked at
cross-purposes.

Negotiations with Smith excited the Afro-Asian-

Caribbean bloc in the Commonwealth -- at least until Wilson accepted
NIBMAR -- and also compromised the seriousness with which Britain
approached the use of sanctions in the United Nations.

At the same

time, support for United Nations sanctions measures alienated the
Conservative opposition as well as South Africa, the country with the
most influence on Rhodesia.

The result of this policy of not using

force to quell the rebellion, of not confronting South Africa as the
major "sanctions buster," and of not "selling out" to the Afro-AsianCaribbean bloc was that the initial British goal of restoring Rhodesia
to a state of legality was not achieved.

In fact, the minority

regime of Ian Smith remained stronger than ever .
John Foster Dulles

16

once said:

The great advantage of economic sanctions is that
on the one hand they can be very potent, while on
the other hand they do not involve that resort to
force which is repugnant to our objective of peace.
Dulles's comments are pertinent to the Rhodesian problem,
especially in conjunction with the conclusions of International
Peace Research Institute scholar, Fredrik Hoffman, who analyzes the
political aspects of sanctions decision-making.

Although studies

like Galtung's indicate that it is extremely difficult to make sanctions effective , Hoffman 17 says "sanctions are very well fit to
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alleviate the tension in a cross-pressure situation."

While sanctions

would not be used if a country is politically motivated for destroying its opponent because they would be considered too slow and complicated, they would be used if the political leadership "feels a need
for doing something but not 'too much,'"
paradox:

18

In effect, he develops a

when sanctions are used, the goal will probably not be

attained because that decision probably indicates that the motivation
of the sanctioning country is too low and that it is not strong enough
to cope with the difficulties involved. 19
If Hoffman's conclusions are true -- and they appear to be quite
logical and based on fact -- then the Labor Party and Wilson were
trying to buy time, hoping that negotiations with Smith would be
successful.

Faced with a "cross pressure situation," and openly dis-

avowing the use of force as a viable alternative, they chose the
option of sanctions ("they wanted to do something but not too much")
as the only way to handle the situation,

What happened is that

Britain, either by its own decision or because it was forced to by
the Commonwealth, ceded responsibility to the United Nations.

Either

Wilson was naive and totally underestimated the effectiveness of
sanctions, or he found the time right for "passing the buck,"

While

many might sympathize with Wilson's unenviable political position of
20 t ·h f t
·
.
.
th a t Bri. t to cater to f our cons t i· t uencies,
e ac remains
h aving
ain's foreign policy was unsuccessful in achieving its stated goals.
Hindsight is always better than foresight and a British policy
of force in Rhodesia was not only unlikely and distasteful, but it
was also inappropriate.

It is still worth speculating, however, as
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to what would have happened if the Wilson administration had opted for
a policy of force,

Robert Good,

21

United States Ambassador to Zambia

during 1965-1968, assesses British policy this way:
The estimate is this, that just as Rhodesia under
white rule is geopolitically the keystone in South
Africa's developing co-security system, so i ts
removal, together with Britain's reinvolvement in
the area, would have opened up new opportunities
for pressure, persuasion, and maneuver probably
leading to eventual changes in South Africa less
productive of racial violence and possible communist
exploitation than otherwise would seem to be the
case,,,British failure to use force was a missed
opportunity of historical significance.
A settlement acceptable to whites and blacks in Rhodesia was beyond
the power of the British to achieve.

The Rhodesian Front refused to

entertain the solution of majority rule and the Africans, inside and
outside Rhodesia, wanted nothing less than that,

The alternative

for the British was to stand aside and let the Rhodesians settle their
own differences or let someone with more power intervene to insure
that they did,

22
Loopholes in Sanctions Policies

The success of United Nations sanctions was dependent on the
interpretation of their wording, the willingness of nations to participate, and the ability of the organization to enforce its actions,
In the case of Rhodesia there was no concensus as to the precise
objectives of economic sanctions ,

There were automatic loopholes

because South Africa and Portugal as well as many others were not
willing to abide by United Nations policy,

In addition, there was

no effective international control system to coordinate the sanctions
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or, more importantly, to enforce them,
In the first place, the United Nations was unable to create
agreement among nations as a basis for action, 23

South Africa,

Portugal, and France refused to participate because they felt the
problem was a British one,

Malawi and Zambia could not afford econ-

omically to fully implement sanctions because of their great dependence on Rhodesia,

Switzerland, for reasons of neutrality, also re-

fused to invoke sanctions.

Even the United States tested the credi-

bility of the sanctions policy during 1971-1977 by importing chrome
from Rhodesia.
The willingness of states to participate in sanctions depends
on the priori ties that the states have, how much they will be affected
by sanctions, and how much their national interests will be enhanced.
While all states believe in the maintenace of international peace and
security, they must ultimately view sanctions in terms of the effects
on their national interests, 25

Obviously, nations like Zambia and

Malawi felt that their economic survival was more important than the
implementation of complete sanctions, even though they strongly believed in the objectives of the sanctions,

Any nation which parti-

cipates in sanctions must be ready to bear the sacrifices and losses
resulting from its participation.
The effectiveness of sanctions by doses -- voluntary, selective
mandatory, comprehensive mandatory -- must also be questioned,

It

was British policy which determined the gradual escalation of sanctions.

While gradual economic sanctions do allow the sending nations

to adjust their patterns of trade, find alternative markets, and, in

24
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the case of democratic countries, to pass legislation regarding the
sanctions ,

26

they also do the same for the receiving nation .

Because

the time lapse between voluntary sanctions and comprehensive mandatory
sanctions was two and one-half years , Rhodesia had time to prepare its
counterstrategies, find alternative markets, and solve its internal
problems.

In addition, the use of voluntary sanctions caused prob-

lems for the United Nations.

Because they were not binding, and

United Nations members were, therefore , not required to enact them,
sanctions provided an automatic loophole for nations like South
Africa and Portugal to continue trading with Rhodesia.
Most experts feel that Britain and the United Nations should have
invoked effective first measures to preclude Rhodesia from preparing
its defenses.

The United Nations should have selected measures in

such a way that the population of Rhodesia would have pressured the
government to sue for peace to avoid dislocation of its economy.
What happened in Rhodesia was that most people, instead of opposing
Smith, actually rallied around him .
While voluntary sanctions were unenforceable, mandatory sanctions
were enforceable, at least according to the United Nations Charter.
Yet the effective enforcement of sanctions depends on international
opinion.

United Nations sanctions, in other words , still depend

for their success on their implementation by individual nations.
While the Special Committee Established in Pursuance of Resolution

253 had the capability to monitor the effectiveness of sanctions, it
did not have the capability to enforce compliance with those sanctions.

In reality, it is extremely difficult for the United Nations
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to force compliance to its decisions,

For example, out of 127 states

in the United Nations in 1970, only 49 cared to inform the organization as to how they were implementing sanctions, 37 responded vaguely,
4o states did not reply at all to the Secretary-General, and one state

challenged the legality of some of the sanctions policies. 27
In trying to determine the impact of the loopholes and of those
countries which happened to be sanctions evaders on the success of
United Nations policies, it is worth examining the Seventh Report of
the Special Committee in Pursuance of Resolution 253 (Sanctions Committee) issued on May 7, 1975, which shows trading statistics between
Rhodesia and "sanctions busters" during the 1968-1973 period.

28 While

the first six reports of the committee are important, they will not
be used in this study because the Seventh Report provides cumulative
information.

It is important to note, however, that beginning in

1973, Rhodesia suppressed publication of trade figures because of
"intensified U,N, hostility, 1129 and, as a result, there is little
specific up-to-date information indicating which countries are
evading sanctions,
In its report the Special Committee 30 noted the laxity of too
many governments in pursuing sanctions.

It reported evidence that

sanctions evasions continued heavily throughout 1974, and that the
failure of the goverillllent of the Republic of South Africa to implement sanctions continued to be a major loophole,

It also noted that

Southern Rhodesian trade continued to flow through Portuguese territories -- Mozambique, in particular,

However, the committee concluded:
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that, although sanctions might not be effective in
securing a rapid return to legality in Southern
Rhodesia without the cooperation of the authorities
in South Africa and the Portuguese territories of
southern Africa, strict enforcement by all of those
governments which professed to enforce them could
nonetheless make an important -- and possibly
decisive -- contribution to the objectives of the
Security Council in imposing sanctions.31
The following statistics, prepared by the Secretariat on Southern Rhodesian trade, estimate Rhodesian exports and imports during
. 32
the first nine years of voluntary and mandatory sanctions:
Exports
Rhodesian exports during the 1965-1973 period increased from
$399 million to $64o million (estimated because of restrictions on
figures).

The $64o million in 1973, if it was attained, was a sub-

stantial increase over the $474 million figure in 1972,

Seventy-

three countries, whose imports were reported to the Special Committee,
show that Rhodesian exports to them were itemized in the following
way (millions):
to reporting countries
South Africa Customs Union
non-reporting countries
world markets via indirect trade

$343 to $ 68
$ 41 to $103
0
$ 15 to
0 to $470

Of the $68 million, $26 million was exported to the United
States in 1973, $21 million to Malawi, $11 million to Zambia, $8 million to Switzerland, and $1 million to other countries,

It is esti-

mated that South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland -as a group, they are called the South Africa Customs Union -- received
Rhodesian exports valued at $103 million.

It would, therefore, appear

that $470 million worth of Rhodesian exports reached world markets
via Rhodesia's neighbors and were reflected as imports.
During the 1965-1973 period, over 40% of Rhodesia's tobacco
reached world markets,

One must remember that this was the reported

amount, and, undoubtedly, more reached world markets in clandestine
ways.

It is estimated that this type of trade was very "active."

There also seems to be evidence that South Africa was importing
asbestos and that West Germany was importing copper.
Evidence of the existence of indirect imports from Rhodesia is
indicated by a comparison of imports of 23 reporting countries (see
Table I).
tions:33

The Sanctions Committee offered the following explanathe discrepancy of $73 million in 1965 ($52 million excess

of imports over exports under South Africa and $21 million under
Mozambique) represents imports received from the South African
Customs Union and Mozambique by the 23 reporting countries over and
above the exports that South Africa and Mozambique declared to have
sent,

These imports were generally known as shipments from Rhodesia

that were sent overseas by the Customs Union and Mozambique.

They

were treated as goods in transit by them, but as imports from the
South Africa Customs Union and Mozambique by the 23 reporting countries.

This explanation is substantiated in Table I by the excess

of declared exports in 1965 of Zambia and Malawi to the 23 reporting
countries over the reported corresponding imports.

This explanation

implies that in 1965, for example, an amount of merchandise valued
at $24 million originated in Rhodesia.

If this reasoning is accep-

ted, it would mean that during 1970-1973, exporters in the South

Table I.34
Comparison of imports of 23 reporting countries (U.S. $ in millions)

1965

1966

1967

1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

South Africa Customs Union
1008
Exports
23 reporting countries importsa1060
Excess of imports over exports
52

1127
1210
83

1310
1401
91

1458
1589
131

1446
1668
222

1422
1674

1811
2128
317

2464

252

1414
1640
226

62
81
19

69
120
51

83
137
54

120
40

84

90
150
60

92
141
49

175
200

140
240
100

622
518
-104

544
510
-34

694
618
-76

939
866
-73

872
879
7

549

520

570
-50

26
24
-2

33
32
-1

40
34
-6

27
40
13

28
34
6

37
35
-2

46
43
-3

44

Total
Exporting countries figures
1551
23 reporting countries imports 1575
24
Excess of imports over exports

1844
1841
-3

1963
2065
102

2262
2384
122

2497
2692
195

2417
2738
317

2101
2344
243

Mozambique
Exports
23 reporting countries importsa
Excess of imports over exports

60
81
21

Zambia
Exports
457
23 reporting countries importsa 410
Excess of imports over exports
-47
Malawi
Exports
23 reporting countries importsa
Excess of imports over exports

-29

25

620

50

6

2650

2948
310

2965
501

973

785

-188
62
60
-2
3639
4050
411

8neduced by 10% to cover freigpt, etc,
0-..
0-..

Table
Southern Rhodesian Exports:
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1965-1973 (U.S. $ in millions)

1965

1966

1967

1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

Domestic exports excluding gold
(1973) is an estimate)

399

238

238

234

297

346

379

474

64o

To reporting countries
(less 10% to cover freight)

343

181

96

68

48

50

48

6o

63

41

60

80

80

85

95

90

100

103

To South Africa Customs Union

a

To non-reporting countries

15

To world markets via indirect
trade

-

-3

62

86

164

201

241

314

474

Re-exports

43

24

17

12

10

8

9

9

12

aDerived from published data for imports of the South Africa Customs Union from "Africa,"
less exports to the South Africa Customs Union reported by the African countries,

°'

-..J
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Africa Customs Union and Mozambique were handling merchandise from
Rhodesia valued at $317 million in 1970, $243 million in 1971, $310
million in 1972, and $411 million in 19730

It should be noted that

the 1970 and 1972 figures are approximate calculations.
In comparing Rhodesian exports to world markets via indirect
trade shown in Table II with figures shown in Table I as "excess of
imports over exports," the amounts of re-exports should be added to
the former because the importing countries identify the sources of
supply without any distinction between national exports and reexports,36
The Sanctions Committee made the following observations about
Table III: 37

the substantial agreement of the figures for the years

1967-1969 and 1971-1972 indicates implicitly that since the implementation of United Nations sanctions, Rhodesia has been able to send
its exports to world markets indirectly via the South Africa Customs
Union and Mozambique.

The discrepancy in 1970 does not detract from

this observation because the A figure is larger than B,

For 1973,

$411 million seems small to cover the indirect exports of Rhodesia
of $486 million,

However, it should be noted that 1973 Rhodesian ex-

ports were estimated at $166 million higher than 1972 exports,

Con-

sidering the "time lag" due to transportation, it is conceivable that
$40-$50 million of the total annual growth were reflected only in the
early part of 1974's trade return of the 23 reporting countries,

It

is also possible that a small portion of 1973 exports from Rhodesia
were of a clandestine nature and that they were not reflected at all
in any recorded imports of any countryo

Table In3 8
Indirect Exports of Southern Rhodesia
(millions UcS. $)

Excess of reported imports
of 23 countries over
exports of 4 neighbors of
Rhodesia

Indirect exports of
Rhodesia including
re-exports (add last
two lines in Table II)

Difference

A

B

A- B

1965

24

43

-19

1966

-3

21

-24

1967

102

79

23

1968

122

98

24

1969

195

174

21

1970

317

209

108

1971

243

250

-7

1972

310

323

-13

1973

411

486

-75

Imports
Rhodesian imports during the 1965-1973 period increased from
$334 million to $480 million (see Table IV), up from $404 million in
1972.

They were itemized this way for the year 1973:

$6 million to

Malawi, $4 million to Switzerland, $2 million to Britain, $2 million
to West Germany, $1 million to the United States, and $1 million to
other countries,

These figures total $16 million compared to $19

million in 1972,

In addition, it is estimated that the South Africa

Table rv 39
Rhodesian Imports:

1965-1973 (U.S. $ in millions)

1965

1966

1967

1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

Imports (1973 figure is estimate)

334

236

262

290

278

329

395

404

480

From reporting countries (less
10% to cover freight)

253

79

63

44

15

16

18

19

16

78

110

135

150

155

160

170

165

180

47

64

96

108

153

207

220

284

From South Africa Customs Union

a

3

Unspecified origin
Unaccounted for

-

~erived from published data for imports of the South Africa Customs Union from "Africa,"
less exports to the South Africa Customs Union reported by African countries,

----J
0
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Customs Union sent $180 million to Rhodesia.

It appears, therefore,

that $284 million worth of Rhodesian imports were not reflected in
the corresponding 1973 export figures of world trade.
It is not possible to investigate the true situation concerning
unaccounted Rhodesian imports for the years after sanctions.

In view

of the fact, however, that there has been considerable expansion of
the import trade of the South Africa Customs Union, Mozambique, and
Angola (Table V), it needs to be determined whether a part of the
expansion has been in the form of goods that ultimately reached
Rhodesia.
40
Table V
Imports of Neighbors of Rhodesia (U.S.$ in millions)

South Africa Customs Union

Mozambi9.ue

Angola

1965

2461

173

1966

2307

207

1967

2690

199

1968

2638

1969

2983

234
260

1970

3565

326

323
368

1971

4039

335

422

1972

3657

399

1973

4964

327
466

195
208
275
308

542

While it is not possible to reach a definite correlation between
the unaccounted Rhodesian imports and the exports of its neighbors,
it is still interesting to note the great increase in imports during

the years following sanctions.

The implication is that many of these

goods reached Rhodesian markets.
As noted earlier, the United Nations Special Committee concluded
that

40%

of Rhodesia's tobacco reached world markets during 1968-1973,

and it assumed that much more reached Rhodesian markets in clandestine
ways.

Reports from Britain, the Economic Research Service, and the

United States Department of Agriculture indicate that Rhodesia was
able to dispose of almost its entire stockpile of tobacco on world
markets.

41 In addition, Rhodesia apparently exported its entire pro-

duction of nickel via South Africa until 1972 and 1973, at which times
the United States directly imported $4.5 million and $11 million re-

. l y. 42
spec t ive
According to the United Nations study, 43 there is little information regarding petroleum and petroleum products.

There was no sta-

tistical evidence during 1965-1973 that any country sent petroleum
to Rhodesia.

Yet there is no report that indicates that a petroleum

shortage existed in Rhodesia.

It is, therefore, reasonable to assume

that there was a constant flow of oil into the country.

Based on the

increase in South Africa's oil exports, the oil most probably came
from that country.
The purpose of the next two tables is to show first of all which
countries did not fully implement United Nations sanctions, and secondly, to show to what extent they broke the sanctions policies.

The

analysis will be limited to the 16 (out of 73) nations which did an
adequate amount of trading with Rhodesia.

The remaining 57 nations

either imported or exported an insignificant amount or nothing at
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all, especially after the imposition of mandatory sanctions.
for example, reported no imports after 1966,
and Brazil reported no imports after 1967.

Sweden,

Norway, Spain, Argentina,
And Ireland and Austria

reported no imports after 1969.
The most important observation to note in Table VI is that all
of the countries reported some degree of imports from Rhodesia.

This

occurred despite the fact that most of these nations openly supported
mandatory sanctions in 1968,

In addition, while Portugal did not

report imports after 1968, it is a known fact that the country was
importing goods from Rhodesia,

It is interesting that with the

exception of Switzerland, Austria, Malawi, and Zambia, the remaining
twelve nations are considered supportive of the Western point of view,
In examining the relationship of total imports of the reporting
nations to the years in which progressive stages of sanctions were
applied, one can make two key observations,

First, due to the

imposition of voluntary United Nations economic sanctions in November 1965 (Resolution 217), the total volume of Rhodesian exports to
the reporting nations dropped 44% from approximately $JJO million in
1965 to $184 million in 1966.

While on the surface this seems like

a dramatic decrease, it should be pointed out that Britain and Zambia
together accounted for $106 million of that drop.
nations did not reduce their imports that much,

Most of the other
On the whole, there-

fore, voluntary economic sanctions proved unsuccessful in terms of
participation by the members of the United Nations.

Second, with the

exception of Portugal in 1967 and Switzerland, Zambia, and Malawi in
1969, all of the nations made dramatic reductions in imports from

Table VI
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Nations' Imports from Rhodesia:

United States
Canada
Belgium-Luxemburg
France
West Germany
Italy
Netherlands
Britain
Portugal
Switzerland
Mozambique
Australia
Japan
Austria
Zambia
Malawi

1965-1973 (thousands$)

1965

1966

1967

1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

14056
3152
2806
2873
35112
16666
5987
83711
2927
5678
2991
3266
26497
4436
99507
20805

9359
1087
3540
1859
30525
8554

6463
4
1998
1059
15966
259
2406
405
5635
3925
4458
60
1266
249
45129
14732

1599
2
829
1171
13298
138
542
215
3582
3483

68
1
477
50
1120
27
136
163

115
1
142
61
572
59
21
117

807
2
97
130
485
2
2
129

12400

222

25670
3
4
215
521
13
259
147

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

3625

4296

4511

4582

7749

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

16240
21077

11000
21278

5-'122

12809
2148
4155
5862
787
13781
1673
64904
17267

74
822
95
31602
12588

-

1

26
30481
12534

-

1

32473
15505

5
10
907
367
9

-

20
29540
15896

"'-J

-{::-
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Rhodesia in 1967 after selective mandatory sanctions were imposed and
again in 1969 after comprehensive mandatory sanctions were instituted.
Canada, Australia, Britain, Austria, Japan, Italy, and the Netherlands reduced their imports to virtually nothing after 1968.

The

same holds true for the United States in 1969-1970 and for France in

1969-1971. And West Germany substantially reduced its imports after
the 1968 Resolution calling for comprehensive sanctions.

It is

interesting to note that during 1969-1971 Zambia imported more than
all of the other reporting countries combined in spite of the fact
that she had reduced her dependency on Rhodesia by

65%.

With the exception of France in 1972 , a situation for which there
is no specific explanation, Canada, Belgium-Luxemburg, Italy, the
Netherlands, Britain, Australia, Austria, Japan and France were the
countries that best followed the sanctions policies.

On the other

hand , the United States, with the passage of the Byrd Amendment in

1971 dramatically increased its importation of chromium and other
goods in the subsequent years to a high of

$25.7 million in 1973.

Switzerland, because of its policy of neutrality, maintained a steady
trade with Rhodesia in the area of $3.5 to $4.5 million, that is
until she increased her imports to $7.7 million in 1973, another
situation for which there is no obvious explanation .

In addition,

while Zambia presumably made every effort to reduce her dependency
on Rhodesia, and in fact had reduced imports in 1973 by 90% of 1965
levels, Malawi actually increased its imports from Rhodesia during
the same period of time.
There are a few other observations that are worth noting ,

Portugal refused to report information to the United Nations Special
Committee after comprehensive mandatory sanctions were passed in 1968,
presumably because its trade increased substantially with Rhodesia
after that time,

Mozambique and Angola, as Portuguese colonies, did

not report imports from Rhodesia either,

In addition, there were no

import reports sent in by the communist nations after 1966, with the
exception of Yugoslavia, or from the African nations of Nigeria,
Botswana, and Uganda after 1967,
The same pattern of trade that was true of imports is a lso true
of exports in that all nations, with the exception of Canada in 1971
and 1973, Austria 1970-1973, and Japan in 1973, reported some degree
of exports to Rhodesia,

In total, however, the nations in Tables VI

and VII were more willing to restrict exports to Rhpdesia than they
were imports from Rhodesia.

By 1970 all nations together had re-

duced their exports by 92%, but they had only reduced their imports
by 83% ,

With some modifications, the same observations made earlier

about the stages of import sanctions can also be made about export
sanctions.
upheld,

Voluntary sanctions as a universal policy were not widely

The great reductions in exports to Rhodesia occurred in

Britain, the United States, Zambia, and Japan.

In addition, dramatic

reductions didn't occur on a general basis until 1969 after the institution of comprehensive mandatory sanctions,

In fact, in 1967 after

selected mandatory sanctions had been implemented, nations like France,
Switzerland, and Malawi did approximately the same amount of business
with Rhodesia while West Germany and Australia actually increased
their exports to Rhodesia,

Table VIr 45
Exports to Rhodesia:

United States
Can?-da
Belgium-Luxemburg
France
West Germany
Italy
Netherlands
Britain
Portugal
Switzerland
Mozambique
Australia
Japan
Austria
Zambia
Malawi

1965-1973 (thousands$)

1965

1966

1967

1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

22982

7491

3557

455

700

581

575

89
1922

1312
2380
12914

139
200

514
16
82
286
1176

652

3625
6832

2024
22

3850
10903
6318
7291
88808

559

1641

3247
4510
16184
800
15317
4359

3444
4246
11186
5010
5748
7648

1055
1890
2698
4072
11110
1256
7018
2951

3976
12305
1339
4699
2877
1824
1939
3818

5653
13597
1252
2850

2735

1295
3000
1946
878
2513
NA
5851
4525
1082
1332
2872

2

1234
73

57
1958
NA
1540
NA

3539

63
278
1206
NA
1969
NA

4

4937
4

87
613
3804

1032
5148

-

51
337

1552
21

255
1698
NA
2851
NA
4840

6
560
5315

17
49
488
2004
42
261

181
451
2229
127

259

1796
NA

1947
NA

3230
NA
4060
2

3834
NA

1540
4297

440

25

5588

---J
---J
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In general, the same countries which greatly supported import
sanctions -- Canada, Belgium-Luxemburg, Austria, Japan, Italy, and
France and the Netherlands, although the last two nations' export volumes were a few hundred thousand dollars higher -- also greatly supported export sanctions.

It should also be mentioned that after Res-

olution 253, Japan virtually cut off exports to Rhodesia.

On the other

hand, Australia, despite United Nations sanctions policies, maintained
a consistent level of exports to Rhodesia until 1973 when the nation
decided to discontinue its policy of shipping wheat to Rhodesia for
humanitarian reasons.

46

While both the United States and West Germany

reduced exports after 1968, each maintained an export average of approximately $0.5 million and $1.5 million respectively during the

1970-1973 period.

Britain also consistently exported $1.5 to $2.0

million worth of goods to Rhodesia during the 1968-1973 period, a s
did Switzerland whose trade increased during the 1970-1973 period.
Lastly, the same comment that was made about Zambian and Malawian
imports can be made about their exports.

While Zambia greatly re-

duced its exports to Rhodesia to only $400,000 in 1973, Malawi actually
filled the gap after 1968 by expanding its export trade to Rhodesia.
A few additional concluding remarks are in order.

First, the

biggest import "sanctions busters," according to the statistics were
Zambia, Malawi, United States, and Switzerland, followed by West
Germany.

While there were other nations which broke the United Nations

sanctions policies, these five countries were the biggest offenders
of the reporting countries.

South Africa and Portugal and its terri-

tories should also be included even though they are non-reporting
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nations,

South Africa was the biggest offender of all.

The biggest export "sanctions busters" according to the statistics during 1968-1973 were Malawi, Australia, Switzerland, West
Germany, Britain, and Zambia, followed way behind by the United States
and France,

Again, both South Africa and Portugal, as non-reporters,

were primary sanctions breakers,
The Special Committee established to monitor sanctions did not
prove to be very effective,

Since it is the responsibility of the

individual nations to submit reports, it is very possible that the
figures mentioned in the preceding tables are inaccurate, 47

However,

despite the possibility that there may be discrepancies in the figures, it is still safe to conclude according to experts that the
biggest offenders of United Nations sanctions policies were those
nations mentioned above,

The greatest problem faced by the committee

is that it did not have the power to force the members who are "sanctions busters" to obey United Nations policies,
Another control factor was the inability of the United Nations
to get non-members like Switzerland and West Germany to comply with
sanctions.

The two countries together bought approximately 10% of

Rhodesia's exports and provided approximately 4.5% of Rhodesia's
imports in 1965,

48 In fact, as of 1965 West Germany was the second

largest European trading partner of Rhodesia, next to Britain.
actually ranked first after Britain imposed sanctions,

She

When West

Germany finally did comply with sanctions in 1968, it was very likely
the result of pressure applied by the Western powers. 49

Neverthe-

less, long-term contracts prior to 1968 were allowed to stand in
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West Germany.

Switzerland, on the other hand, caused a problem because

of her status as a neutral nation.

The major concern with Switzerland,

however, was not over the amount of trade with Rhodesia -- the average
of the 1962-1965 period was not substantial -- but rather with the
fact that the nation was a distribution center for Rhodesian goods for
all of Europe.
Second, based on the preceding statistics and despite the cases
of "sanctions busting," one could make a strong case for the success
of sanctions during the 1965-1973 period, at least with those nations
reporting to the United Nations.

The 16 nations mentioned in Table VI

represented 83% of Rhodesia's exports in 1965 ($330 million out of
$399), but by 1973 they represented only 10% of Rhodesia's exports
($66.8 million out of $640 million).
represented

59%

In Table VII the same nations

of Rhodesia's imports in 1965 ($197 million out of

$334 million) and only 3% in 1973 ($15.7 million out of $480 million).
Both sets of figures indicate dramatic declines in the trade of the
reporting nations with Rhodesia.

However, by finding alternative

markets, instituting clandestine trade practices, and diversifying
its own economy, Rhodesia was able to weather the "sanctions storm"
and prosper in the 1970's.

The major reason for this success was

that South Africa and Portugal, including its territories (Mozambique
and Angola), were willing to support the Smith regime.
Third, i t is interesting to see how most nations interpreted
the policy of comprehensive mandatory sanctions as stated in Resolution 253.

While the intent of the resolution was that all trade

with Rhodesia was to be severed by the members of the United Nations,
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almost none of the nations voting for the resolution were able to
achieve that goal.
Rhodesian Counterstrategies
The Rhodesian response to sanctions was grossly underestimated
by the British.

The Smith regime was well prepared politically and

e conomically to meet the challenge .

Internally, it gained the sup-

port of the Rhodesian populace by eliminating opposition from the
African nationalists and Europeans opposed to UDI.

In addition, it

consolidated its control over the army and the news media.

In

September 1962 and August 1964, the Rhodesian Front banned two African
nationalist parties, the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) and
the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZAND) and detained their leadership, saying t hat the infighting among nationalists was a threat to
law and order.

Joshua Nkomo, head of ZAPU and Ndabaningi Sithole,

head of ZAND, actually spent their next ten years in prison.

With

the l eadership of the opposition effectively immobilized, Smith declared UDI at an opportune time because African morale was at an all
time low, and they were too unorganized to resist,

The African

nationalists were not able to build a revolutionary infrastructure
to oppose UDI,
To eradicate European opposition, the Smith regime undermined
the support of the Rhodesian National Party and its successor, the
Rhodesian Party, which warned of the negative effects of UDI and
advocated a constitutionally-achieved independence.

The Rhodesian

Front's strategy was to adopt the independence issue without explaining
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how it would happen,

It was difficult for the European opposition

to challenge the Rhodesian Front without attacking the struggle for
Rhodesian sovereignty,50
To ensure that opposition within the army was eliminated, Major
General J, Anderson, General Officer commanding the Rhodesian army,
was retired on the grounds of age, but in reality because of his
opposition to lIDI, 51

After UDI any army move to suppress the inde-

pendence movement was eliminated by appeals from the British government to Rhodesia to avoid violence,
The Rhodesian regime also moved to control the media and use it
as a preparation for UDio

It portrayed Rhodesia as a target of world

conspiracy and placed loyal men in key broadcasting positions.

It

eliminated African opposition by banning the African Daily News in
1964.

In addition, at the time of lIDI there was a blackout of news

except for pro-regime ideas.
Smith made sure that the white minority in the country favored
independence by having a referendum prior to lIDI in which there were
58,091 "yes" votes and 6906 "no" votes. 53
The Smith regime and the Rhodesian people also countered the
economic impact of sanctions,

To develop counterstrategies in the

short run, the government sent out instructions to all major economic
interest groups prior to UDI to get some idea of the impact of sanctions.

Smith asked for advice from the business community, espec-

ially those who opposed lIDI.

In addition, since the Smith regime

was able to decide the date of lIDI, in the short run he was able to
control the impact of sanctions,

Rhodesia's trade was lowest in
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November and highest in early s:pring when the tobacco and sugar crops
are exported,

By selecting November for UDI, the Rhodesians were

able to avoid the immediate effects of sanctions,

Rhodesia also at-

tempted to gain assurances from South Africa, Mozambique, Zambia,
and Malawi that economic relationships would not be disru:pted,

In

November 1964, the nation signed a five year trade :pact with South
Africa, and it sought alternative markets in case Zambia and Malawi
decided to apply sanctions.

In addition, Rhodesia withdrew a large

amount of its reserves from London to South Africa before Britain
moved to freeze them • .54

In response to a freeze on £,5, 1 million in

investment income owed Rhodesia by Britain and Zambia, Rhodesia
countered by blocking ;[8,8 million owed to them, therefore, netting

£ 3, 7 million, 55
In the longer term, Rhodesia was forced to counter the major
two-part objective of United Nations sanctions, 1-ihich were designed
to deprive Rhodesia of needed imports, thereby creating a high level
of consumer dissatisfaction within the country and also to deprive
Rhodesia of markets for its exports, thereby :preventing the nation
from obtaining foreign exchange earnings necessary to hel:p it :pay its
im:port bills and to grow as a nation.

Rhodesia combatted the United

Nations sanctions objectives by instituting measures (import quotas ·
and diversification) to hold down import bills to keep the economy
going while the country searched for alternative markets for its
exports through loopholes in United Nations :policies,
Immediately after UDI and the institution of sanctions by Britain, the Smith regime :put through emergency legislation designed to
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avert a balance of :payments crisis in light of the situation that
exports would be restricted.

Executiv~of international companies

were :persuaded to act in the national interest by diversifying their
:product lines according to government import substitution guidelines
and to invest locally rather than outside the country.

Since most of

the management of foreign industry was centered in the hands of Rhodesians, these enterprises acted like nationalized or de facto
expropriated enterprises.5 6
The government also imposed regulations controlling manpower in
order to prevent unemployment among Rhodesians.

Furthermore, unem-

ployment among whites was eased as they were "reassigned" to public
service jobs throughout the country.

African unemployment was eased

somewhat by the forced departure of workers from Malawi and Mozam.biq_ue.57
Tobacco that could not be exported was stockpiled at government
expense until new markets could be found or until new structural
adjustments in the economy occurred.

These new structural adjust-

ments took one major form -- import substitution.

The purpose of

this policy was to make Rhodesia less dependent on foreign imports
and more self-sufficient.
The import substitution policy had a great effect on the industrial sector as manufacturers switched from producing goods for export
to producing substitutes for commodities that were previously imported.
By allocating foreign exchange away from unnecessary items to those
that could be manufactured locally, the government assisted Rhodesian businesses to become more self-sufficient and make use of all

available plant capacity,

While the economy was mainly geared to

agricultural export-oriented policies prior to UDI, afterwards the
manufacturing industry blossomed with this new government approach,
In fact, the number of enterprises almost doubled, and the number of
domestically manufactured products increased from 1059 to 3837
between 1966 and 1970,

58 To finance the expansion in the manufac-

turing sector, the government relied heavily on South African investments, government financing, and reinvestment of blocked profits by
foreign and domestic firms,
In agriculture the government forced farmers to switch from the
key export crop (tobacco and sugar) syndrome to food and industrial
crops,

Quotas placed on the amount of tobacco that could be grown

forced farmers to diversify into the production of wheat , maize,
vegetables, and dairy products and brought Rhodesia to a point of
near self-sufficiency i n food crops.

By diversifying into cotton

production, farmers also aided a quickly expanding textile and
clothing industry,

As far as agriculture is concerned, Rhodesia no

longer produces for export, but if there happens to be a surplus, the
nation tries to export the commodities through the loopholes i n
sanctions policies.
To counter the second objective of United Nations sanctions,
Rhodesia searched for alternative markets through loopholes.

As was

already discussed earlier, Rhodesian businesses had a great deal of
success finding markets for their exports , especially those from the
nation's mining industry.

Rhodesia increased the production and

processing of chrome ore and ferrochrome, especially for the American
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market, as well as nickel, copper, steel, iron and asbestos.
mineral production increased annually at an average rate of

In fact,

7%

during

1966-1974. 59
The Special Committee Established in Pursuance of Resolution 253
considered a number of possible violations during its annual sessions.60

Without examining those in detail, let it suffice to say

that Rhodesia was not only able to find obvious loopholes like the
trade statistics indicate in the previous section, but was also able
through clandestine measures to establish trading outposts throughout Europe and also in South Africa.
number of patterns:

The loophole can follow a

importers can falsify documents relating to the

origin of the imports; goods can change their points of embarcation
in mid-ocean; goods are usually sold to one country and then reexported to another.

The best example of this type of action is the

U1TIVEX affair where a business in Switzerland, in conjunction with a
South African firm, acted as a coordinating body for the sale of
Rhodesian chrome in Europe.

By routing shipments of chrome through

Mozambique, falsifying certificates of origin, and using a corporation in Switzerland as an intermediary, UNIVEX was believed to have
handled exports of 10,000 tons of chrome in 1968-69 .

61

Italian, West

German, and Dutch businesses have similarly assisted Rhodesia in
.
evad ing
sane t·ions. 62

South Africa is reported to have gone so far

as to repack Rhodesian goods in South African packages for reexport.63
The mineral that was most crucial to Rhodesia's survival,
especially in the early stages of sanctions, was oil, and Rhodesia
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has had little trouble procuring it despite the British blockade of
Beira,

The British blockade forced the shutdown of a pipeline carry-

ing crude oil from Beira on the Mozambique coast to Umtali in Rhodesia and subsequently shut down the Rhodesian refinery built at
Umtali by an oil group of which the major partners were Mobil, Caltex, Total, Shell, and B,P.

64

Because of the Umtali shutdown, Rho-

desia for the last thirteen years has not only had to import crude
oil but fuels and non-fuels (lubricants) as well,

This has been

public knowledge since the imposition of sanctions in 1965, but because of a web of secrecy, it has not been clear until recently which
companies were involved or how they were doing it. 65
There is evidence that the five oil companies mentioned above,
espe cially Mobil, have been responsible for providing Rhodesia with
her oil needs,

66

As subsidiaries in Rhodesia of either United States

or European parent companies, these five companies under "direct
watch" by the Smith government, have allegedly operated with their
subsidiaries in Mozambique (until closure of the border) and South
Africa to break United Nations sanctions.

Evidence suggests that

Mobil was the principal provider of Rhodesian oil in the beginning
and that the other companies became involved in the early 1970's,

67

While evidence shows that the oil may have come from the South
African subsidiaries, it also indicates that the oil did not come
directly from them, but came via intermediary companies in South
Africa,

68

Mobil called this technique a "paper-chase,

1169

Its

purpose was to minimize the chance that the scheme would be detected,
The Rhodesian recipient has usually been GENTA, 70 an agency set up
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by the Smith regime to coordinate the importation of oil.

It has

served first as a front for the government and secondly as a tight
control over the importation of oil :products.
The most economical way to transport oil to Rhodesia was by
rail or ship from South Africa to the Mozambican :port of Lourenco
Marques and then by rail to Rhodesia.

However, when the FRELIMO

government imposed sanctions against Rhodesia in March 1976, and,
subsequently closed its border, Rhodesia was forced to use more costly
routes for its oil importation,

The first and most important route

now is a direct rail link between Rhodesia and South Africa opened
u:p in 1974.

The second is a road between South Africa and Rhodesia,

and the third is a rail link between South Africa to Rhodesia via
Botswana.

The first route is by far the most advantageous, and most

importantly, it shows how completely dependent Rhodesia is on South
Africa for its :petroleum :products,
While it appears that sanction legislation written in Britain,
France, Netherlands, and the United States does not apply to South
African subsidiaries, thereby exempting the oil companies from
:prosecution -- unless :perhaps intent to supply Rhodesia could be
:proved -- the entire situation :produces a serious loophole in United
Nations sanctions :policies, 71

In the final analysis, Rhodesia is the

beneficiary,
The Oil Conspiracy does make a convincing case and :presents a
fascinating analysis of alleged "sanctions busting,"

Whether one

wants to believe the evidence or not, the fact of the matter is that
Rhodesia has received oil from somewhere, and it has come in sufficient
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quantities to keep the country running for the past thirteen years.
However, pressure is building from African sources to stop the flow.
Zambia has initiated legal proceedings against the five oil companies
mentioned earlier.7 2
The Smith regime has tried throughout the economic boycott to
keep the white population as removed as possible from the effects of
economic sanctions, thereby thwarting the United Nations objective of
trying to create citizen dissatisfaction with the regime,

The govern-

ment has, for the most part, been able to maintain white incomes and
consumption, often at the expense of the African population.

The

ability of the Smith regime to generate public support among whites
for its programs and maintain a relatively high morale under the circumstances (at least until the mid-1970's) has allowed Rhodesia to
successfully resist the sanctions of the United Nations ,
When Britain and the United Nations imposed sanctions, they
acted under the assumption that a cut in exports or in imports would
send incomes down, creating pressures within Rhodesia for a return to
legality and subsequent majority rule, 73

While the success of this

kind of action was disputed by University of York economists, Timothy
Curtin and David Murray, back in 1967

74

desian incomes would not drop far enough

because they felt that Rho-

(25%)

to cause citizen pres-

sure on the regime, subsequent policies were instituted anyway.
Rhodesia shattered United Nations objectives and confirmed the conclusions of Curtin and Murray.

Expanded trade with South Africa

and other sanctions breakers, accompanied in Rhodesia by government
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measures such as import substitution designed to make Rhodesia more
self-sufficient, provided the nation with a successful means of resisting United Nations sanctions.
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V,

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The purpose of this chapter is to substantiate the conclusions
made in chapters three and four that ineffective British foreign policy, loopholes in United Nations sanctions policies, and innovative and
devious Rhodesian counterstrategies resulted during the 1965-1978 period in the unsuccessful attempt to return Rhodesia to a state of legality and to effect a change to majority rule,

'Ibis objective will

be accomplished through a brief summary of the impact of economic sanctions on Rhodesia in terms of the available statistics,

Unfortunately,

attempts to do this are hampered , in some cases, by inaccurate statistical data, and, in others, by outright contradictory data,

The great-

est contradiction seems to appear in British figures, which attempt to
paint a favorable picture of the success of sanctions, at l east in the
late 1960's, and the Rhodesian figures, when they are available, which
attempt to show how Rhodesia has thrived since the implementation of

.
1
sane t ions,

The correct statistics probably appear somewhere in

between, but at least these can indicate some important trends,

The

intent of the analysis is to split the economic impact of sanctions
on Rhodesia into two time , periods:

1965-1974 and 1975-1978 ,

Economic Impact 1965-1974
During the initial period, sanctions failed to damage the economy
severely, despite the significant declines in Rhodesian imports and
exports during the 1966-1969 period,
96

2

Imports were kept at a tolerable
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level by import substitution strategies.
began again to increase dramatically.

By 1969 Rhodesian exports

One must remember that avail-

able statistics do not acknowledge fully the success the Rhodesians
had in clandestine trade ,

However, figures show a marked deteriora-

tion in Rhodesia's visible trade balance from a surplus of £40 million in 1965 to a deficit of £ 8 million in 1968. 3 Rhodesia was able
to gain on balance, though, by repudiating commitments on past
borrowing and controlling the transfer of dividends and interest, so
that the net requirement for foreign exchange on current account
actually fell.

4

As a result, the balance of payments on current

account moved from a surplus of £ 15 million in 1965 to an approximate balance in 1966, to a
deficit in 1968 of

£10 million deficit in 1967 to a large

£ 27 million. 5 The inflow in 1968 of over .£25

million in private investment, however , brought the net amount to a
meager deficit of

£ 1.6 million. 6 Up to 1972 when the visible trade

balance recovered to show a surplus, the Rhodesian government was
able to keep the nation's balance of payments in line by raising the
capital amount reserves either through private or public sector
investments,

Because of the favorable visible trade balance, by

1973 the nation achieved its largest surplus.
After a 4% decline in the gross domestic product in 1966, 7 due
to initial British and Zambian export-import restrictions and the
transitional period involving the institution of the import substitution program in agriculture and industry, the Rhodesian economy
experienced remarkable economic growth through 1974,
able to average an annual growth rate of

7%

The nation was

for the entire post-UDI

98
period and actually experienced an impressive growth rate of
during 1970-1974.

8

8.5%

This is a remarkable figure even if the rate were

exaggerated. 9
While all key sectors of the Rhodesian economy -- agriculture,
manufacturing, mining -- were hurt by sanctions, agriculture was hit
the hardest.

Sugar and tobacco commodities suffered the most.

example , less than

40%

For

of the tobacco crop was sold in 1966 1 10 and

today the number of tobacco farmers has been cut in half from 3000 t o

1500. 11 Yet by 1971 and 1972 the agricultural sector had recovered.

However , in 1973, due to a severe drought, the output again declined

12 Rising world commodity prices, however, especially in meat,
sugar, and tobacco, offset the decline in agricultural volume. 13 The

by 16%.

shortage of tobacco also enabled Rhodesia to sell its entire stockpile accumulated after UDI, although it probably had to do so at

14 In fact, by 1975 the total volume of agricultural output had increased by 72% of the 1964 leve1. 15
lower than current world prices.

Mineral exports were less affected by sanctions and with
increased world demand for Rhodesian products, the volume of mineral
production increased at an annual average rate of 7% between 1966
and 1974.

16

It was claimed that mineral exports set new records in

1972-73, 17 and that production alone during 1976 increased 35% over
.
18
th e previous year .
The steady growth in the importance of manufacturing indicates
Rhodesia's transition from underdeveloped to semi-developed status.
In 1965 manufacturing had a 19.7% share of the gross domestic production compared to a combined share of 24.1% for agriculture and

19
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By 1974 it had increased to 25 , 2% against 24% for agricul-

mining.

ture and mining,

20

It was the manufacturing sector of the Rhodesian

economy which actually benefitted from sanctions and the subsequent
governmental emphasis on import substitution to a point where it
registered an average annual growth rate of 12% per year during
1966-1974,

21

This is obviously a very impressive figure,

It is also important to note that gross national income was
maintained at more than adequate l eve ls,

Despite an initial drop of

4% in 1966, the impact of which was felt particularly by the minority
of whites in the agricultural sector, gross national income grew at
the rate of g/o in 1967-68,

22

Figures indicate that employment and

average earnings rose faster during 1966-1971,after sanctions were
imposed, than they did prior to UDI. 23

Moreover, white Rhodesians

were able to maintain their standard of living between 1965-1971 because average earnings rose 35% while the consumer price index went
up 18%.

24

In addition, between 1971 and 1974, national disposable

income increased 46%, 25

This present annual rate of approximately

2% seems to fit the explanation provided by Curtin and Murray that
"over a longer t ime horizon, 2% to

'J'/o growth of national income

although inadequate in terms of the rate of the African population
increase would provide for reasonable increases in per capita income of the static white population, 1126

In other words, there would

not be enough citizen economic dissatisfaction to create an environment for political change,

As one can see, the political and economic repercussions that
were supposed to occur in Rhodesia after sanctions did not result in
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the fall of the Smith regime from power,

Both UDI and United Nations

sanctions forced major structural changes in the Rhodesian economy ,
which actually benefitted an economy that had probably become too
dependent for its own good on cash crop production,

Agriculture was

forced to shift from production of tobacco and sugar as export crops
to consumer-oriented food crops and to industrial crops which, in
t urn , supported the food processing and textile industries,

Manu-

facturing shifted to the production of consumer and capital goods,
And mining, which continued to be mostly export-oriented , also bene fitted the economy by earning most of the foreign exchange needed to
help finance capital goods imports for manufacturing and large scale
agricultural projects , 27

The end result during 1965-1974 was impres-

sive economic growth , especially in light of United Nations sanctions,
Economic Impact 1975-1978
Despite Rhodesia's economic success during 1965-1974, events
have occurred in the last three and one-half years , which seem to
indicate that the political and economic success of the Smith regime
might be short-lived,

Economically, events have taken a t urn for the

worse , partially because of expanded United Nations sanctions and
partially because of an expanded guerrilla war ,

While this paper will

deal briefly with the guerrilla war l ater in this section, the major
intent here i s to focus on expanded economic problems caused by
United Nations sanctions policies.

The impact of the guerrilla war

on both the economic and political status of the Rhodesian Front and
Ian Smith will be studi ed in greater detail in Part II of the thesis ,
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United Nations sanctions are now more effective because they
have been made more universal,

First, in January 1973, Zambia

implemented more comprehensive sanctions,

By late 1973 the nation

had closed its borders completely to Rhodesian trade.

Although the

United Nations recognized Zambia's predicament and on March 10, 1973
appealed to all states for "immediate technical, financial, and
material assistance 1128 for the country, the bulk of the aid did not
arrive, and Zambia continued to suffer, 29

However, the border

closure was also particularly damaging for Rhodesian Railways which
lost the lucrative traffic of Zambian copper.
Secondly, the independence of Mozambique from Portugal in June

1975, also changed Rhodesia's economic position,

After instituting

a radical Marxist government, Mozambique changed from being a close
ally of Rhodesia to being a political antagonist.

On March 3, 1976,

Mozambique closed its borders to Rhodesian trade, worxh approximately

$49 million per year, 30 On March 17, the Security Council made the
same appeal to member states for assistance to Mozambique that it
had made for Zambia,

In April Henry Kissinger supported the resolu-

tion by pledging $12.5 million in aid from the United States, 31
Thirdly, on March 20, 1977, the United States repealed the Byrd
Amendment which had authorized importation of chrome from Rhodesia
for security reasons, 32 thereby depriving Rhodesia of millions of
dollars worth of export trade ($26 million in 1973).
The significance of the effects of the expansion of United
Nations sanctions by Zambia, Mozambique and the United States is
difficult to measure.

Rhodesia has undoubtedly found alternative
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markets for exports and imports, presumably from South Africa ,

With

the closure of the Mozambique border , however, Rhodesia has lost a
useful export market and is now forced to incur the added costs of
lengthening her lines of communication and trade with foreign markets.
In addition, the closure of both the Zambian and Mozambique borders
have created substantial transport problems for Rhodesian goods,
thereby making the nation more dependent on South Africa for her
merchandise,

This presents a real threat to Smith if South Africa

uses this monopoly of Rhodesian transport lines to the sea as a pressure lever for political change,

Moreover, the imposition of sanc-

tions on chrome has indicated that the United States is more fully
committed to a policy of majority rule in Rhodesia than it used to be.
The closures of Zambian and Mozambican borders to Rhodesian
trade may or may not have an adverse effect on Rhodesia's economy .
Much depends on how much of the slack South Africa is willing to
pick up.

They do, however, provide significant political and military

consequences for Rhodesia,

Both governments are openly committed to

the demise of the Smith regime and are doing their part to enhance
that situation by providing sanctuaries for Rhodesian nationalists
to make attacks on the country.
The statistics that are available indicate that Rhodesia is
experiencing economic problems.

The economy is under a much greater

strain than in preceding years ,

After the phenomenal growth rate of

manufacturing from 1965 to 1974, there was a fall in output of

7%

in

1976,33 The country ran net balance of payments deficit of$ R 33.1
in 1974 and$ R 26.6 in 1975. 34 Tourism , a source of foreign exchange
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fell by

4o%

in 1976 to 140,000 people, down from 244,000 in 1975 and

from 339,000 in 1972. 35
1.1% and in 1976 by 3.4%.

$

Real gross domestic product fell in 1975 by
36

Although the 1976/77 budget earmarked

R 84.4 million for defense, an increase of

4o%

over 1975/76, it

may be closer to R $125 million by adding defense-related expenditures from the ministries of the Treasury, Police, Interior, and
Roads. 37

The sales tax has been upped from 5% to 15% in two stages3 8

to help pay for the war effort.

Perhaps indicative of the situation

in Rhodesia is the fact that economic problems and the guerrilla war
have increased white emigration, which resulted in net losses of
7000 whites in 197639 and 3600 in the first q_uarter of 1977.
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What

is significant about the outflow of whites is that most are professionals, who provide technological and administrative services to
the country.
Evaluation of the United Nations Role
In retrospect, it doesn't appear that United Nations economic
sanctions have been effective.

The political and economic repercus-

sions that were supposed to occur in Rhodesia after the institution
of sanctions did not result in the fall of the Smith regime from
power.

The British were unable to resolve the Rhodesian problem even

though they had the res:ponsi bili ty because they did not have the
power,

They were faced with the alternative of either acce:pting the

sit uation existing in Rhodesia, which meant permitting a racially
segregated society as a basis for independence, or intervening forcefully to alter it.

41

Unable or unwilling to do either, they chose a
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compromise which in fact made matters worse,

Part of that compromise

was a reliance on economic sanctions and the support of the United
Nations.

Just as Britain would not use force to bring about a consti-

tutional settlement, so the Wilson regime would also not challenge
the sources of support for the Smith regime,
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As a result, Britain

helped implement a United Nations policy that could not possibly have
resulted in a settlement.

In the first place, Portugal, South Africa

and others continued to violate the sanctions.

Secondly, the Smith

regime, entrenched in power and buoyed by innovative emergency measures and by assurances of continued economic support , was able to
hold out a gainst a constitutional settlement that would have resulted
in African majority rule.
Perhaps the above conclusion is a bit too harsh .

The outcome

might have been different if some ·of the conditions under which
sanctions were imposed were changed.
following changes were made:

Suppose, for example, that the

that the timing of sanctions had been

handled more effectively, thereby eliminating the piecemeal approach
and providing for the institution of comprehensive mandatory measures much sooner than 1968; that Rhodesia had not had the capacity
to implement effective internal measures to combat sanctions; that
South Africa, the biggest obstacle to the success of sanctions had
agreed to support the economic boycott; that sanctions had been
extended to nations not cooperating with the Uni tecL Nations against
Rhodesia; that the African population in Rhodesia had instituted
internal sanctions ( general strikes) in conjunction with the United
Nations external measure s; or as a last resort, that force had been

105
used i n the matter,

All of these conditions presume that the United

Nations would have had greater controls and enforcement powers,
characteristics more consistent for a national government ,

In real-

i ty , the organization does not have those powers, and while it is safe
to say that if South Africa were to support United Nations sanctions,
the "rebe llion" in Rhodesia would come to an abrupt halt, it is l ess
like ly t hat the other conditions would have produced the same results,
with the possible exception of the situation of internal sanctions or
expanded sanctions to those uncooperative nations,
While sanctions in theory provide a feasible policy tool for
meeting stated obje ct ives, in reality they do not,
themselves they do not,

At least by

The crucial point is that the divergence of

opinion by nations concerning their own economic and political
priorities makes it almost impossible to provide a universal front
to reach th ose stated objectives,

This fact is clearly borne out by

the reality that South Africa and oth ers saw sanctions as being less
important than something else, thereby creating loopholes,

The

politics involved with deciding on sanctions as evidenced by the
split between Britain and the Commonwealth and between the United
Nations and South Africa precluded the possibility that United Nations
sanctions in Rhodesia would work,

This is why Michael Reisman's

comment that "the process of sanctions and enforcement has fared
poorly1143 is so relevant to the Rhodesian crisis,

In addition,

sanctions can, and have in the case of Rhodesia, caused suffering
among the participating nations (Zambia) as well as among the masses
(Africans), despi te the fact that they are also aimed at the elite
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ruling body of the nation.
The argument that sanctions were really the only viable policy
alternative that the United Nations had in trying to resolve the
Rhodesian crisis raises some other points worth discussing,

In addi-

tion to the effects on the Rhodesian economy, sanctions have achieved
a number of more limited aim~:

44

they have denied outright victory

to the Smith regime; they have kept the regime in diplomatic isolation; they have forced the regime to go on struggling for economic
survival; they have internationalized the human rights issue ; and
they have sustained the unacceptabili ty of the Rhodesian regime,

In

sum, sanctions have helped to rally most of the international community to the "cause" and have lent a measure of illegitimacy to the
Smith regime and its policies,
The more limited obj e ct ives, however, have become less important
in light of the general i neffectiveness of sanctions on the economy.
One must, therefore, question the credibility of the United Nations
as a peacemaker in world affairs in view of what has happened in
Rhodesia,

The need for conflict resolution is still very great,

Werner Levi has commented that "the institutionalization of measures
for the non-violent settlement of international conflicts has been
called the central problem of international politics and international law, 1145

There is still a large gap, however, between the need

for conflict resolution and actual achievement.

Cyrus Vance said in

1971, "The United Nations, despite twenty-five years of modest
achievement , still has little capacity to shape a more orderly
world,,.The political achievements have been sporadic and on the
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whole unsatisfactory. 1146
In the words of David Forsythe, the United Nations has used the
techniques of mediation-conciliation, arbitration-adjudication , and
enforcement-sanction in attempting to attain peaceful settlements to
world conflict.

47

Yet enforcement-sanction, the major concern in

Part I,has failed in Rhodesia for lack of a consensus in support of
sanctions measures,
Two other points are worth discussing ,

The first is the posi-

tion of some that sub-organizations within the United Nations do not
favor conciliation, but rather follow a practice of brow-beating
target states into complying with their points of view.

48 This

strategy can be applied to the case of Rhodesia where the Third World
countries used the Special Committee of Twenty-four and the General
Assembly in their attempts to pressure Britain into using force to
"decolonize Rhodesia."

In fact, George Mudge has argued that pos-

sibly United Nations activities have contributed to the politicization of the racial question in Rhodesia, that the highly publicized
condemnation of the Smith regime may have had a dysfunctional effect on domestic politics and actually contributed to more racial

.

ex t remism.
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While it is likely that Smith would not have acted any

differently in terms of implementing political change in Rhodesia,
he still was able to use the actions of the United Nations as a means
of rallying support for the Rhodesian Front.

While the actions of

the Third World nations on the issue of Rhodesia do depict an inevitable kind of brow-beating, at the same time, they have helped those
nations to develop a political consciousness at a much faster rate ,
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The second point is that certain nations' perspectives of power
sometimes cause them to bypass the United Nations in favor of national
mediators.
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While it is premature to discuss this point in detail

at this time as it will become an integral component of Part II, it
is nevertheless worth mentioning.

What it means is that nations

usually world powers -- either for reasons of politics or selfinterest, feel more comfortable about solving international problems
on their own.

They, therefore , go over the head of the United Nations

in trying to end the dispute.

This argument is especially appro-

priate in the Rhodesian case, where both Britain and the United
States in the mid-1970's have, with the assistance of South Africa,
attempted to resolve the Rhodesian crisis,

The national priorities

of individual states become more important than the efforts of the
United Nations.

Or, at the very least, these states feel that the

United Nations is incapable of being the peacemaker,
In conclusion, United Nations sanctions against Rhodesia have
had only limited success.

The resolution of the Rhodesian conflict

must be analyzed in terms of other dimensions, namely the impact of
the guerrilla war and outside forces on the Smith regime.

It must

be emphasized that only in examining sanctions by themselves can it
be argued that they are ineffective.

In conjunction with an

expanded guerrilla war and pressure from outside forces, economic
sanctions are proving to be successful in helping to effect political change in Rhodesiao

Coincidentally, Rhodesia began to feel the

economic strain of sanctions in 1976 at the same time that the
guerrilla war was escalated and that pressure began to be exerted by
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South Africa on the Smith regime to find a political solution to
the problem,
Finally, in light of the preceding evidence, United Nations
economic sanctions alone will not be an effective policy tool in
fut ure conflicts as long as there are loopholes,

After a comprehen-

sive study of Rhodesian sanctions , one can only tend to agree with
Forsythe 52 when he states that
,,,economic sanctions entail such difficulties
that they have not proven a clearly effective
way to rectify impermissible behavior,,,military
sanctions have not been tried through true collective security because of even greater problems
that is greater costs and greater suffering , Inis
Claude has noted a whole series of psychological
and material problems impeding collective security
through the U.N. Little on the horizon indicates
that these problems will be overcome, and indeed
Claude suggests that if they could be overcome a
global consensus would support not just collective
security but true world government. This insight
demonstrates how far the U.N. is from effective
enforcement,, ,O ne is forced to reaffirm that UN
peacemaking, narrowly defined, is insufficient
for what ails the world,
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VI.

FAILURE AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE

Africa in this decade is a testing ground of the
world's conscience and vision. That blacks and
whites live together in harmony and equality is
a moral imperative of our time. Let us prove
that these goals can be realized by human choice,
that justice can command by the force of its
rightness instead of by force of arms. These are
the ideals that bind all the races of mankind. They
are the mandate of decency and progress and peace.
This drama will be played out in our lifetime, Our
children will inherit either our success or our
failure. The world watches with hope and we approach
it with confidence. So let it be said that Black
people and White people working together achieved on
this continent -- which has suffered so much and seen
so much injustice -- a new era of peace, well-being
and human dignity.1
These words, spoken by Dr. Henry Kissinger in Lusaka, Zambia, in
April 1976, place the problem at hand in perspective.

In the case of

Rhodesia , the issue is not whether the human rights goal of black
majority rule will be achieved , but when.

The issue is more than a

moral imperative, it is an inevitability.

The question is whether or

not black majority rule can be achieved peacefully, and, in addition,
whether or not it will provide conditions under which blacks and
whites can live together in equality and harmony.
The assumption, therefore , is that political change in the form
of black majority rule will be achieved in Rhodesia.

The thesis of

Part I is that United Nations economic sanctions have not, and will
not by themselves , cause political change in Rhodesia.

What will

cause political change , as examined in Part II, is one of two events :
a peacefully-negotiated settlement or a dictated peace following the
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conclusion of a violent civil war.

While economic sanctions are a

factor in the outcome of the Rhodesian crisis, the current guerrilla
war in Rhodesia will provide the major impact leading to either
solution to the problem.
the questions are:

Assuming that majority rule is inevitable,

How long will it take for majority rule to be

achieved, and who will wield political power in the name of the
majority?
Rhodesia has become increasingly dominated politically and economically by the guerrilla war.

To understand why the nation has

reached this stage of confrontation politics, it is necessary to provide a brief background of the events leading up to the present situation.

This background information will indicate that there have

been many unsuccessful attempts at achieving a negotiated peace in
Rhodesia.
Formation of ZAPU and ZANU
To understand the effect of the war, one must examine the attitudes of black nationalists and the development of their opposition
parties.

It has already been mentioned that the Zimbabwe African

Peoples Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)
were banned as opposition parties prior to UDI.

Since that time,

their military wings have operated either undercover in Rhodesia or
from sanctuaries in neighboring Zambia, Botswana, and Mozambique.
Their major goal is the military defeat of the Smith regime ,
U:p until 1976 the African nationalists were not formidable foes
for the white minority regime in Rhodesia,

Racked by internal
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conflict, the African leadership was not able to offer an effectively organized means of opposition to the Smith regime in its
quest for majority rule.

The first attempts to initiate independence

for Rhodesia under majority rule began in 1960 with the formation of
the National Democratic Party (NnP) under the leadership of Joshua
Nkomo, Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, and others.

This party pressured

Britain into having a constitutional conference in 1961.

When the

NnP did not achieve their demand for one man-one vote in the 1961
Constitution, it tried to force Britain into rescinding the constitution and was promptly banned as a political party,

Nkomo and

Sithole regrouped and formed ZAPU to lobby the United Nations into
helping to bring about change in Rhodesia.

Recognized in Rhodesia

as a threat to the white regime of Sir Edgar Whitehead, ZAPU was
banned in 1962, and its leadership detained,

When the Smith regime

came to power in 1962, the African leadership was released from detention,

It was at that time that Sithole organized ZANU as a

splinter party because he felt that Nkomo had not fulfilled his promise to have a successful revolution in Rhodesia,
Because of the split in leadership and the lack of organization,
the African nationalists were not able to provide a united front to
the Smith re gime, either at the time of UDI or in the years following,
Rather than competing with the Smith regime during the 1964-1970
period, they fought among themselves for political legitimacy.

The

Zimbabwe revolution was devoid of ideology and revolutionary leadership,

The cause of the guerrillas was hurt further by the fact that

both Nkomo and Si thole had to spend the years 1964 to 1974 in prison,
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Formation of the African National Council
A turning point for the nationalists' cause came in 1971 with
the establishment of the African National Council (ANC) by Bishop
Abel Muzorewa to mobilize African opposition to the Home-Smith Agreement, a settlement for independence negotiated between British Foreign
Minister, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, and Ian Smith,

This agreement mod-

ified the 1969 Constitution to the point of conceding the principle
of majority rule at an unspecified date in the future through the
progressive addition of more African members of parliament to the
Legislative Assembly,

However, because of franchise qualifications

based on education and income -- it was estimated that majority rule
would not have been reached until 2035,

2

In fact, Smith said , "•••

no European need harbour any anxiety about the security of his
future in Rhodesia,"3
Although the terms for Rhodesian independence were thought by
many to be no more than a token gesture to the first four British
principles, the agreement did contain, in conformity with the fifth
principle, provisions for a test of the agreement's acceptability
"to the people of Rhodesia as a whole, 114

A British Commission under

the leadership of former High Court Judge , Lord Pearce, was sent to
Rhodesia to determine whether or not the Home-Smith Agreement met
the test of acceptability,

Mass African opposition, developed by

the African National Council, showed the Pearce Commission that the
new constitution was unacceptable to the African population, and it
was subsequently withdrawn by the British government ,

Although the
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African National Council was recognized as a "legal" organization in
continued negotiations with Smith, it met with harassment, and its
leaders were often detained, 5

Negotiations between ANC and Smith

finally broke down in June 1974, precipitating the African National
Council to reverse itself and support a policy of armed struggle as
the only means to achieve African majority rule,
Lusaka Agreement
The African leadership and the Rhodesian government again tried
to reach a settlement in December 1974 in Lusaka , Zambia,

These

meetings were prompted by the collapse of the Portuguese empire in
Africa and the possibility that the guerrilla war in Rhodesia would
spread beyond its borders and engulf all of southern Africa,

The

talks were held between Rhodesia , South Africa (which had troops in
Rhodesia), and Zambia, Tanzania, and Botswana, which supported the
nationalist movement.

While the political viewpoints of Rhodesia's

three black neighbors varied widely with those beliefs held by
Rhodesia and South Africa, all of the nations had a direct interest
in keeping the war from spreading ,
The diplomatic effort was kept secret until December when
Nkomo and Sithole were released from prison and agreed to unite
ZAPU and ZANU under the leadership of Muzorewa and the ANC,

Further

prisoner releases, normal political activity , and a cease-fire were
intended as part of the basis for a negotiated settlement.

In

addition, South Africa began to withdraw its military forces from
Rhodesia as part of the agreement,

The leaders of the ANC and the
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Smith regime were finally brought together under the sponsorship of
President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and Prime Minister John Vorster

1975.

of South Africa in the historic Victoria Falls talks in August

The talks failed, however, and the terms of the Lusaka Agreement
were never met.

There was not a ceasefire, as militant members of

ZAPU and ZANU continued to fight.
released.

Political detainees were not

Instead, more African nationalists were arrested.

Thus ,

despite the pressure of Zambia on the guerrillas and South Africa on
Rhodesia, the settlement was never realized.

More than anything,

the failure of the Victoria Falls talks pointed out two important
problems in the resolution of the Rhodesian crisis:

(1) the deep

split within the African leadership and (2) the intransigence of the
Rhodesian leadership and its unwillingness to accept the role that
South Africa wanted it to play.

Although the Lusaka Agreement and

the subsequent talks at Victoria Falls failed to produce a settlement to the Rhodesian problem, they were a significant prelude to
renewed involvement by Britain and the initial involvement by the
United States in the crisis,
British Proposals
Influenced by the presence of Cuban forces in Angola and the
fact that the African front-line states (Zambia, Botswana, Tanzania,
Angola, and newly independent Mozambique) were gearing up to support
the guerrillas by providing sanctuaries from which they could mount
raids against Rhodesia , British Foreign Minister James Callaghan
attempted to play a greater role in negotiations.

The British role
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to that point had been to remain an interested, but detached, party, 6
Although committed to a negotiated settlement through the use of a
constitutional convention, the British had not done so because the
major condition for majority rule had not been met -- renunciation of
UDI and the acceptance of majority rule prior to independence,

How-

ever , the solution which Callaghan proposed -- transition to African
majority rule over an 18 month to two year period, no independence
before majority rule, and the negotiation of a new constitution
implementing majority rule -- was essentially the same proposal that
the African National Council had advocated earlier and that had been
rejected by the Smith government . 7 What is important is that Callaghan,
in announcing his solution to Parliament on March 22, 1976, admitted
that the British government was in no position to impose such a solu-

.
8
t J.On,

Instead, Britain was trying to put forth proposals for others

to consider.

If an agreement could be worked out, Britain in t urn

would provide financial and economic assistance to ensure a background
in which both blacks and whites could live in harmony in Rhodesia,
The problem was that Callaghan's proposals were rejected by Ian
Smith as "no less extreme than those of the ANC, 119
Diplomatic Efforts of Henry Kissinger
During his first official state visit to black Africa, United
States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, appeared to have been
influenced by the successful Russo-Cuban intervention in Angola,
leading the United States to emphasize a commitment to black majority rule in southern Africa,

In April 1976, Kissinger announced in
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Lusaka, Zambia, that the United States desired a raJ)id, just, and
African solution to the issue of Rhodesia,

° Kissinger's involve-

1

ment turned into a "shuttle di:Plomacy" as he visited the African
front-line states and South Africa :Prior to holding talks with Ian
Smith,

Those talks culminated in a Smith-Kissinger Agreement on

.
.
. 1 es : 11
f ive
Jlrincip

(1) majority rule within two years; (2) a multi-

racial interim government including a Council of State to be composed of an equal number of whites and blacks with a white chairman;

(3) a Council of Ministers with a black majority, but with the
Ministries of Law and Order (security) and Defense to be kept in
white hands until independence; (4) an international trust fund to
assist Rhodesia in its transitional efforts ; and (5) the protection
of the political and property rights of the white minority.

In

essence, the Kissinger plan called for majority rule, but also included the protection of minority rights so that whites as well as
blacks would have a secure future in Zimbabwe ,
While the Kissinger-Smith Agreement seemed at first to be a
major breakthrough in the Rhodesian crisis, it ultimately failed to
achieve its objectives,

While the :Proposals were accepted by Smith

in a national broadcast on September 25 , 1976 ,

12

they were de-

nounced by the front-line African presidents the next day as "tantamount to le galizing the colonialist and racist structures of J)Ower, 1113
In their view and the view of the African nationalist guerrillas of
Rhodesia who also criticized the plan, any details relating to
transitional government should be decided by a conference of the
"legitimate representatives of the people of Zimbabwe,

1114

According
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to Colin Legum,

15 distinguished expert on southern African affairs,

Associate Editor of The Observer (London) and Editor of the Africa
Contemporary Record, Kissinger's subtle diplomacy led (or perhaps
misled) Smith to believe much more than was actually conveyed in the
essential, yet ambiguously-worded, talks of September 21,

While

Kissinger felt that the five principles were negotiable, Smith maintained that they were not,

16

In addition, officials of the United

States acknowledged that details of the settlement proposals were
not accepted by the front-line presidents in advance of their submission to Smith. 17

Apparently, the actual plan was Kissinger's

"own refinements of terms for a peaceful settlement.

1118

The Kissinger proposals did, however, result in a Geneva Conference in October-November 1976, chaired by Britain.

But Smith's

acceptance of the Kissinger plan as a non-negotiable package, and
the African nationalists' and front-line states' desires for modification, led to irreconcilable differences,

The conference broke

down without any accord on the formation of a transitional government.
The Owen-Young Proposal
Prior to 1978 one last attempt was made to resolve the Rhodesian crisis at the negotiating table,

Since both the Carter admini-

stration in the United States and the Callaghan administration in
Britain are committed to majority rule in Rhodesia, they attempted
to influence in the spring of 1977 Rhodesian politics by sending
United Nations Ambassador Andrew Young and British Foreign Minister
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David Owen to southern Africa,

The outcome of the visits was a

British proposal which asked the United States to aid Britain in
resolving the Rhodesian crisis,

The plan went further than the

Kissinger proposal and was mo:re specific about how future events
would be handled in Rhodesia,
elements:

19

The plan incorporated the following

(1) the holding of a constitutional conference to define

the democratic proces s for a transfer of power to majority rule and
to provide for an independent Zimbabwe nation; (2) the surrender of
power by the Smith regime to a British transitional government;

20

(.3) the presence of a United Nations peacekeeping force during the
transitional phase to help guarantee a ceasefire; (4) the cessation
of United Nations sanctions; (5) the establishment of a development
fund through the World Bank to help with the economics of the transitional stage; (6) the institution of black majority rule, but also
protection of white minority rights; (7) the replacement of the
existing armed forces by a new Zimbabwean army after the transition
phase; and (8) the invocation of an amnesty clause preventing punitive actions arising out of the political situation since UDI.
For a variety of reasons, there was no agreement on the major
issues,

While Muzorewa and Sithole both endorsed the proposal, they

needed to be satisfied that the Smith regime was actually willing to
relinquish power ,

Nkomo and Mugabe, on the other hand, wanted the

conference to transfer complete and effective power to the majority,
Since they felt that the Patriotic Front represented the legitimate
interests of the Rhodesian blacks, their feeling was that the conference should be between their organization and the British.

21
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While Muzorewa and Sithole favored the idea of a United Nations
peacekeeping force, both Smith and the Patriotic Front rejected it,
the latter because of memories of what happened in the Congo, 22
A major controversy arose during discussions on the security
arrangements during the transitional phase,

The guerrillas would not

accept the idea of :phasing the Smith army into a Zimbabwean armyo
Muzorewa did not want guerrillas in his army, and Smith rejected a
plan to replace his army with one made up most ly of guerrillas, 23
He supported the Kissinger proposal which insured white control over
the army,
There was obviously no agreement on the crucial issues,

The

three groups contesting for control of the government -- the
Patriotic Front, the Smith regime, and the Muzorewa-Sithole
supporters -- could not resolve their differences.

Because of this

pattern of disagreement , a negotiated settlement, based on majority
rule and acceptable to all of the factions involved, was not produced during the 1962-1977 time period,

The result was an escalating

civil war between the guerrilla forces of the Patriotic Front and the
Smith regime, with the moderate nationalist leaders caught in between.
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VII.

THE GUERRILLA WAR:

THE PRIMARY ACTORS

Escalation of the War
Despite the fact that the Zimbabwe nationalist government was
ineffective and unorganized during the 1964- 1970 period, it is evident that it has grown in strength in the 1970's.

While the guerrilla

war , initiated by African nationalists, has not had complete success
in forcing Ian Smith to accept majority rule, including ZA~U and
ZANlJ participation in the formation of a new government , it has had
relative success in forcing Rhodesia to act in a state of siege.
guerrilla war has escalated for a number of reasons:

The

the failure of

political negotiations to achieve black majority rule left a military solution as the only alternative to ending the Rhodesian conflict; African front-line state backing, especially from Zambia and
Mozambique, has provided Rhodesian guerrillas with sanctuaries from
which to operate their attacks on the Smith government and the white
population of Rhodesia; and the guerrillas have developed a kind of
military infrastructure as well as a political ideology and are much
better trained in the techniques of fighting,
Although the escalation of the guerrilla war began to occur in
1973, especially along the Zambian border, it wasn't until 1976 that
the African nationalist movement established itself as a formidable
foe of the Smith regime,

Despite political divisions within the

movement, by 1977 all factions were united on two major issues:

1

(1) their demand for immediate independence under majority rule, with
127
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no transitional agreement that would leave the sources of power
(police, military, defense) in the hands of the white minority; and
(2) their commitment to armed struggle as the only way to achieve
majority rule as long as negotiations continued to fail.
In addition to developing their own commitment to armed struggle, the nationalist guerrillas are supported by the African frontline states of Botswana, Zambia, Angola, Tanzania, and Mozambique.
President Kaunda of Zambia, once an advocate of non-violence, represented the common feelings of the group when he indicated that there
would be no "peaceful settlement" of the Rhodesian conflict because
of the intransigence of the Smith regime. 2 With Zambian sanctuaries
open to Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU forces and with the Marxist government
of Mozambique supporting the ZANU forces of Robert Mugabe, Rhodesia
is faced with a major security problem .

It has become extremely dif-

ficult for the nation's security forces to patrol the borders of
Botswana, Zambia, and Mozambique to prevent the infiltration of the
countryside by guerrilla forces.
Aims of the Movement
The African nationalist guerrillas have also developed a disciplined theoretical framework for revolution.

According to Herbert

Chitepo, 3 assassinated ZANU leader,
The strategical aim, ,,is to attenuate the enemy
forces by causing their deployment over the
entire country. The subsequent mobilization of
a large number of civilians from industry, business, and agriculture would cause serious economic
problems, This would have a psychologically
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devastating effect on the morale of the whites ,
most of whom had come to Zimbabwe, lured by the
prospect of the easy, privileged life promised
by the regime,
There is a great deal of evidence which indicates that to some
degree the guerrilla movement has achieved these objectives,

Aside

from the fact that the war zone has increased dramatically as a result
of the support for the guerrillas by the FRELIMO government in Mozambique, the war has also become a drain on Rhodesian society,
expenditures for 1976-1977 are estimated at 25% to
budget,

Defense

40% of the national

This amounts to$ R 80,4-$ R 84,4 million (U.S. $125-$130

million), a

40% increase over the 1975-1976 period and almost a JOO%

increase since the fighting began in 1972,

4

At the end of January

1977, the government instituted a military call-up rule affecting
men between the ages of 38 and 50, 5 While this decision reflected
the growing escalation of the war, it also caused concern in the
business community for its effect on the Rhodesian economy,

6

Because

the war has taken skilled and professional people from the business
sector, it is feared that productivity will drop off substantially.?
This now means that national service for high school and college
graduates is twelve to eighteen months, and that men between 25 and
38 years of age are liable for compulsory military training for at
least 84 days,

In additi on, those men between 38 and 50 are eligible

for lighter t r a ining and shorter tours.

The impact of these military

tours on the Rhodesian economy is substantial for another reason as
well.

When employees of the private sector are on tour or in train-

ing, they still receive their normal wages in addition to those paid
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by the Ministry of Defense. 8
The guerrilla war has also increased white emigration,

Reports

indicate that Rhodesia registered a net loss of 2280 people for the
first six months of 1976 (compared to a gain of 1600 in 1975 for the
same period) 9 and 7000 for the year,

10

The nation suffered a net out-

flow for the first three months of 1977 of 3600 people, 11

This emi-

gration presents Rhodesia with a serious problem because most of the
people leaving are skilled workers,
One other factor, which could become a potential problem for the
white minority, is the role of the black members of the army and
milit ary police,

They provide two-thirds of the active manpower and

25% of the reserves.

12

While at the moment they seem to be loyal to

the Smith regime, the question remains as to whether the blacks in
the armed forces will continue to maintain their allegiance.

If they

don't, the consequences would be disastrous for the white minority
government.
Nationalist Leadership
There is no doubt that the guerrilla war is taking its toll on
Rhodesian society.

While ne gotiations originally involved the Brit-

ish and Rhodesian governmerit s, today the black nationalists and the
Smith regime are the primary actors in the resolution of the conflict.
Yet factors such as the lack of a consensus among black leaders,
feelings of distrust among political and military parties, and intertribal rivalry, which have hampered meaningful negotiations between
the Smith government and the African nationalists in the past,
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continue to plague attempts at a solution today.
An understanding of the internal politics of the guerrilla movement is essential if one is to assess the outcome of the war effort
and the subsequent struggle for power among the nationalist guerrilla
leadership.

What is crucial is that the four major African nationalist

leaders -- Bishop Muzorewa (ANC), Rev. Sithole (formerly ZAN1J), Joshua
Nkomo (ZAPU), and Robert Mugabe (ZAN1J and ZIPA) -- have not been able
to consistently resolve their political differences.

The Zimbabwe

nationalist movement has been complicated further by the fact that
the leaders have two constituencies -- their electorate at home and
their military cadres in the front-line states.

It has been extreme-

ly difficult for them to mold the political, military, and ideological beliefs of each constituency into a national movement.
Dissatisfaction within the ranks of the Zimbabwe African Peoples
Union and with the leadership of Joshua Nkomo caused a split in 1963
and resulted in the formation of the Zimbabwe African National Union,
Division at that time followed tribal lines with the Ndebele supporting ZAPU and the Shona, ZAN1J.
The ethnic factor 13 resulted in another split in 1971 when the
Zezeru, who had lost faith in both ZAPU and ZAN1J, defected to form
the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI).

The division was

temporarily solidified in 1974 when the African National Council
(ANC) combined ZAPU, ZAN1J, and FROLIZI under the leadership of a
"neutral" political figure, Bishop Muzorewa o Yet this unity was
short-lived when Muzorewa expelled Nkomo and his ZAPU supporters
from the ANC in the fall of 1975.

Sithole later broke with
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Muzorewa, leaving himself without a supporting organization, because
Robert Mugabe had deposed him as head of ZANU.

Si thole's military

wing of ZANU elected to join the Zimbabwe Independence People's Army
(ZIPA), and his internal supporters chose to stay with Muzorewa's
United A.NC.

Despite the endorsement of the African front-line states,

·
the ANC
. was never a bl e t o cont ro 1 th e mi· 1·i t ary camps 14 in
. 1 eaders.h ip
Zambia and Mozambique.

When talks between Smith and Nkomo failed in

March 1976, and when Nkomo and Muzorewa failed to form a political
alliance in early October 1976, Nkomo and Mugabe formed the Patriotic
Front shortly thereafter.
The purpose of the Patriotic Front was to consolidate the
allegiances of ZAPU, of ZANU, and indirectly through Mugabe, of
ZIPA, thereby eliminating the danger of conflict between the three
rival armies 15 and providing a united front to the Smith regime at
the Geneva talks in December,

While Legum terms this alliance a

"marriage of convenience, 1116 it dealt a major blow to the A.NC when
it received the support of the front-line presidents in November

1976.

In January 1977, the Council of Ministers of the Organization

of African States (OAU) also decided to recognize the Patriotic
Front, thereby robbing Muzorewa of the outside support he so desperately needed.
It is obvious that by 1977 , the African nationalist movement in
Rhodesia still had a fractured leadership.

The dilemma was that

while Muzorewa and the United ANC had the widest political backing
in Rhodesia, 17 they did not have the military backing of ZAPU, ZANU,
and ZIPA.

In addition, it was rejected by the African front-line

1JJ
states and ignored by the British and the United States, which
--P
· · t·ing, 18
de mane
d d a cons t l. t u t·iona 1 co1u.erence
wi• th a 11 groups part icipa

Various theories have tried to account for the occurrence of
factional fighting between the nationalist groups,

These explana-

tions view the clashes in terms of tribal, ideological, or personality differences, by which groups may be distinguished, 19

ZAPU and

ZANU, for example, have been criticized for expending most of their
energies fighting among themselves rather than against the Smith
regimeo

This in-fighting has been blamed on the fact that ZAPU is

comprised mostly of Ndebelian tribesmen and ZANU of Shona tribesmen,
Most commentators believe, however, that tribal differences take a
secondary place in the explanation of events when political, ideological, or personality differences can be found,

20

Ideology mignt be a cause of conflict between the various
nationalist groups,

The Soviet Union, for example, has supported and

helped train ZAPU recruits, while Red China has supported and helped
train ZANU recruits,

While there have been differences in policy

and strategy between ZAPU and ZANU, they have, more noticeably, however, shared similar nationalist goals,

21

The most widely-held theory on conflict within the nationalist
movement has drawn on personality differences , style of leadership,
and other psychological factors to explain inter-group rivalrieso
The thought here is that people like Muzorewa, Sithole, Nkomo, and
Mugabe are involved in the political struggle for power in a future
Zimbabwean nation,

Although this aspect will be discussed later in

this chapter, the major confrontation today is between the Patriot
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Front, which espouses armed struggle as the only strategy to bring
down the Smith regime, and an alliance between Muzorewa and Sithole,
who together have formed a "moderate front" and have signed an "internal agreement" with Smith for the transfer of power to black majority
rule on December 31, 1978,

This situation has added a new dimension

to nationalist politics in that the nationalist leaders are no longer
opposing Smith as a group because two of them have now sided with the
"hated" Rhodesian leader.
Rivalry, however, still exists within the Patriotic Front.

Mu-

gabe has always opposed Nkomo's leadership.

He assisted Sithole, for

example, to set up ZANU as a rival to ZAPU.

His alliance with Nkomo

in the Patriotic Front is merely tactical.

Mugabe 22 explained that :

It is possible to enter into an agreement with
your political opponents to fight your enemy;
but it is never possible to ally yourself with
the enemy to fight your political opponents.
The implication is clear,

Mugabe's alliance with Nkomo is necessary

to bring about the downfall of Smith.

At the same time, however,

once that objective is achieved, he will feel free to engage in a
struggle for political power with Nkomo, 23
As the youngest (51) of the nationalist leaders, Mugabe is also
considered the most militant.

His support in the ranks of ZIPA indi-

cates his ability to articulate the younger guerrillas' belief in
armed struggle as the only means to bringing an end to the Smith
regime,

His Marxist beliefs, however, have not allowed him to build

a constituency within Rhodesia.

Yet Mugabe, and the fact that he is

the "political spokesman" for ZIPA , present a serious threat to
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Nkomo's dream of heading a new Zimbabwe state.
Joshua Nkomo, on the other hand, represents a more moderate
voice in the Patriotic Front.

More conciliatory than Mugabe, he is

also more of a politician, having tried in the past to negotiate
rather than fight to bring majority rule to Rhodesia.

He too, how-

ever, committed himself to the armed struggle in 1976 after talks
with Smith broke down.

What is important is that Nkomo commands more

political respect in Rhodesia than Mugabe.

Despite his Russian

patronage, Nkomo is the Rhodesian leader whom British, American, and
Rhodesian businessmen would like to see win -- unless it is Muzorewa.

24

Ndabaningi Sithole will not be discussed in detail because after
he was deposed as leader of ZANU, he never regained his status as a
formidable nationalist leader.

Bishop Muzorewa, as the political

figure with the most popular appeal in Rhodesia, is a formidable foe
for both Nkomo and Mugabe, especially since he became part of Smith's
"internal agreement."

His major problem has been his inability to

gain the allegiance of the guerrilla groups ZAPU, ZANU, and ZIPA.
In addition, he has not been able to gain the support of the African
front-line stat es or the British and American governments in his
attempts to bring majority rule to Rhodesia through Smith's internal
agreement.
The four nationalist personalities represent an interesting
amalgamation of leadership q_ualities.

Each has been involved in the

nationalist movement since the early 1960's.

Each is desirous of

leading a new Zimbabwe nation based on majority rule,

Yet each, for

whatever reason -- the desire for political power, differing ideology,

1J6
or tribal influence -- has not been able to subordinate his personal
position for the good of the nationalist movement.

Or perhaps, it

has not been possible for the leaders to balance political and military interests to gain a united nationalist movement.

At any rate,

as political leaders, Nkomo , Sithole and Muzorewa are still distrusted by ZIPA, which has emerged as a major factor in the guerrilla
war.
Zimbabwe Independence People's Army
The Zimbabwe Independence People's Army (ZIPA) was formerly
organized in November

1975

to merge the military wings of ZAPU and

ZANU and especially to heal the quarrels within ZA.NU itself. 25

Up

until that time, more guerrillas had been engaged in fighting rival
guerrilla factions than had been engaged in fighting the common
enemy.

26 Pressure to unify the Zimbabweans came from the front-line

presidents, mainly from Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Samora Machel
of Mozambique, especially since the military training in the camps
is directed by the Chinese, Tanzanians, and Mozambicans.

According

to Dzinashe Machingura, 27 Political Commissar in ZIPA., the organization was formed
for the purpose of rescuing the Zimbabwe liberation
struggle from the chaotic situation that had been
created by the ANC leadership. It is an armed
body of men, which was formed for the purpose of
resuming the armed struggle, intensifying the
armed struggle, and carrying it to i t s logical
conclusion •••
In a further explanation of who is considered the enemy by ZIPA,
.
28
says
Mach ingura
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Our society is essentially a colonial society
and as such we have to wage a national democratic
revolution to overthrow national oppression •••
those who are opposed to the liberation and
independence of the Zimbabwean people are our
enemies. These comprise the Smith racist regime,
and the imperialist powers that back it, puppet
Africans serving the Smith regime, and all those
who are opposed to the independence of the
Zimbabwean people •••
While ZIPA has not had much success combining ZAPU and ZANU
cadres in the same training camps, the unified structure of the military command has remained intact. 29

What is important is that the

organization opposes Sithole and Muzorewa and is a major factor in
the continuation of the guerrilla war.

At this point in time, ZIPA

has the most respect for Robert Mugabe,
In sum, despite the organizational problems experienced by the
nationalist movement, since 1976 it has presented a formidable opposition to the Smith regime, until, that is, Muzorewa and Sithole
decided to join forces with the Smith government,

The Patriotic

Front and ZIPA are now the only organizations which advocate, and
continue to pursue, the armed struggle,
Strength of Liberation Forces
While it is difficult to find a consensus of opinion as to the
real strength of the guerrilla forces, i t is still worth looking at
estimates.

They indicate that between 12 ,000 (Rhodesian estimate)

30

and 20 ,000 (African estimate) 31 men are involved in the guerrilla
movement,

It is interesting to note that probably for political and

strategic reasons, the Rhodesian estimate is at the low end of the

1.38
spectrum and the African estimate is at the high end,

South African

intelligence sources estimate the gueITillas' strength at 15,000 men,
a figure in-between the Rhodesian and African amounts, 32

In January

1977 Ted Sutton-Pryce, Deputy Minister in the Rhodesian Executive
Office, broke down the Rhodesian estimate this way: 33 1500 "teITorists " operating in Rhodesia under the ZIPA banner ; 2000 reinforcements
i n Mozambique with another 2000 in training or a-waiting it ; 4000 in
Tanzania; and 100 operati ng in Rhodesia under the ZIPR.A banner
(ZIPA's counterpart in ZAPU) with approximately 2000 more backing
them up in Zambia,

The total Rhodesian figures seem underestimated,

primarily those concerning ZAPU forces operating in Botswana and
Zambia,

South African estimates indicate there are more gueITillas

.
t raine
. d in
. Zamb ia
. an d more operat·ing wi. t'h•in t 'h e count ry , J4
b eing
Other sources indicate that Nkomo's ZAPU forces have as many as 8000
men, 35

At any rate, this is a sizable military force with which the

Rhodesians have to contend,
Liberation forces have mounted attacks in almost every part of
the country.

While Rhodesian forces still control the cities and

most of the countryside, guerrillas have "semi-liberated" large sections of the nation, especially along the Zambian, Botswanan, and
Mozambican borders,

Attacks on white civilians appear to be part of

a strategy aimed at lowering the morale of the minority population,
These attacks, as well as those against economic and transportation
targets, have put a great deal of pressure on Rhodesian security
force so
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Rhodesian Resistance
Despite escalating guerrilla activities, the Rhodesian army and
police have done an effective job of instituting counter-insurgency
measures.

Guerrilla strategies of disrupting rural government, of

interfering with the transportation of goods, and of trying to gain
the allegiance of the local population have been countered by a
Rhodesian "protected village" program.

This plan, started in 1973

and designed to cut the guerrillas off from the Rhodesian population,
has forced 300,000 Africans to live in communities that are protected
by Rhodesian security forces. 36

In addition, the Rhodesian army has

taken its case to the classroom, 37

By instituting psychological

actions based on counter-insurgency techniques developed in Malaysia
and Vietnam, the government is trying to demoralize the guerrillas
by diminishing support for them among the country's black population.
This technique has been used especially along Botswana's border,
where guerrillas have been recruiting Rhodesian students. 38
Although the active army of Rhodesia is relatively small
7900 men including 2400 conscripts 39 -- it is a highly efficient
fighting force,

There is a high degree of professionalism and moti-

vation since the soldiers feel they are defending their homes,

Rho-

desian armed forces are not hindered by outmoded conventional warfare
methods,

They are experts in the use of guerrilla and counter-

guerrilla tactics including the use of bush fighting, flexible warfare, and the elements of stealth and surprise,

The Rhodesians de-

pend on smaller tracker units rather than massive conventional warfare
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techniques to resist the nationalist guerrillas.

In addition, the

army is backed by an effective air force and a military police made
up of 8000 active men and 35,000 reservists.

40

Despite the fact that the Rhodesian armed and security forces
provide the nation

with an effective defensive system, it is obvious

that the military situation will get worse.
probable reasons, including:

There are a number of

the expansion of the war zones; aid

from the front-line states; increasing numbers of guerrilla recruits;
and training assistance from the Russians and the Chinese.

While the

Smith regime could put a total of 50,000 security forces in the fi eld
against the guerrillas , by using every able-bodied white Rhodesian
and black volunteer, this situation would place a heavier burden on
an already beleaguered Rhodesian economy,
Ian Smith's Internal Solution
Besides the Rhodesian guerrilla groups and the black moderate
nationalists , the other primary actor in the Rhodesian drama is
Prime Minister Ian Smith.

Smith shocked the world in November 1977,

when he announced a drastic change in his domestic policy and
accepted the concept of one man-one vote for the black population in
preparation for majority rule, as long as black moderate leaders
accepted the principle that white rights would be protected,

41

This

was a far cry from the Smith who had said after the failure of the
Victoria Falls talks in August 1975, "We have never had a policy in
Rhodesia to hand our country over to any black majority government
and as far as I am concerne d we never wi· 11 • .. 42
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Smith's aim in his 1977 initiative was to invite black moderates
into a multiracial government and rewrite a new constitution which
would protect white rights and allow them a major say in the operation of a new government.

Referred to as his "internal solution,"

the plan would actually involve a unilateral implementation of the
Kissinger proposals .

This strategy was aimed at collaborating with

moderate black leaders -- Muzorewa, Sithole, and Chief Jeremiah
Chirau, 43 the leader of the Zimbabwe United People's Organization
(ZUPO) -- in an effort to win international legitimacy as well as
external support to fight the guerrillas.

The "internal solution"

became a reality on March 3, 1978, when the agreement was signed by
the four leaders.
The accord contains three major agreements worked out in

. t·ions : 44
ne got ia
1.

It grants majority rule to the African population by enfranchising all citizens over 18 years of age who will elect officials on
the basis of one man-one vote.

These officials will constitute

the first Zimbabwe government, with 72 of the 100 seats in the
legislative assembly reserved for blacks and the remaining 28
for whites. Twenty of the seats reserved for whites will be
elected on the basis of a preferential voting system (only
whites will vote), while the remaining eight will be elected on
the general franchise (multiracial electorate) from 16 candidates
nominated b y the present Rhodesian Parliament.

The 28 seats re-

served for whites will be retained for ten years or the life of
two parliaments, whichever is longer.

Since major constitutional
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changes can only be made by a vote of

78

members of farliament,

this situation will give the whites a veto power for at least
ten years.
2.

It involves a transitional government , which will lead the
country to independence.

This government's major tasks include

establishing a ceasefire

in the guerrilla war , integrating

guerrilla forces into the existing Rhodesian forces, and providing aid to those affected by the war.
ment will comprise two bodies :
of Ministers.

The transitional govern-

an Executive Council and a Council

The former organization will include the four

leaders who signed the accord , with the chairmanship of the committee rotating among its membership.
unanimous.

All decisions must be

The Council of Ministers will be made up of equal

members of white and black officials and will be responsible for
the day-to-day affairs of the country,

The chairmanship of this

body will alternate between a black and white minister.

In

addition, the present Rhodesian government will continue to
function, but will only assemble at the request of the Executive
Council.

Its major function will be to enact legislation formu-

lated by the Council, concerning the process of transition .

J.

The interim government will provide for the release of political
detainees and will review cases of political prisoners.

It will

also supervise electoral procedures and try to ensure the existence of an atmosphere that is conducive to free political activity and the holding of fair ele ctions .

Another clause will provide

for an independent judiciary and an independent public service
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board that will control appointments, promotions, and discharges
from the 45,000-member civil service, which currently is also all
white above the clerical level.
also be provided for whites:

The following safeguards will

the prevention of the deprivation

of property without adequate compensation and the guarantee of
government pensions which can be sent out of the country if people
wish to emigrate .
According to the signatories, the constitutional accord should
lead Rhodesia to black majority rule by December 31, 1978, the date
for the changeover to the transitional government,

If the accord is

carried out, it could mark the end of 88 years of white minority
rule in Rhodesia.
While Smith has indicated that the vast majority of the black as
well as the white population of Rhodesia supported the "internal
solution, 1145 it is by no means certain that it will succeed.

The

accord has not won the support of the Patriotic Front, the African
front-line states, Britain, the United States, or the United Nations,
Joshua Nkomo

46

responded in Lusaka by saying:

That these black men in Salisbury should have been
parties to such an agreement must rank as the
greatest sellout in history, •• What Smith has conceded is not majority rule, but one-man, one-vote
for the election of 72 powerless seats in parliament
and 72 dummies with no power ••• We are not giving our
lives for a constitution that is going to entrench
the position of the black man and the position of
the white man .••
Robert Mugabe 's47 reaction was equally critical:
The agreement guarantees that white settlers will
remain in possession of our people's stolen land.
The judiciary presently comprised of racist and
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genocidal judges will be preserved (and) the
public service will remain all white for the
forseeable future.
The Patriotic Front vowed to escalate the guerrilla fighting because its leaders feel that the agreement does not truly establish
majority rule in Rhodesia.

Most importantly, since they claim to be

the le gitimate representatives of the people of Zimbabwe, Nkomo and
Mugabe want a major role in any settlement which will result in the
nation's transition to majority rule,

Besides indicating that they

would escalate the war against the Smith regime, the two leaders devised a diplomatic strategy to deny external support for the accord,
First, they traveled to the United Nations to speak to a special
session of the Security Council on Zimbabwe.

With the support of the

Afro-Asian bloc in the United Nations, they secured the passage of
Security Council Resolution 423 on March 14, 1978, declaring "illegal
and unacceptable any internal settlement under the auspices of the
illegal (Rhodesian) re gime and calling upon all states not to accord
recognition to such a settlement."

48

This was a major victory for

the Patriotic Front since i t denied United Nations recognition for
the new agreement and the subsequent lifting of economic sanctions,
a primary objective of the Smith regime,
Second, the l eaders wanted to prevent endorsement of the accord
by the British.

The initial reaction of the British was a "quali-

fied support" by Foreign Minister David Owen and a warning to the
Patriotic Front not to wreck a settlement that had the support of
the Rhodesian people, 49

In fact, it was reported in the New York

Times that the British were ready to abandon the Anglo-American plan
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and support the internal agreement,50
The United States, on the other hand, through United Nations
Ambassador Andrew Young, warned that the Smith agreement could lead
to a " black-on-black civil war, 1151

Young went so far as to draw a

parallel with the situation in Palest ine :

"What are they (the Brit-

ish) going to do -- run out and leave us with JO years of trouble the
way they did in 1948, 1152

After patching up their differences, the

United States and Britain refused to support a Rhodesian settlement
that did not include participation by the Patriotic Front,

Instead,

Owen and United States Secretary of State Cyrus Vance met with Nkomo
and Mugabe and also with the signatories of the Rhodesian accord, in
hopes of preparing a peace conference that would include all of the
interest groups.

Such a conference, however, did not materialize,

Both groups -- the Pat riotic Front and the signatories of the Smith
agreement -- actually opposed the meeting.

The Patriotic Front re-

jected the meeting on the grounds that an enlarged conference would
add a degree of legitimacy to the internal settlement,

The signator-

ie s of the accord rejected talks outside the framework of their agreement.

The Owen-Vance talks were important, however, in establishing

two arguments:

(1) that an accommodation between the Smith regime,

the black moderate s, and the Patriotic Front is necessary to end the
fighting and, as will be discussed later , from averting an expanded
war with Soviet and Cuban involvement; and (2) t hat international
presence would be desirabl e to l egitimize elections in the eyes of
the world,
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In addition to rejection by the Patriotic Front, the United
Nations, Britain, and the United States, the internal agreement was
condemned by the African front-line states in a communique issued at
the end of their summit conference in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, in
l ate March, 53

They vowed "total support" for the black guerrillas

and called for an "intensification of the armed struggle, 1154
Analysis of Smith Agreement
Perhaps the most interesting element concerning the internal
solution to the issue of majority rule is that it brings together
three people -- Smith, Muzorewa, and Sithole -- who have been political enemies for years,

Sithole, for example, spent six years in

prison (1968-1974) for plotting to assassinate Smith, and was, at
one time, r egarded as the foremost leader of the Zimbabwe militants,
Muzorewa has always been an ardent foe of Smith,

And Smith has de-

clared that he did not want to see majority rule "in my lifetime or
in that of my children,"

Why then would these three leaders

Chirau is omitted because he is recognized as a collaborator of the
Smith regime -- form an alliance?
I t is difficult for an objective observer to conclude that Smith
had a change of heart , especially in light of his past actions and
statements about majority rule,

The internal solution, however, is

the only vi able alternative that Smith has if he wants to continue a
situation i n which he and the Rhodesian Front have had great political
power,

It is obvious that UDI is failing and would fail more rapidly

if he did not gain the backing of the black moderates.

By omitting
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the Patriotic Front from :political :participat ion, Smith will, in
effect , bring about a change to a new government that is "moderate"
by black standards and, therefore, more desirable to the Rhodesian
white :populat ion,

This is reinforced by the items agreed to in the

settlement relating to :protection. of white rights,

Because of the

whites' ability to block le gislation for ten years, the internal
solution grants majority rule without effectively granting majority
:power, 55

From a :political standpoint, therefore, Smith and the

Rhodesian Front, as well as the entire white :population, would benefi t greatly, at least in the short run,
Muzorewa and Sithole will also benefit from an internal settlement,

Since Muzorewa is considered the most :popular black leader in

Rhodesia, he stands to gain the most :politically. 56

Because of his

fear of the Patriotic Front,he is obviously more interested in
collaborating with Smith than he is with either Nkomo or Mugabe,

His

distrust of Nkomo and Mugabe was enhanced by the isolation he felt
at the Geneva talks in 1976.

Si thole, on the other hand, has a great

deal to gain, especially since he has lost favor with the ZANlJ
forces who used to support him.
:Nkomo and Mugabe have nothing to gain :politically by accepting
the internal agreement.

Because of their distrust for Smith, neither

one would accept the internal agreement,

Nkomo, on the other hand,

has more to gain if a settlement is reached, which includes active
:participation by the Patriotic Front, :primarily because he has more
:political clout in Rhodesia than Mugabe.

If the ultimate solution

to the war is a military one, however, Robert Mugabe, as the most
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popular leader among the militant factions, will have a political
edgeo

Because Mugabe does not have the political base of either

Muzorewa or Nkomo, violent overthrow and an authoritarian type of
government would serve his political aims,

Peaceful, free elections

would benefit either Nkomo or Muzorewa,
Although the internal solution would accomplish Smith's goal of
excluding the Patriotic Front from a political settlement, it will,
if implemented, probably have the reverse effect and deepen the split
between the moderates and the guerrillas, thus resulting in an expanded civil war,

According to Legum, 57 while the Salisbury agree-

ment marks the end of white rule, what remains may be more bloody
than anything that has happened before.

His view is that if the

United States and Britain had given in to pressures to support the
accord, they might have been responsible for creating a turmoil
similar to what happened in the Horn of Africa.

What he is saying

is that the internal agreement does not provide conditions that are
necessary for a durable peace.

The following is a synthesis of his

reasons why.
There are three prerequisites for having a durable peace:

the

ending of the violent struggle; the holding of free elections before
independence to enable all Rhodesians, white and black, to select
their leaders; and the cessation of international sanctions.
First, the armed struggle can only be ended if the Patriotic
Front agrees to the settlement,

Since the Salisbury agreement did

not include the Patriotic Front, the fighting will -- in fact, has
continued.

Second, as long as the fighting continues, it will be
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impossible to hold free elections.
would lack validity.

Even if they were held, they

As long as guerrilla leaders claiming to repre-

s ent a considerable part of the black electorate are excluded from
elections, the principle of majority rule is vitiated,

Third , there

is no way of rescuing the Rhodesian economy unless sanctions are
called off.

Only the Security Council can lift sanctions, and that

body is unlikely to do so as long as the Patriotic Front is excluded.
Therefore, none of the three :prereq_uisites can be achieved unless the
Patriotic Front is included.
Whether one agrees with the ideas of Legum or not, they have
great appeal.

The Rhodesian problem is one of :power, and its out-

come hinges on whether or not the Smith government and the black
moderates can make the internal solution work o If they are only
willing to accept majority rule under their conditions and are not
willing to include the Patriotic Front, one thing is certain:
civil war will continue.

the

Unless Muzorewa and Sithole are somehow

able to rally the guerrillas to their side -- and this is very
unlikely -- the result will be a more intensive black-against-black
civil war.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER VII
1.

Legum, Africa Contemporary Record 1976- 1977 , op, cit,, :p, B901.

2 , See
35- 36,

"Two Sides of a Stalemate."

Time, CX (Aug. 8, 1977),

3, Quoted in Maxey, Kees, The Fight for Rhodesia: the Armed Conflict in Southern Rhodesia Since UDI, London: Rex Collings, 1975 ,
J), 163-.
- - -4, See the following: Hodges, op, cit,, p, 16; Legum, Africa
Contemporary Record 1976-1977, op. cito, :p, B911; Moyana, op, cit.,
p. 514 ; Carter and O'Meara, op. cit., :p. 35. See O'Meara's chapter
"From White Rule to Independent Zimbabwe."

5. Legum, Africa Contemporary Record 1976-1977, op. cit., p. B909.
6,

ibid, and Hodges, op, cit,, :p. 16.

7,

Hodges, op, cit,, p, 16,

8.

Moyana, op. cit,, p. 514.

9, Carter and O'Meara, op. cit., :p. 36, See chapter by O'Meara
entitled "From White Rule to Independent Zimbabwe."
10. _ _ _ "'Three Years of Squeeze," op, cit,, :p. 86 and Legum,
Africa Contemporary Record 1976-1977, op, cit., p. A22.
11 .

Hodges, op. cit,, p. 16.

12. Gann, L,H., "Pro spects for White Resistance," Africa Report,
XXIV (Sept./Oct. 1977), 11 and _ _ _ "Two Sides to a Stalemate,"
OJ), cit., p, 35-36.
13. See Breytenbach, WoJ., "Ethnic Factors in the Rhodesian Power
Struggle." Bulletin of the African Institute, XV (#3 & 4 1977), 71.
14.

Legum, Africa Contemporary Record 1976-1977, op, cit,, p. A14.

15. Nkomo stated: "We don't want fighting between ZAPU and ZANU,
We don't want our :people to wage a war after finally getting their
freedom they have strived to achieve for years," See loc, cit.,
:p . A19o
16.

ibid.
150

151
17, It is estimated, for example, that a Salisbury crowd of 100,000
welcomed his return from 15 months of self-exile in October 1976. It
is widely held among experts on Rhodesia that he is the most popular
nationalist figure among Rhodesian blacks.
18,

Breytenbach, op. cit., p. 71.

19. See Henrig_ues, Julian, · "The Struggle of the Zimbabweans:
Conflicts Between the Nationalists and With the Rhodesian Regime."
African Affairs, CXXVI (Oct. 1977), 501.

507.

20.

loc. cit. , p.

21 .

Henrig_ues, op, cit., p. 504.

22 . Quoted in Legum, Africa Contemporary Record 1976-1977, op. cit.,
p. A17.
23 .

ibid.

24. loc. cit., p. A19. See also ____ "The Shape of Zimbabwe's
Government to Come ." African Development, XI (Aug . 1977), 782.
25 , The military wing of ZANU is the Zimbabwe African National Libera tion Army (ZANLA) and its counterpart in ZAPU is the Zimbabwe
Pe oples Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA).
26. Legum , Africa Contemporary Record 1976-1977, op, cit., p. A20.
At one point in 1974 as many as 2000 guerrillas were in detention
in Zambia and Tanzaniao Virtually the entire ZANU High Command was
in prison , facing charges of killing Herbert Chitepo,
27. See interview conducted by the Mozambican Information Agency,
"The Zimbabwe People's Army: An Interview With Dzinasbe Machinguia."
Issue , VII (Spring 1977), 15,
28.

loc, cit., p. 17.

29.

Legum, Africa Contemporary Record 1976-1977, op. cit., p. A20.

JO, See Gann, op. cit., p. 10 and Legum, op. cit., p. B909. Other
sources place these fi gures as high as J0,000-40,000 men. See
Matat u, Godwin, "A Consensus of Suspicion," African Affairs, LXXX
(April 1978), 22 where ZANU's forces are estimated between 20,00030,000 and ZAPU's at 8000 with another 3000 operating within Rhodesia.

31.

Legum, Africa Contemporary Record 1976-1977, op. cit,, p. A22.

32.

Gann, op. cit,, p. 10,

JJ.

Legum, op. cit., p. B909,

152
34. South African sources break down the guerrilla movement this
way: 5000 men in training in Tanzania; 4oOO in Mozambique; 3000 in
Botswana; 3000 in Rhodesia.
35. See ~ - - - "Putting Down the Burden." Time, CXI (March 6 ,
1977), 46 and Younghusband, Peter, "Is Rhodesia Next?" Newsweek,
XCI (March 13, 1978) , 42.
36. Hodges, Tony, "Counterinsurgency and the Fate of Rural Blacks."
Africa Report, XXIV (Sept./Oct. 1977), 18. It is interesting to
also note that during the Vietnam war, American strategists utilized
a similar "protected village" approach, 'Ihe technique, however ,
failed to prevent the Vietcong from reaching and winning over the
support of a large portion of the rural populationo
37. Burns, John, "Rhodesian Regime Takes Its Case to Black Grade
Schools." New York Times, CXXVI (April 7, 1977); 2.
38, ____ "Rhodesian Blacks Join Uprising by the Hundreds."
York Times, CXXVI (Feb, 16, 1977), 12.

New

39. Gann, op. cit., Po 11 and Legum, Africa Contemporary Record
1976-1977, op. cit., p. B911.
4o.

ibid.
"Another Smith Surprise."

41.
47.

42.

Newsweek, XC (Dec. 5, 1977),

Quoted in Houser, op. cit., p. 11.

43. Chirau is a conservative black who briefly served as Smith's
Minister of Development before he resigned last year to form a new
political party.
44. Matatu, op. cit., p. 21-22, and Burns, John F., "Rhodesian
Leaders Sign Pact Providing For Majority Rule." New York Times,
CXXVII (March 4, 1978), 1,

Li-5. See interview between Johannesburg Bureau Chief William
McWhirter and Ian Smith, "Putting Down the Burden." Time, CXI
(March 6 , 1977), 46-47.
46. Quoted in----=- "Settlement for the Settlers." Southern
Africa, XI (April 1978), 12, quoting Nkomo's reaction.
47.

ibid,

48. ____ "Rhodesia Internal Agreement Declared Unacceptable,"
UN Monthly Chronicle, XV (April 1978), 23-32 .

153
49. Carroll, Raymond and Younghusband, Peter, "Smith Cuts a Deal."
Newsweek , ~CI (Feb. 27, 1978), JS.

50. ____ "U.S. Reacts Cautiously to Rhodesian Agreement." New
York Times, CXXVII (March 4, 1978), 2 .

51.

"Settlement for the Settlers," ope cit., p. 12 , and Raymond,
op, cit., p. 37.

52.

Quoted in Mata tu, op, cit., p. 22.

53. Quoted in ____ "5 African Countries Vow Aid in War on
Rhodesia ," Grand Rapids Press, (March 27 , 1978), 11-A.
54 . ibid.
55.

____ "Settlement for the Settlers," op. cit., p. 11.

56.

Some reports indicate that Muzorewa's popularity is exaggerated .
See loc. cit., p. 12.

57.

Legum, Colin, "Troubled Zimbabwe,"
(March 18 , 1978), 12-14,

New Republic, CLXXVIII

VIII.

THE GUERRILLA WAR:

THE SECONJJARY ACTORS

The secondary actors in the Rhodesian drama are the African
front-line states and South Africa.
come of the Rhodesian crisis:

Both have an impact on the out-

the front-line states, for example, by

providing sanctuaries for the Patriotic Front, and South Africa by
providing economic, and possibly military help, for the Smith regime,
African Front-line States
'Ihe five front-line presidents -- Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia,
Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Samora Machel of Mozambique, Sir Seretse
Khama of Botswana, and Agostinho Neto of Angola

1

-- have come to play

a crucial role in the affairs of all of southern Africa, but especially in Rhodesia.

They have acted as a caucus within the Organiza-

tion of African Unity (OAU) and emerged as a group of like-minded
leaders in response to South Africa's overtures in 1974~ (talks prior
to negotiations at Victoria Falls).

Kaunda and Nyerere have long

been close friends and both are close to Khama, who sees them as
allies in his attempt to lessen Botswana's dependence on South Africa.3

Nyerere is especially close to Machel in that he allowed Tan-

zania to be used as a base for the FRELIMO movement in its struggle
in Mozambique.
Nyerere's role as chairman has been crucial.

His credentials as

the champion of liberation movements in southern Africa have enabled
him to balance competing interests within the group, especially
between Kaunda and Machel.

Kaunda has been regarded as a moderate
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and a pacifist and has often been willing to negotiate, as already
noted,

Machel, on the other hand, under pressure from his revolu-

tionary Marxist colleagues, has had to balance the desire to abandon
diplomacy with the pragmatic realism of trying to negotiate with the
United States and South Africa,
While there may be fundamental differences among the front-line
presidents, they are agreed on two major objectives:

first, the

achievement of majority rule in all of southern Africa, beginning
first in Rhodesia and ending in Namibia and South Africa; and second,
commitment to change through peaceful negotiation, but if that should
fail, then commitment to armed struggle.

The second objective is an

outgrowth of the Lusaka Manifesto, written by Kaunda and Nyerere in
It states:

4

We have always preferred, and we will still prefer,
to achieve liberation without physical violence,
We would prefer to negotiate rather than destroy,
to talk rather than kill, We do not advocate
violence. We advocate an end to the violence
against human dignity which is now being perpetrated
by the oppressors of Africa ••• But while peaceful
progress is blocked by actions of those at present
in power in the states of southern Africa, we
have no choice but to give the peoples of those
territories all the support of which we are
capable in their struggle against their oppressors,
The front-line states originally committed themselves to armed
struggle in 1976, after the failure of the Victoria Falls talks and
the subsequent Smith-Nkomo talks.
changed,

Today, that position has not

In fact, armed struggle was re-emphasized in March 1978 in

their communique denouncing the internal agreement,

The stand of the

front-line presidents is that negotiations will not result in a
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lasting peace unless all contending forces are involved in the final
decision-making,
The front-line states have tried to unify the divided and
unorganized ranks of the Zimbabwean movement into a credible opposition to the Smith regime,

As already noted, they first attempted

in 1974 to organize ZAPU, ZA.1\TU, and FROLIZI under the umbrella of the
African National Council.

When that failed, they withdrew support

from the political leaders and supported what Nyerere called the
"Third Force" (ZIPA) in its escalation of the struggle,

In Geneva

in 1976 they attempted to bring together the military and political
wings of ZAPU and ZANU in addition to Muzorewa and Sithole to negotiate with the Smith regime,

During the Geneva talks, Muzorewa and

Sithole found themselves isolated by the Patriotic Front,

Despite

his popularity at home, Muzorewa did not have the backing of the
military camps.

When Muzorewa's deputy, Dr, G.L. Chavunduka, attacked

Kaunda in public for "plotting with Smith and the Western imperialists" to undermine Muzorewa, and Muzorewa refused to apologize, he
was subsequently disowned by Kaunda.5

In November 1976, the front-

line states as a group abandoned their position of neutrality and
supported the Patriotic Front as the political voice of ZIPA and the
guerrilla movement,

Afterwards, Muzorewa lashed out at Kaunda, say-

ing he had an "unbeatable record of backing losing horses" and
accused the front-line presidents of trying to impose their own
leadership on the Zimbabwean movement.

6

The front-line states are an important link to external support
for the guerrilla movement.

These African nations have been adamant
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in their desire, however, to keep the liberation struggles out of the
hands of the major powers.
themselves,

They would prefer to resolve the problems

Nyerere has said the "Peoples of southern Africa are not

asking others to fight their liberation battles for them, •. They cannot import freedom.

The peoples of these countries are asking only

for appropriate support,,."?

The front-line states fear a situation

of being caught in the middle of the rivalry between the Soviet Union
and the United States o
While the African nations would prefer to settle their own
differences , the intransigence of the Smith regime and the failure
of the West to pressure Smith into meaningful negotiations could
cause the front-line presidents to reshape their policies,

Nyerere

has said that in looking for help, they look toward Africa first.

But

outside Africa, he says, "experience has shown that communist nations
are almost the only ones which are both able and willing to give
assistance (arms) to nationalist movements.

The Western bloc urges

patience and non-violence. 118
Kaunda has also warned the Western nations of the danger of the
Rhodesian situation,

He wants the West to understand why the front-

line states support a policy of armed struggle.

In addition, he

wants the United States and Britain to know how close the region of
southern Africa is to war.

He has admonished that "The Western

countries should not blame anybody when the Angolan situation repeats
itself in Zimbabwe, as the freedom fighters will turn to the Eastern
bloc countries, the only ones willing and prepared to help them
achieve their freedom,,, 119
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The United States and other Western nations have made a point of
not identifying themselves with the Smith regime.

If the solution

to the Rhodesian crisis, however, has to be decided on the battlefield, the situation that the West fears most -- radicalization of
the war effort and the growth of communist influence -- might well
occur,

This is a situation that even the front-line states would not

like to see happen.

While the front-line states do not want an

American solution to the problem of Rhodesia, they do want the United
States to use its influence to persuade Rhodesia to accept a negotiated peace resulting in majority rule,
Divisions within the Patriotic Front and the "power struggle"
between Nkomo and Nugabe present another problem for the front-line
states to consider,

At least one observer -- Lawrence Vambe -- has

raised the question:

Have the presidents made peace more difficult

by supporting the Patriotic Front? 10

His point is that the front-

line states have become less concerned with wresting power from
Smith's hands and more concerned with which black hands should hold
power,

Since this appears to be the case, it raises the question of

which Patriotic Front leader will the front-line states be likely to
support?

While the front-line states at this point are probably more

interested in a Patriotic Front victory over Smith than in the issue
of who should lead Zimbabwe, it is interesting to note that Kaunda
and Khama might back one leader and Machel the other,

Zambia and

Botswana support Nkomo's ZAPU while Mozambique is more closely associated with Mugabe's ZAND.

While Angola gives political support to

. Nami.b.ia, 11
ZAPU , it is more centrally involved in th e pro bl em in

That
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again leaves Nyerere in the unenviable position of trying to unite
the groups,
Role of South Africa
Throughout the crisis, South Africa has played a vital role in
:preventing the destruction of the Rhodesian economy as well as the
Smith regime,

South Africa has been so important to the survival of

Rhodesia that some people have called Rhodesia its "sixth province, 1112
For this reason, South Africa could hold the key to the future of
Rhodesia,
The collapse of Portugal's fascist state on April 25, 1974 , and
the subsequent impact on its African territories of Angola and Mozambique, greatly affected the balance of power in southern Africa and
forced South Africa to reshape its African foreign policies,

What

had once seemed a stable tripod of white power in the region
Portuguese territories, Rhodesia, and South Africa -- was beginning
to crumble,

Independence for Angola and Mozambique provided an

immediate threat to the stability of the Smith regime in Rhodesia
and increased the possibility that South Africa would face greater
military and strategic :pressures ,

The black challengers of white

power would hold a strategic area all the way down to the borders of
Namibia and South Africa, thereby depriving South Africa of the
cordon sanitaire on which it had relied to keep its borders insulated
from pressures to the north, 13

In addition, Rhodesia no longer would

be able to rely on Portuguese military assistance to secure its
eastern border, nor on the availability of transportation to give its
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imports and exports access to the sea.

14

Because Rhodesia was the most vulnerable area for the next stage
of the African liberation movement, South Africa began to play a major
role in the negotiations affecting the Smith regime.

Prime Minister

John Vorster responded with a new South African policy of detente.
He held out a hand of friendship to the new FRELIM0 government in
Mozambique, commenting that a "black government in Mozambique holds
no fear for us whatsoever. 1115

More importantly, on Rhodesia he said

"it is in the interests of all the parties to find a solution. 1116
Vorster followed up his statement on the necessity of a peaceful solution to the Rhodesian problem in 1974 with overtures to the
front-line states, primarily Zambia, asking them to cooperate in
bringing the Smith regime and the African nationalists to the negotiating table.

He made no secret of his view that the only viable

policy that Rhodesia could adopt was one of majority rule since the
alternative of guerrilla war would present a much worse outcome to
the situation.

Vorster's decision to participate in the Lusaka

Agreement and the subsequent talks at Victoria Falls indicated that
South Africa viewed the deterioration of Rhodesian-Zambian relations
as an impediment to its foreign policy of detente with black Africa.
In preparation for the talks, South Africa pulled its 3000 combat
troops out of Rhodesia.
The desire for a settlement of the Rhodesian problem was
actually not a new foreign policy adventure for South Africa.
Vorster was well aware that since UDI, the Rhodesian crisis had
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placed severe constraints on South Africa's ability to play an
influential role in the affairs of southern Africa commensurate with
its economic and military power. 17

If a solution were not found,

South Africa feared the prospect of having to support the Smith
re gime economically and militarily in the face of a protracted
guerrilla war.
What was new in Vorster's policy of detente was the recognition
that cooperation was required between the nations in southern Africa
if peaceful transition to majority rule was to be accomplished in
Rhodesia.

18

Moreover, South Africa's ultimate goal -- to have

neighbors that are moderate or conservative in political outlook so
that its security is not threatened -- is a major objective of his
detente policy.
The major obstacle to Vorster's strategy in southern Africa has
been Ian Smith.

As long as the white tripod existed in southern

Africa, the Vorster and Smith regimes saw their national interests
as being mutual.

With the collapse of Portugal's colonial system

and the advente of detente, however, their national interests began
to diverge.

While South Africa's foreign policy dictated that it

help implement majority rule in Rhodesia, this was not an acceptable
solution to the Smith regime.

There is a good reason:

it is ironic

that while South Africa advocates black majority rule in Rhodesia,
it still practices the same kind of repressive policies within its
own borders.
Vorster could argue, probably convincingly, that the interests
of the white communities in both Rhodesia and South Africa demand
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that majority rule be achieved in Rhodesia,

In addition , South

Africa has had the power to initiate this kind of a change by withholding economic support from Rhodesia,

The;r-e are two important con-

straints, however , on this kind of foreign policy, 19

First, Vorster's

electorate, as well as elements within his party, need to be convinced
about the wisdom of "selling out" the white minority population in
Rhodesia,

They could convincingly use the argument that once

majority rule came to Rhodesia, South Africa would be next,

Second,

Vorster's policy cannot afford to cooperate in actions associated with
economic sanctions, since these are weapons which have been advocated
over the years by the international community against South Africa to
force it to change its policies of apartheid,
The result of South Africa's policy of detente -- at least toward
Rhodesia

has not yet been successful,

Despite Vorster's involve-

ment in the Lusaka Agreement and his subsequent influence on the
Kissinger- Smith talks in September 1976, he was not able to get Smith
to come to terms with the nationalist movement,
South Africa is, therefore, faced with a major dilemma, which
governs how it will respond to the Rhodesian crisis,

On the one

hand, Pretoria, must help bring change to Rhodesia

and Namibia, for

that matter -- in the form of moderate governments which would cooperate with South Africa,

On the other hand, South Africa must try

to influence the make-up of these regimes so that they don't appear
to the international community to be puppet regimes, thereby subjecting them to destabilization via their Marxist neighbors (Angola and
Mozambique) to the north,

20

South Africa has not been able to
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accomplish this feat, primarily because of the intransigence of the
Smith regime and the constraints placed on Vorster's foreign policy.
What is important is that if the internal solution succeeds in
Rhodesia, South Africa's goal of having a moderate regime to the north
will be achieved.

However , since the success of the internal solu-

tion is highly problematical, and, assuming that Smith remains
intransigent, South Africa is faced with some unpleasant prospects,
First, if Vorster and the front-line presidents are unable to achieve
a compromise, the guerrilla war in Rhodesia will probably continue to
expand.

The regime that ultimately comes to power will likely be

more leftist in nature and less willing -- at least in the long run
to cooperate with the South African regime.

If South Africa is will-

ing to accept this prospect, then it would have to be ready ultimately
to defend its borders from guerrilla attacks as Rhodesia has.

If

South Africa is unwilling to accept the prospect of a leftist regime
in Rhodesia, it might intervene militarily to prevent that situation
from occurring.

The result would likely be an "Angolan solution" in

which the Rhodesian guerrillas and front-line states would ask for
outside aid from the Soviets and Cubans, thereby embroiling all of
southern Africa in a war,
Second, even if South Africa achieves its goals of decolonization in Rhodesia and Namibia, it may still ultimately be faced with
guerrilla attacks from sanctuaries in these countries,

One must

remember that the ultimate goal of the front-line states and the
African movement is to bring majority rule to all of southern Africa.
Because South Africa is so economically and militarily dominant in
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southern Africa, the front-line states have encouraged wars of liberation to take place first in Rhodesia and Namibia.

Clearly, the black

nations of Africa are in no :position in the near future to take on
the might of South Africa.
While neither :prospect appears encouraging to the Vorster
regime, a :peaceful solution to the Rhodesian problem would go a long
way toward improving the situation.

Because the nations of southern

Africa are still so economically dependent on South Africa and are
in many ways so underdeveloped, they would :probably in the foreseeable future leave South Africa alone, despite what happens in Rhodesia and Namibia .

Ultimately, however, South Africa's northern

neighbors will press more strongly for majority rule in that country.
The more radicalized these regimes are, the sooner that is likely to
occur.

Prime Minister Vorster was undoubtedly right when he said a

failure in Rhodesia might result in "consequences too ghastly to
contemplate."
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IX.

CRISIS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA:

THE ROLE OF THE SUPER POWERS

The most desirable solution to the Rhodesian crisis would be a
peace that could be negotiated between the primary actors -- the Smith
regime, African moderates, and the guerrillas.

If they are not able

to do this on their own, hopefully the secondary actors, with their
immediate interests in the area, can persuade or pressure them to do
so,

If a solution is not achieved peacefully through the efforts of

the primary or secondary actors, however, and a military solution becomes the only alternative (which seems likely), then the role of the
world's major powers -- the United States and the Soviet Union
becomes more important.
Internationalization of the Conflict
The extent to which the Rhodesian crisis has become internationalized since UDI is manifested in the words of James
Chikerema,

1

former lieutenant in ZAPU and FROLIZI leader:

The Rhodesian crisis has become more serious and
more complicated with every passing year, Today
there are many people and countries involved (in
the crisis) in one way or another,
It is probably true, as a minister of the Rhodesian government
told an elections meeting in Salisbury in 1977, that "Rhodesia has
become the football of international politics, 112

What is perhaps

even more obvious is that, as the Rhodesian crisis becomes more
internationalized, there is a greater chance that the United States
and the Soviet Union will become more directly involved,
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A major

position taken in this study, therefore , is that the impetus for a
solution to the problem has switched from United Nations sanctions to
the escalation of the guerrilla war,

Since a military solution to

the Rhodesian crisis presents the most likely outcome at this time,
the roles of the United States and the Soviet Union take on more
importance,

The basic question is:

Can the major powers agree on

the means to effect peaceful change in Rhodesia?
is:

A corollary then

What is the :place of southern Africa (Rhodesia in :particular) in

the international arena?
Two major changes

both of which occurred against the thrust

of Western policies -- showed the dramatic suddenness by which events
have changed the situation in southern Africa, 3 The first, as
already noted, was the unpredicted demise of Portuguese colonialism
in April 1974.

This event contradicted the predictions of the

National Security Council of the United States, the British Foreign
Office, and the NATO Defense Council.

4

The second change was the

successful intervention by the Soviet Union and Cuba in Angolan
affairs to ensure the victory of the Popular Liberation Movement
(MPLA).
Besides damaging the stable tripod of white :power in the region,
the collapse of Portuguese colonialism strengthened the African belief in the viability of armed struggle in liberating a nation.

It

also brought to power Marxist governments in Angola and Mozambique,
which had only the communist nations to thank for their success.
The Angola affair was important in demonstrating that the Soviet
Union was both willing and able to provide military support for the
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liberation movements in Africa.
was greatly strengthened.

The Russians' influence in Africa

In addition , it showed that the West had

not only underestimated the volatility of the region, but had also
underestimated the desire of the Soviets to get involved,

Perhaps

most importantly, the Angola affair demonstrated that nothing did
more to legitimize the Soviet-Cuban interference in Angola than the
intervention in the fi ghting by South Africa. 5
The Soviet intervention in Angola dramatizes the fact that a
super power can become a primary actor and change the entire course
of events in a liberation war o President Kaunda

6 of Zambia empha-

sized the importance of such interventions :
Our failure to find a solution here (in Angola)
confirms that the Organization of African Unity
(OAU) has no power to shape the destiny of Africa.
Power is in the hands of the Super-Powers, to
whom we are handing Africa by our failure.
The experience of Angola does not necessarily mean that the
same chain of events will occur in Rhodesia,

According to Legum , ?

the Soviets we re able to play a successful role in Rhodesia for three
major reasons:

(1) because of the unique nature of the power strug-

gle among rival factions where there was no legally recognized government;

(2) because of the Chinese decision to stay neutral in the

power struggle; and (3) because of South Africa's decision to intervene militarily,
None of these conditions is present in Rhodesia, at least not
at this time.

First, the front-line presidents are committed to a

strategy of insisting that the fi ghting in Rhodesia be done by
Zimbabweanso

Second, because the Chinese are directly involved with

170
the training of ZIPA and ZAND forces, it is doubtful that they would
allow active Soviet or Cuban participation similar to what occurred
in Angola.

In addition, the adamant stand of the front-line presi-

dents that major power involvement should only be supportive (providing training, for example, or arms) will help prevent an Angolan
situation.

Nyerere,

8

aware of the danger that Africans could lose

the power to determine their own political future, commented that
" ••• We are not fighting in order to enable Russia or China or the
United States to intervene in Africa,"

The fact that all forei gn

military and economic aid for the guerrillas must be funnelled
through the OAU Liberation Committee in Tanzania9 is indicative of
the big-power role sought by the front-line presidents.

Third, while

it is difficult to say what South Africa will do, especially in view
of the fact that Vorster is unwilling to apply pressure to the Smith
regime to force him to negotiate a settlement, it does appear that
he is unwilling to support Smith with troops.

This was evidenced by

Vorster's policy of detente and subsequent decision to withdraw
troops from Rhodesian soil.

Unless South Africa is willing to commit

troops to Rhodesia, it appears that the primary actors will settle
their differences.

According to Nyerere,

10

if South Africa comes to

the aid of Smith, the nationalist guerrillas would be forced to seek
external help and the communists would likely give that assistance.
The reverse could occur too, however, if Cuban soldiers were introduced on the side of the guerrillas, thereby forcing South Africa to
come to the aid of Rhodesia.
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United States Policy Towards Rhodesia
The Angolan civil war forced the United States to re-evaluate
its foreign policy towards southern Africa,

Prior to that time,

American foreign policy , according to Dr. Donald Baker, was based
inter alia on the following assumptions: 11

whites in the Portuguese

colonies, Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa would retain power for
a long time ; although guerrilla warfare might eventually lead to
Portugal's withdrawal in Angola and Mozambique, factional divisions
wi thin the nationalist movement in Rhodesia would not allow it to
effectively contest the Smith regime; South Africa, because of its
military and economic power, could resist any African opposition; the
condition of black workers might improve through greater industrialization , thereby creating a more stable atmosphere, and South Africa
would ultimately grant independence to African homelands, which would
still r emain dependent on that nation.
American foreign policy concerning southern Africa was ba sed
extensively on the now infamous National Security Council Memorandum
No. 39, enunciated by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.

Option 2

of that policy was adopted in part by President Richard Nixon in 1970
.

.

an d was b ase d on th e f o11owing premises:

12

whites are there to stay

and effective change can only come through them; there is no hope for
blacks to gain political advantage through violence, which will only
lead to chaos and communist involvement.
Most of the American foreign policy objectives during the early
1970's were, therefore, directed at supporting the white regimes at
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the expense of the liberation movements, which were considered radical
and responsible for most of the instability in the area,

In parti-

cular, American foreign policy followed the lead of the British,
Although economic and political sanctions were applied against Rhodesia, it has already pointed out that the United States continued to
import chrome and other minerals under the Byrd Amendment,

In gen-

eral, up until 1974, southern Africa was relegated to the status of
a "neglected" area,
With the advent of change in Angola, the last ten months of the
Ford administration and the "reign" of Henry Kissinger witnessed a
major change in American foreign policy toward southern Africa,

The

results in Angola provided an implicit threat to American economic,
trade, investment, political and strategic interests,

At that time,

the United States abandoned its traditional policy that Europe (Britain) should take the lead in initiating Western foreign policy in
southern Africa,
Kissinger's first problem was to overcome his statements in
National Security Council Memorandum No~ 39 by emphasizing America's
commitment to majority rule in southern Africa.
faced was in conducting "open" foreign policy: 13

Another problem he
he found it diffi-

cult to negotiate with the front-line states since they could not
impose their decisions on the liberation movements; he also found it
difficult to negotiate with the guerrilla leaders since they often
had a tough time controlling their bands.

As a result, he found it

easier to negotiate with Prime Minister Vorster,

Because the inter-

ested parties (Britain, the United States, and South Africa) could
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not simultaneously work out all of the problems of southern Africa,
he proposed a concentration on Rhodesia,

14 Kissinger advocated United

States support for majority rule with a timetable,

In addition , he

pledged support for African nations implementing sanctions against
Rhodesia and advocated repeal of the Byrd Amendment.

The result was

the agreement with Smith ( and Vorster) , which proposed a transfer of
power to a multiracial government within a two-year period,
According to Baker, 15 Kissinger's basic assumption was that
development in southern Africa is impossible without stability,
Kissinger recognized that the Third World countries would undergo
periods of political and economic instability,

If the major powers,

however, could keep from becoming enmeshed in that instability, then
peace could be maintained among the major powers.

While racial,

economic, and political conflict would persist, the major powers
should only serve as mediators rather than participants,
Currently, the Carter administration appears to be following a
more "open" kind of diplomacy toward southern Africa,

Its foreign

policy has stressed the importance of fundamental civil and political rights .

In fact, people like Andrew Young, United States Ambass-

ador to the United Nations, have been critical of past American policies for tending t o neglect the issue of human rights,
ing to Richard Bissel1,

Yet, accord-

16 Young's record has not differed substan-

tially from Kissinger's.

He proposes this question:

Is the United

States committed to justice and development -- the perspective of the
front-line states -- or is it mainly interested in preventing Soviet
influence in the area?

He tends to agree with the latter statement,

174indicating that elements of American foreign policy in 1977 still
sound traditional:

17

(1) the need for human rights and majority rule

without violence; (2) the need to reduce white resistance to change
by guaranteeing compensation to whites for -property rights ; (3) confidence that the economies of the nations of southern Africa would
cont inue to be closely tied to the United States and Western Europe,
no matter who rules the nation; and (4-) recognition of the African
quest for stability, law , and order,

The problem, as Bissell sees

it, is that the combination of one and four is not acceptable to both
whites and blacks, and that, therefore, the United States needs an
unorthodox policy to help resolve the crises in southern Africa,
Legum is another scholar who feels that United States foreign
policy is outmoded,

18

Despite the triumph of Soviet and Cuban inter-

vention in Angola and the onset of other racial conflict in Rhodesia,
he f eels that the United States, as well as Britain and other NATO
countries, still cling to the "carefully formulated ambiguities" designed over the past 20 years , to maintain a kind of neutrality between
the forces in conflict in southern Africa,

His argument follows :

In the absence of a credible policy the Western
nations, with their different degrees of involve ment and commitment, fall back on a generally
defensive posture and react on an ad hoc basis to
each new development as it occurs, Thus Washington
and London have both warned the Russians and Cubans
to keep out of Rhodesia, but without at the same
time indicating what role they themselves intend to
:µ.ay in the struggle and, without spelling out what
-precisely they intend to do to stop the Russians and
Cubans if they should decide, as in Angola, not to
stay out , To the Africans who, having waited
-patiently for a solution to the Rhodesian rebellion
for 11 years, their advice is that they should be
careful not to get themselves involved in a race
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war; and to the besieged white minority they urge
'caution and wisdom' in not getting themselves
involved in a war they cannot hope to win, But
these exhortations in a highly-charged emotional
situation, with both sides already engaged on the
battlefield, are no more than pieties, Unwilling
to adopt any positive positions of their own,
Western diplomacy is limited to telling others to
behave sensibly,
Legum's argument bears examining,

He feels it is no longer

credible to remain carefully neutral, that the West should pick a
side,

Up to this point it is obvious that neither the United States

nor Britain has been willing to do this,

Neither country, for

example, has been willing to pressure South Africa into forcing Smith
to achieve a settlement with the Patriotic Front,

While the policy

of neutrality, on the one hand, is very desirable, Legum feels, on
the other, that it can create one very serious problem in the future: 19
The active role of the Communist nations in
support of liberation movements will have increased;
and anti-Communist African leaders will find it
much less easy to resist the influence of the
Communist supporters, If the Western nations should
have failed to make their choice by then, their
options during the last stage of the struggle will
be even more sharply reduced,,,their influence in
southern Africa will by then have been seriously
eroded, and their standing in the rest of the
continent considerably weakened,
The key problem for the United States is still how to promote a
peaceful change of power to African leadership that is favorable to
western economic development, economic investment, trade, and political interests while also trying to avoid the appearance of intervention in that process,

20

If change comes through a militaty transfer

of power, that objective would be more difficult to achieve,
What are the options of the United States?

First of all, it
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should be clearly stated that there are limitations on what :polici es
the United States can follow,

President Carter recently said that his

o:ptions are hamstrung by congressional control over foreign :policy ,
The Congress of the United States , in the :post- Vietnam :period,
has demonstrated that it disa:p:proves of covert military or guerrilla
o:perations by the Central Intelligence Agency,

Yet , gi ven the degree

of legitimacy assigned to the Patriotic Front, the United States and
the West cannot easily su:pport Smith's internal solut ion , 21

Agreeing

to Muzorewa's initial suggestion that a Rhodesian referendum should
select a nationalist leader wi th whom Smith could negotiate would
22
.
th e securi. t y arrangemen t s associa
. t e d wi. t ·h sue.h an e 1ec t ion.
·
ignore

What the United States and Britain are left with, therefore, is the
necessity of inserting a "neutral" force capable of claiming legitimacy between the militant guerrillas on the one hand and the intransigent vihi te regime on the other, 23

That "neutral" force was desig-

nated in the Anglo-American :peace :pro:posal to be a United Nations
interim :peacekeeping force ,

The :problem is that this solution was

not agreeable to either the guerrilla forces or Smith,
Des:pite the fact that Legum's argument i s highl y credible, i t
is :possible for the United States to achieve its goal of stabilizing
southern Africa and allowing the :primary actors in the Rhodesian
crisis to solve their own :problems if i t is able to keep the RussoCuban and South African forces out of the struggle.

Right or wrong ,

this is the tact the United States seems to want to follow,

Andrew

Young's res:ponse to a question about the role of the United States
in Rhodesia is indicative of that :policy:

24
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We were in the position of having been told by
the Africans ••. that they did not want this
initiative to in any way suggest some superpower rivalry in Africa, and they wanted to
see it as essentially a proposal of the United
Kingdom, and they welcome the U.S. support but
they insisted that our role be a supportive role,
The Western position in southern Africa (Rhodesia) has been
ambiguous, given the dilemma between its economic , political, and
strategic interests in the area and its desire to avoid a race war,
The United States and Britain achieved one objective, however, although
it must be considered a short-term aim.

By rejecting Smith's internal

agreement, the chances are that they , at l east temporarily, have prevented a major escalation of the war and more direct involvement by
Russia and Cuba. 25

If support for the agreement had been given, the

front-line states , who have been cooperative with Britain and the
United States, would have felt betrayed and might have thrown more
support behind the guerrilla forces by asking for more direct RussoCu'ban involvement.

In the long run, however, the British and the

Americans may have to choose between their interests in South Africa
and the rest of the African continent.
The Soviet Union and China in Southern Africa
It must be mentioned initially that it is difficult to discuss
communist strategies in southern Africa because the availability of
information is limited.

In the case of the Soviet Union and China,

a discussion of foreign policy strategies also depends a great deal
on whether their aims are perceived as ideological goals

the

struggle between the imperialists and the anti-imperialists -- or
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whether they reflect policies dicated by national interest.

While

i t is impossible to completely separate the two, the strategies of
Russia and China will be viewed here primarily in terms of their
national interests,
This thesis has argued that neither the Russians nor the Chinese
have had any problem supporting the African wars of liberation.
have not faced the dilemma that the United States has faced.

They

Their

policies are one-sided and are not as ambiguous as those of the West.
What has occurred, however, is th3..t a competition has developed
between the two powers for influence in southern Africa.
Legum

26

In fact,

notes that most commentators' analyses of the Soviet inter-

vention in Angola as a cold war move against the West omit an important element -- the rivalry between Russia and China.
It is obvious from this study that the Soviets (and the Cubans)
were the chief beneficiaries of the MPLA victory in Angola,

The

Soviet s succeeded in outmaneuvering the Chinese, who supported the
Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA.).

When the Organization of

African Unity called for a neutrality between the MPLA, the FNLA,
and the UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola),
the Chinese, in response to this call, withdrew their instructors
from FNLA camps in Zaire.

When the Soviets refused to honor the OAU's

call for neutrality and backed the MPLA, the Chinese were left out
in the cold.

According to Legum, 27 what happened in Angola indicates

that the Sino-Soviet rivalry in southern Africa may have become more
important than either nation's rivalry with the United States.
In Rhodesia, where both communist nations have kept a much lower
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profile than in Angola, the Sino-Soviet rivalry also exists,

ZANU's

relations with China in the early 1960's caused the Soviets to back
the ZAPU forces.

While the Chinese have always provided training

instructors to ZANU camps in Mozambique and Tanzania, until recently
the Soviets t rained ZAPU forces in Eastern Europe,

Now, however, this

task has be en assumed by Cuban instructors in Zambia. 28

What remains

unclear, however, is how the alliance of ZAPU/ZANU leaders in the
Patriotic Front will affect fugure relations with Russia or China.
Although China's major pre-occupation in foreign policy i s with
trying to increase its status as a world power and to counter Soviet
and United St ates' attempts to isolate it, 29 its role in southern
Africa, at least according to Nyerere, 30 is limited, By supporting
the more radical forces of Robert Mugabe, however, China has a great
deal to gain by the continuation of the armed struggle in Rhodesia,
Since Chinese aid is given in a way that is widely accepted,
most African leaders find the Chinese the easiest of the major powers
to get along with. 31

However, it is clear that the Chinese do not

have the capability to deliver the massive amounts of military aid
that may be required by the liberation movements,

In this respect,

the Soviet role in southern Africa is more important.
I t does not appear that the Soviets have been able to follow up
their success in Angola with future successes in Rhodesia.

Because

of Kissinger's commitment of the United States to majority rule in
Rhodesia, the Soviets could no longer argue that the United States is
a supporter of the white-ruled Smith regime,

While they have

achieved Friendship Treaties with Angola and Mozambique, their
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headway in Rhodesia is still somewhat limited ,

Besides diminishing

American and Chinese influence in the area and seeking to spread its
economic and political interest as a world power, Russia is also
interested in promoting its security interests, especially those related to the Soviet navy . 32
While the changing environment in southern Africa has opened the
way for the Soviets, their track record in helping to establish
communist regimes in Africa has been dismal.

Yet, the added factor

of Cuban as sistance makes them more influential in the outcome of the
Rhodesian liberation struggle .

The crucial point, however, is that

there appears t o be just as much suspicion of the intentions of the
Russians among southern African leaders as there is of the aims of the
West .

Because of t his feelin g , it will be difficult for the Soviets

or the Americans to play a lasting influential role vis-a- vis the
government of Rhodesia or any other southern African nation , " While
the supportive role of a major power is welcomed in the solution to
the Rhodesian problem, the competition between the Soviet Union,
China , and the United States is perceived by the front-line states as
a dangerous rivalry.

It is for this r eason that they strongly desire

that the maj or powers avoid a direct confrontation in Rhodesia,
al though they r ecognize that competition among them to gain influence
in southern Africa may contribute ultimately to the kind of solution
they want .
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FUTURE OF ZIMBABWE

If majority rule is inevitable, Zimbabweans will have crucial
political, economic , and social decisions to make,

The future of

Zimbabwe hinges on the outcome of the guerrilla war and/or the success or lack of success of Smith's internal accord,

The shape of

Zimbabwe's political structure will determine its economic and social
order,

The extent of change in Zimbabwe will depend, in other words,

on whether the new government is moderate or radical.
O'Meara,

1

Patrick

for example, states that
The difference between moderate and radical
perspectives is a difference between simple
reform and revolutionary reordering: a mere
replacement of the white establishment by an
African establishment or a fundamental change
in the structure of the society and in international relations.

The difference, therefore , between a new nation whi ch espouses the
ideas of a Smith-Muzorewa-Sithole coalition, on the one hand, and one
which is based on the ideas of the Patriotic Front, on the other, is
immense,

Moreover, the difference between a Mugabe-led nation and a

Nkomo-led nation would also be substantial,

In addition, the role of

the white Rhodesians in any of these new situations is an issue of
great importance.

Their place in a society which i nitiates incremen-

tal change would obviously be much different than one that initiates
comprehensive, revolutionary change,
Before Rhodesia can make the transition to Zimbabwe, it must
solve its political problems.

Because of the rivalry between groups

the Patriotic Front, the black moderates, and the Rhodesian Front --
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and also between individuals, the many-faceted struggle for power must
run its course,

It is difficult to say at this time what kind of

political structure Zimbabwe will have ,

It could become a multi-

party state including the Rhodesian Front, black political parties,
and/or multiracial parties,

On the other hand , a one-party state,

led by Robert Mugabe, is a distinct possibility,
on the outcome of the guerrilla war,

The future hinges

What is certain, however, is

that ideological and regional ethnic positions, hardened by the
nationalists' struggle, will create problems in the building of a new
nation ,

The reentry of guerrillas into the civilian sphere might

create immediate problems, while in the long run, military appointments for former guerrillas might create a situation for a military
coup,

2

Despite Smith's internal agreement, there is no doubt that

the guerrilla war will continue,

If the Patriotic Front is successful

in overturning the internal agreement , there is also the possibility
especially because of past experience -- that factional fighting
will continue within that group ,

Much will depend on how successful

the nationalist leaders are in controlling the military groups, especially ZIPA,
Prior to determining the political role of the white minority,
the black leadership must, therefore , resolve its own internal conflicts,

What is obvious is that whites will play a subordinate role

in Zimbabwe,

The extent of that role depends on which black l eaders

gain control of the government,

Under the Smith-Muzorewa-Sithole-

Chirau Agreement, the white minority will still have substantial
political and economic power for a decade,

Under a Mugabe-led
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government, it might not have any,

Multiracial coexistence has a

much greater chance of succeeding under a moderate government than
it does under a radical one,
The economic issues will largely be determined by the structure
of the economy.

The structure of the economy , in t urn , is dependent

on the government of Zimbabwe .

African leaders on all levels accept

the basic premise that Zimbabwe is the home of both black and white,
Because of his managerial abilities and professional skills, the
white man could have a major role to play in Zimbabwe, 3
mains to be seen , however , what role that will be,

It still re-

A moderate gov-

ernment -- based on a coalition of Smith, Mugorewa, Sithole, and
Chirau -- would probably propose what O'Meara calls "Africanizationlocalization," while a radical approach -- instituted by Mugabe -might go beyond the Africanization of the bureaucracy and initiate
nationalization of industry, land, and business .

4

Under the terms of the Smith agreement, all property rights are
to be protected,

If the government confiscates property, there must

be just compensation paid to the owners.

This part of the agreement

is reminiscent of Anglo-American proposals for a Zimbabwe Development Fund, which would have compensated whites who were unwilling to
live under black majority rule,

This Fund was based on the key

assumption of the "Kenya model," which is the willingness of a future
Zimbabwean government to develop an African elite . 5 What the West
wants , in fact, is an expansion of the black middle class and more
opportunities for black participation in the business sector,

The

result would be an economic system based on black capitalism, which
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would be more acceptable to the West and to Rhodesian whites because
t heir rights would also be protected,
Both Mugabe and Nkomo have indicated that they do not want
Zimbabwe to depend on a capitalist development model, 6 Mugabe, however, backs a more radical agrarian program, urging redistribution
of land to those who have been dispossessed in the past (black farm
laborers) and the establishment of rural cooperatives. 7 In addition,
more nationalization of industry would occur under his regime than
any of the other leaders.
Muzorewa and Sithole's commitment to Smith's economic proposals
are not too different from what they have advocated in the past.

Dr. Gordon Chavunduka, hired by Muzorewa to draw up an economic program for the United ANC, stressed that Muzorewa and the party did
not favor widespread nationalization.

8

A similar view was provided

by Phineas Sithole, the National Secretary of the African National
Council Sithole, the legal internal wing of ZAND, led by Ndabaningi
Sithole. 9

In interviews, both Chavunduka and Sithole explained that

their parties did not support communism and desired a mixed economy
with an important place for private enterprise.

10

Nkomo's economic policies .fall somewhere in between Muzorewa's
and Sithole's, on the one hand, and Mugabe's, on the other.

While

Josiah Chinamano, Nkomo's chief lieutenant in Rhodesia , has indicated
their party does not favor "nationalizing for the sake of nationalization,11 Nkomo and ZAPU are more committed than the Muzorewa-Sithole
alliance, at least on the surface, to a socialist economic structure,
It could be called "African socialism" where "all citizens of

187
Zimbabwe must benefit from the nation's wealth" and "where free
enterprise that is not inconsistent with the policy •.• will be permitted indefinitely.

1112

The degree of socialism and resulting

nationalization will depend on the philosophy and on the policies of
those political leaders who ultimately win power in the state,
A settlement in Rhodesia would result in the lifting of United
Nations sanctions , greater access to foreign capital and transportation routes, and the opening of major markets in Africa, thereby providing the economic base for boom conditions in the country.

The

government, however , will still face difficult economic problems.

Any

future policies will probably be directed at raising the income levels of black workers , especially in the rural areas.

Because the

total potential work force is so large as to preclude its absorption
into a present employment situation, government economic plans would
have to be directed at increasing investment in the tribal areas and
resettling the tribal population onto unused commercial and plantation lands. 13

Recent studies indicate that

75% of European land

would be needed to accommodate the present excess tribal population
and enable them to achieve modest wage gains .

14

Such a resettlement

would not only require huge government investments, but it would
also confront the issue of white economic rights.
Conditions associated with urbanization could also present
potential problems.

The introduction of foreign aid and new capital

after a resettlement will lead to an urban influx,which, if not controlled , could create serious dysfunction because of inadequate
housing and other facilities. 15

Employment opportunities will
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undoubtedly exist on a large scale , but unemployment problems could
arise in a post-boom period,

If the problems associated with

urbanization occur , the result could be a large alienated section of
the population,
. t a b'l't
ins
i i y,

These conditions might produce major political

16

A post-settlement government will also have to contend with a
debt problem and the outflow of funds,

The experience of Third World

nations shows that international debt repayment is a major economic
problem which severely handicaps domestic economies , 17
and Zambia can attest to this problem.

Both Kenya

This condition assumes that a

Zimbabwe government will pay off these debts.

While a more radical

restructuring of the economy might ignore the situation , a future
government would then be subject to the loss of its international
credit,
The issue of development aid depends a great deal on the outcome
of the guerrilla war,

A moderate government will undoubtedly attract

assistance from the West,

A victory by the Patriotic Front, and

especially the political success of Robert Mugabe, will attract aid
from the communist nations,

What is perhaps more important is the

future relationship between Zimbabwe and South Africa,

While most

of the nationalist leaders have indicated that trading links with
South Africa would not be terminated,
what a radical government would do,

18

it is difficult to predict

Because Zimbabwe is so depen-

dent on South Africa for economic assistance, it would be almost
impossible for any government to sever relations with the Vorster
regime, at l east in the short run.
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According to Moyana, 19 the major weakness of the Rhodesian growth
model is that it has not evolved into a development model which would
allow for internal structural changes in the society in order to make
the inward-looking structural changes in the economy more meaningful.
His point is, and it appears to be valid, that any model which shuts
off 95% of the population from having a meaningful role is ignoring
creative energies which could increase its potential,

Such a situa-

tion is bound to be unstable.
Any Zimbabwe government will face a difficult challenge in trying to solve the nation's problems.

While a multiracial society

would be ideal for Rhodesia, a great deal depends on how many whites
decide to stay in the country.
inspire more whites to emigrate .
encourage people to stay.

A Marxist government would probably
A moderate regime would probably

The problem is that the present violence

in the guerrilla war creates a future atmosphere of political and
economic instability.

As Dr. Chavunduka

20

has observed:

"Any

government that takes over, I'll feel very sorry for them."
Concluding Remarks
The concluding remarks in this paper will be based on the descriptions and analyses provided in this study.

Most of the con-

clusions will be recapitulations of points stressed in earlier chapters.

This study has attempted to analyze the Rhodesian crisis from

UDI (1965) to the present.

It has focused on two major themes:

first, that United Nations economic sanctions, while impacting upon
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the crisis, have not been successful as a primary tool for resolving
the problem; and second, that the outcome of the conflict will most
like l y be decided on the battlefield, although there is still a
chance that peace can be negotiated,
The Rhodesian crisis is an extremely complicated phenomenon in
in ternational affairs,

Despite the fact that the crisis started as

a cons t itutional conflict between Britain and Rhodesia, it e scalated
quite rapidly into an international problem,

The United Nations

served not only as the forum where the Rhodesian issue was internationalized, but also where coterminously the nations of the Third
World, especially the African countries, began to develop as a potent , independent political force,
Besides raising the human rights issue of majority rule in
Africa, a continent that had fel t the impact of colonialism for
decade s , the Rhodesian crisis has also (along with the situation in
Angola) led t o the reawakening of United States interests in southern Africa, to greater involvement by the Soviet Union, China, and
Cuba in the area, and to the reshaping of South African foreign policyo

I t has forced the entire world to evaluate the role of sout h-

ern Africa in world affairs and the future of black Africa,
The Rhodesian crisis also mirrors many of the problems characteristic of southern African affairs:

political and economic insta-

bility in the area caused by the circumstances preceding majority
rule, although Rhodesia is unique in that, to this point, it has not
negotiated i ts independence with its mother country; factional infighting characteristic of poli t ical power struggles; severe problems
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faced by African majorities that have been deprived of a key role in
society and the impact of that situation on the future of the nation;
and economic interdependency of the involved nations with South Africa,
There are a tremendous number of variables present in the outcome of the Rhodesian conflict,

United Nations economic sanctions,

by themselves, have been partially successful in initiating white
attempts to bring majority rule to Rhodesia,

More importantly, how-

ever , the guerrilla war , influenced immediately by the African frontline states and South Africa, and potentially by the effects of great
power involvement, will determine the outcome of the drama,

In the

case of Rhodesia, United Nations economic sanctions did not precipitate the desired political objective of majority rule,

While sanc-

tions should not be interpreted as a mechanism for bringing peace
and orderly change to Rhodesia through the reform of the Smith regime,
they should, however, be viewed as an adjunct to the growing assertion of African rights and power,

21

This growing assertion of rights

is not only characteristic of the moderate nationalist and guerrilla
movements aimed at majority rule , but also of the black African
nations who are members of the United Nations and the Organization of
African Unity who have supported the nationalists' cause in the
Rhodesian conflict,

If this assertion of rights is not accommodated

through a negotiated settlement with Ian Smith, or through the
assistance of an outside power, the only way left for political
change to occur in Rhodesia is through violence o That condition now
appears to be more of a probability than a possibility,
While t he resolution of the Rhodesian crisis was initially the
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responsibility of Britain, it was gradually ceded to the United
Nations, although the organization's strategy of economic sanctions
failed to achieve the objective of majority rule in Rhodesia.

The

roles of Britain and the United Nations have now been superceded by
the primary actors in the conflict -- the signatories of the Smith
accord and the Patriotic Front.
While majority rule is inevitable in Rhodesia, it does not look
like that condition will be achieved through Smith's political solution to the crisis.

Despite the fact that United Nations economic

sanctions, in conjunction with an expanded guerrilla war,caused Smith
to seek a political solution , it still appears at this point in time,
however, that a military solution to the problem is the only realistic alternative .

The reason that the continuation of the guerrilla

war seems certain is that the Patriotic Front has not accepted
Smith's political solution -- the internal settlement,

The parti-

cipants in the Smith accord seem confident that they can establish
majority rule in Rhodesia and that they can hold out against the
continuing onslaughts of the Patriotic Front.

Their hope is that if

their transitional government can get the support of the black population through elections, that their regime would be accepted by the
world, and that subsequently , sanctions would be lifted by the
United Nations and that aid would come from the West,

Because the

guerrillas, on the other hand, have been excluded from the internal
settlement, they will try to disrupt the elctions and wreck the signatories' attempts t o legitimate their majority rule.

It appears

that the guerrillas are strong enough to continue the war, and that
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those who will suffer the most will be Rhodesian civilians, both
black and white.
Even if the competing parties were to sit down again at the
negotiating table, it is difficult t o imagine that they could put
aside their past differences and compromise,

One of the obstacles in

the way of a negotiated settlement, according to Kenneth Mufuka, 22 is
the "divergence betwe en African aspirations and European assumptions ,
shared by white Rhodesians, the Americans and the British, as to
what is reasonable and desirable ,"

His point is that the white

Rhodesian-American-British side assumes that a reasonable period of
transition is necessary to avoid political and economic chaos,

The

first assumption is that Africans must be " taught" the arts of government,

The second assumption is that the interests of both blacks

and whites would be served if the economy were kept at least at the
present l evel of production, in order to ease political antagonisms
between blacks and whites,

In order to achieve economic growth, the

presence of whites would be necessary,
Mufuka continues that these assumptions cannot be supported by
facts or logic in the case of Rhodesia . 23 If whites are willing to
teach Africans the arts of government, one must assume that the
nationalists would want to l earn ,

He fe els that having failed to do

this for 88 years, the Europeans would not now be prepared to transmit this knowledge , espe cially t o those Africans in the civil service
bureaucracies,
Ther e is also the question of t rust,

Because of the presence

of f ear, distrust, ent r enched privilege, and racial dominance and
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subordinance in the Rhodesian crisis, any solution will be difficult
to attain.

When one looks at potential negotiations between the

Patriotic Front and the Smith regime, it is difficult to imagine the
forces of moderation winning out in the end.
The future of a Zimbabwean nation is obviously clouded,
ing in Rhodesia in 1959, Colin Leys
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Writ~

commented, perhaps with some

considerable foresight, that
a solution to the country's major problems is
fundamentally impossible within the system,
To solve them is to change it.
The issue is whether or not the changes initiated by Smith,
Muzorewa, Sithole, and Chirau are fundamental enough to solve the
nation's problems .
Front, they are not.
impasse,

Obviously, from the viewpoint of the Patriotic
The Rhodesian situation in 1978 is at an

The resistance of the Smith regime, the devisiveness among

African nationalists, and the inability of Britain, regardless of the
party in power, to resolve the confrontation means that Rhodesia sits
on a powderkeg.
If Britain and Portugal had effectively decolonized their territories in the 1960 1 s, there might not be left-wing regimes in Mozambique and Angola today and a potential one in Rhodesia.

As a result

of these failures in Africa, and in Rhodesia in particular, there is
a unity of purpose among the Soviets, the Chinese, and the Third
World nations to end white minority rule in that region.

The Western

nations, on the other hand, find themselves in a difficult position.
Past policies identified them with the white-ruled nations.
however, in response to the increasing communist influence in

Today,
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southern Africa, Western policies have changed and have moved closer
to the African side,

Great power rivalry in the region has both pro-

duced a change toward Africanization and majority rule while at the
same time creating obstacles to their realization by support of competing groups .
The ultimate solution to the Rhodesian crisis would be a negotiated peace among all competing factions -- the Patriotic Front, the
Smith regime , and the black moderates,

Since this does not appear

likely or even possible in 1978 , or in the foreseeable future, it is
increasingly evident that the parties involved will continue to try
to settle their differences militarily,

The greatest danger stems

from the possibility that the front-line states and South Africa wi ll
undertake actions which will cause a major power confrontation in the
area,
In regard to the Rhodesian crisis, therefore, four very important questions remain:
the problem themselves?

(1) Will the Rhodesians (Zimbabweans) settle
(2) At what point, if any, will the guerril-

las ask for more direct help from the Soviets and/or the Cubans?

(3) At what point, if any , will the African front-line states permit
a situation like that to occur?
West and South Africa react?
to answer,

(4) If it does occur, how will the

These are extreme ly difficult questions

It does appear, however, that the conditions present in

the Rhodesian crisis -- the opposition of the front-line states to
direct major power involvement, the Chinese influence in ZANU and
ZIPA and their desire not to be outdone by Russia like they were in
Angola, and the probability that South Africa will stay out of the

conflict as long as the Cubans do -- will prevent, at least in the
short term, an "Angolan solution" from occurring and allow the primary actors to settle the dispute themselves.

If, however, the

participants in the internal agreement are able to hold elections and
gain a degree of legitimacy, the Patriotic Front might be forced to
take more drastic action by asking for more involvement from the
Russians and the Cubans to help achieve their aims, resulting in further de-stabilization of Rhodesia and southern Africa.

If the

Patriotic Front is successful in mounting future military charges,
thereby forcing Smith and the moderate African nationalists to come
to the negotiating table on their own, further Russo-Cuban involvement is unlikely.
Given the magnitude of danger involved in a major power confrontation or a Cuban-South African conflict, one can only conclude
that a grave responsibility rests with the world community -- inside
and outside the United Nations -- and especially upon the great powers
involved to expedite their efforts to secure a viable settlement to
the conflict.

While those attempts proceed, the world community and

the great powers must recognize that the crisis must be "controlled"
to the extent that it does not worsen and provide circumstances for
potentially catastrophic results.

The record of African anti-colonial

changes since World War II lends credence to the hope that ultimately
some form of compromise solution to the impasse will emerge.
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APPENDIX I
Pertinent Excerpts From Charter
of the United Nations

CHAPTER I--PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES
Article 1
The Purposes of the United Nations are:
1. To maintain international peace and security , and to that end:
to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal
of threats t o the peace, and for the suppression of acts of a ggre ssion or other breaches of the peace , and to bring about by peaceful
means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or
situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;
2, To deve lop friendly relations among nations based on respect
for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples ,
and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;
J, To achieve international cooperation in solving internationa l
problems of an economic, social , cultural, or humanitarian character,
and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion; and
4, To be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the
attainment of these common ends,
Article 2
The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes
stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following
Principles .
1, The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign
equality of all its Members,
2, All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and
benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfil in good faith the
obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter .
J, All Members shall settle their international disputes by
peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and securi ty , and justice, are not endangered,
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any sta t e, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
5, All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in
any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall
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refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United
Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action,
6. The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so
far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace
and security,
7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members
to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but
this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement
measures under Chapter VII,
CHAPTER IV--THE GENERAL ASSD'IBLY
FUNCTIONS AND POWERS
Article 10
The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters
within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and
functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter, and
except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to the
Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both
on any such questions or matters,
Article 11
1. The General Assembly may consider the general principles of
cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security,
including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation
of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such
principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both,
2. The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the
maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by
any Member of the United Nations, or by the Security Council, or by
a state which is not a Member of the United Nations in accordance
with Article 35, paragraph 2, and, except as provided in Article 12 ,
may make recommendations with regard to any such questions to the
state or states concerned or to the Security Council or to both , Any
such question on which action is necessary shall be referred to the
Security Council by the General Assembly either before or after discussion.
J. The General Assembly may call the attention of the Security
Council to situations which are likely to endanger international
peace and security,
4. The powers of the General Assembly set forth in this Article
shall not limit the general scope of Article 10 ,
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CHAPTER V--THE SECURITY COUNCIL
FUNCTIONS AND POWERS
Article 24
1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United
Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and
agree that in carrying out i ts duties under this responsibility the
Security Council acts on their behalf,
2 . In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in
accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.
The specific powers granted to the Security Council for the discharge
of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII.
3. The Security Council shall submit annual and, when necessary,
special reports to the General Assembly for its consideration.
Article 25
The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out
the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present
Charter.
VOTING
Article 27
1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote .
2, Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall
be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.
3, Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall
be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions
under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a
dispute shall abstain from voting .

CHAPTER VI--PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUATES
Article

33

1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security,
shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to
regional a gencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their
own choice.
2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call
upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.
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Article 34
The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a
dispute, in order to determine 'l<rhether the continuance of the dispute
or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international
peace and security,
Article 35
1 • Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute , or
any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly,
2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring
to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly
any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the
purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter.
3, The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of matters
brought to its attention under this Article will be subject to the
provisions of Articles 11 and 12.
Article 36
1, The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the
nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature,
recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment,
2. The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already been
adopted by the parties,
3, In making recommendations under this Article the Security
Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes
should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the
Statute of the Court.
Article 37
1. Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in
Article 33 f ail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article ,
they shall refer it to the Security Council.
2, If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the
dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international
peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under
Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider
appropriate.

Article

38

Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the
Security Council may, if all the parties to any dispute so request,
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make recommendations to the parties wi th a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute,
CHAPTER VII--ACTION WI'IH RESPECT TO THREATS TO
THE PEACE, BREACHES OF 'IHE PEACE,
AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION
Article .39
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat
to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall
make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in
accordance wi th Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security,
Article 40
In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security
Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the
measures provided for in Article .39, call upon the parties concerned
t o comply with such provisional measures as it deems ne cessary or
desirable, Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to
the rights, claims, or posit ion of the parties concerned, The Securi ty Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such
provisional measures,
Article 41
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the
use of armed force are t o be employed to give effect t o its decisions,
and i t may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such
measures, These may include complete or partial interruption of
e conomic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, tel egraphic, radio,
and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic
relations,
Art icle 42
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for
in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate ,
it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security, Such
action may include demonstrations, blockade, and ot her operations by
air, sea, or land forc es of Members of the United Nations,
CHAPTER XI--DECLARATION REGARDING NON-SELF-GOVERNING
TERRITORIES
Article 7.3
Members of the Uni ted Nations which have or assume responsibilit ies
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for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet
attained a full measure of self-government recognize the principle
that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the
utmost, within the system of international peace and security established by the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of
these territories, and, to this end:
a. to ensure, with due respect for the culture of the peoples
concerned, their political, economic, social, and educational
advancement, their just t reatment, and their :protection against
abuses;
bo to develop self-government, to take due account of the
political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the
progressive development of their free political institutions,
according to the particular circumstances of each territory and
its peoples and their varying stages of advancement;
c. to further international peace and security ;
d. to promote constructive measures of development, to encourage research, and to cooperate with one another and, when and
where appropriate, with specialized international bodies with a
view to the practical achievement of the social, economic, and
scientific purposes set forth in this Article; and
e. t o transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for informat ion purposes, subject to such limitation as security and constit utional considerations may require, statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social , and
educational conditions in the territories for which they are respectively responsible other than those territories to which
Chapters XII and XIII apply .
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